

News from behind the IRON CURTAIN

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FEATURES

- The Bulgarian Course
- Economic Report: Albania
- The House of the Seven Windows
- Command Performance
- Infant Communists
- Radio Free Europe



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ABOUT THIS PUBLICATION . . .

NEWS FROM BEHIND THE IRON CURTAIN, published monthly by the Free Europe Press of the Free Europe Committee, is distributed to those with a specific interest in events and developments in Communist-dominated Europe. This bulletin is made available to representatives of the press and other media, to universities, churches, libraries, and research centers, and to other groups of citizens who want to know more about "Communism in practice." The magazine is not an organ of editorial policy; wherever possible direct quotation is used to provide source material and to document commentary. The Committee believes that accurate information contributes to an understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of the Communist system, and hence to the ability of the free nations to combat this system.

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The Month in Review



AS PART OF their current Party Congresses and election campaigns, the Satellite regimes revealed a growing **need to improve farm output**. At the Polish Congress, Party leaders insisted that attention must now be focussed on consumer goods production and particularly on eliminating the serious lag in farm production. The fact that almost one **million tons of grain** had to be **imported** in 1953 was cited as evidence of the present agricultural crisis. The campaign to gain peasant support was reflected in the Party's new membership policy. At present 48 percent of the total membership is composed of workers, while peasant representation amounts to only 13 percent. In the future, the Party will concentrate on **increasing membership in rural areas**, especially by recruiting young people between 18-21, formerly members of the Communist-dominated youth organization, whom the Party intends to use to help eliminate peasant resistance and to overcome farm shortcomings.

In Hungary, the Communist Party Congress, originally scheduled to take place on April 18, was postponed until May 24. The delay may be due partly to agricultural difficulties. Because of failing farm production, the regime held several conferences in March and April attended by kolkhoz members, tractor station workers and members of rural consumer cooperatives. The speeches delivered revealed that independent farmers had not cooperated in boosting production, that work on **kolkhozes** was **far behind schedule**, and that tractor stations had not been able to fulfill their tasks.

Poor farm production was also underscored by Czechoslovak Premier Siroky, who proposed a series of measures to remedy the critical situation which, if it continues, will "endanger" the regime plan to "improve the welfare of the people." At the same time, the government announced that the policy of relieving the domestic food shortage by **increased food imports could not be continued** indefinitely because funds for this purpose were not unlimited. In Romania, the regime took steps to deal with the farm problem by sending **skilled mechanics** and technicians from factories to **tractor stations** to keep farm machinery in working order.

While stressing the importance of increased work discipline, the Satellite regimes implemented the New Course by declaring new **price reductions** on consumer goods items. In Czechoslovakia, the prices were cut on 53,000 items at an alleged yearly savings to the people of 5,600 million *koruny*. At the same time, a large quantity of consumer goods, valued at six billion *koruny*, was released from State stockpiles and made available at the new prices. However, the people were less enthusiastic about the price cuts than was expected. In a radio talk Minister Nejedly revealed that many people considered the price cut a **pre-election maneuver**. Consumers are apparently doubtful that the present level of supply will be maintained, a necessary consequence if the full benefits of the price cuts are to be received. Probably with consumer demands in mind, the regime announced that the 1954 plan would be revised to ensure sufficient quantities of

consumer supplies in 1954 and 1955. But Party leaders cautioned that for some time to come, demand would be greater than supply.

Taking similar steps, the Hungarian regime announced a 10-15 percent **reduction** of the **costs of meat, fat and lard**, and the Bulgarian regime announced a price reduction which presumably will result in yearly savings to the people of 970 million *leva* (\$140 million). Price cuts on industrial goods were larger than those on food, and although the **price of bread** was **reduced** by about 12 percent, the cost of commodities such as milk, butter and cheese remained the same. Meat prices were also reduced but remained relatively high for the average consumer.

Political events behind the Iron Curtain also reflected the New Course. Changes in the Party leadership announced at the Polish Congress were patterned on the Soviet post-Stalin policy of **collective leadership**. Boleslaw Bierut relinquished the post of Premier and, like Matyas Rakosi, now holds the single position of First Party Secretary. Bierut was replaced by Jozef Cyrankiewicz, the only former Socialist to hold an important post in the present government. All other ex-Socialists were demoted to minor posts and replaced by relatively unknown young Communists. The "grey eminence," Jacob Berman, was made a Vice-Premier, and Hilary Minc and Zenon Nowak were promoted to First Vice-Premiers. Although theoretically collective leadership prevails, there is no doubt that Bierut still controls the government as well as the Party.

The new Hungarian Party statutes, published on March 14, revealed a policy of **tighter Party control** to eliminate internal weaknesses. A so-called Central Supervisory Committee will be set up to control work performed by the Central Committee, and county and city Party secretaries will now be appointed by the Central Committee instead of elected as hitherto. Furthermore, the new statutes demand that Party members guilty of violating discipline be expelled and punished. By introducing these restrictions, the Communists evidently hope to make the Party a more efficient regime instrument.

The **Czechoslovak** political scene was dominated by **intensified election propaganda**. For the National Committee elections scheduled on May 16, the regime set up special election commissions in all regions and districts, and established propaganda centers supposed to provide entertainment and make political lectures more palatable to the people. Significantly, regime spokesmen stressed that **all candidates** must be presented and **approved by the Communist-controlled National Front**, which may reject any candidate without explanation. Although the Communists have rigged the elections, they are depending on the pre-election propaganda drive to activate more support of the government.

Despite this large-scale effort to woo the masses, the Prague regime suddenly **postponed elections** to trade union shop committees. These elections were scheduled to form an integral part of the spring election campaign and, according to a Government Act, should have been held before the end of April. This unexpected postponement suggests that either the regime felt the event could not be properly controlled or that it needed more time to gain worker support. Regime difficulties with workers were reflected in numerous press reports complaining about serious losses resulting from the high percentage of production rejects. It was stated that leading industrial establishments produce as much as 20-40 percent in rejects.



Title: . . . the quality of production is poor because the major method in the struggle for quality improvement is shouting.

Caption: The Plan: "With such shoes I won't go very far! . . ."
Sturshel (Sofia), March 5, 1954

The Bulgarian Course

If we do not win the people's support and if we fail to convince them of the correctness of the Bulgarian Communist Party's policy, we will not be able to make use of the great force of the people in our struggle to build a Socialist community in Bulgaria.

Politburo Member Encho Staykov, Radio Sofia,
 March 8, 1954

NINE YEARS of Communist rule and six years of intensive industrialization, collectivization, Sovietization and police terror have left their peculiar mark on Bulgaria. Like all the Soviet Satellites, Bulgaria embarked on a New Course in 1953, but in 1954 the nation showed fewer signs of a change in policy than any other captive country. For a long time Bulgaria has been unique in many ways because it was, in a sense, the "pioneer" captive country. It had the first "People's Republic" constitution, and independent peasants and non-Communist peasant party and government functionaries began to be imprisoned there as early as September 1944. Collectivization was begun sooner and pushed farther and more quickly than elsewhere. A greater percentage of the nation's arable land is in the collectives and the State farms than in the other orbit countries. Industries were nationalized sooner and more thoroughly than in any other present Satellite, and domestic trade was State-monopolized to a greater degree.

The first post-Stalin Party Congress was held in Bulgaria (February 25-March 3), where Communist leaders assembled to review the nation's political and economic situation and to plan and approve directives for the future. The main speeches—delivered by Premier Chervenkov and Vice-Premier Chankov—indicated a moderate amount of "liberalization" but the New Course was only faintly visible. New directives constituted a change only insofar as they did *not* envisage a marked further increase of the ex-

isting disproportions between heavy and light industry and between industrial and agricultural sectors. Previous plans had aimed to transform Bulgaria from an "agricultural" country to an "agricultural-industrial" country. Present plans seem designed primarily to consolidate that transformation rather than further it. Far-reaching changes were few, but the areawide phrase—"sharp improvement in the material and cultural well-being of the masses"—vague though it is, was constantly reiterated.

I. Political Program

The Party's political aims were summed up by Vulko Chervenkov, who elaborated on domestic and foreign policy. Confirming his September 8 announcement, Chervenkov revealed that improving relations with Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia was the Communists' chief strategic move in international affairs.* This policy is intended to offset the effects of the Balkan Pact and give the Communists relief from external pressure at the nation's borders so that they can focus on domestic conditions. Chervenkov lauded recent efforts in this direction—which include transportation agreements with Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia, final demarcation of a common border with Greece, and a Bulgarian-Greek Trade Agreement—and said that his government hopes to re-

* See issues of March 1953, pp. 53-54, November 1953, pp. 44-45, December 1953, p. 48, and March 1954, pp. 50-51.

sume diplomatic relations with Greece in the near future. Perhaps even more significant was Chervenkov's statement about normalizing relations with Yugoslavia* which, since Tito's break with the Cominform in 1948, has been a major target of Satellite attack. Aside from these new tactics in the Balkans the regime's foreign policy goals remain much the same as before. As listed by Chervenkov, they are: "to develop friendship with the Soviet Union; strengthen ties with the People's Democracies . . . ; struggle for peace and the peaceful solution of . . . international problems and support the USSR's peace policy; and to continue efforts to normalize relations with neighboring capitalist states and to develop trade ties with them and other capitalist countries." It should be mentioned that both Chervenkov and Chankov launched attacks against the US.

Domestic Policy

While Bulgarian Communists are faced with the special problem of easing tension in the Balkans, they are also confronted with the general problem, now plaguing Satellite rulers elsewhere in the area, of gaining mass cooperation. With this aim in mind, the regime has slightly softened its attitude towards certain segments of the population. As explained by Chervenkov, the New Course policy is to display a milder front towards private peasants, former Army officers, former political prisoners and other persons previously subjected to harsh persecution. Chervenkov said that "vigilance does not mean suspicion," and insisted that former Army officers should neither be treated as enemies nor left without jobs.** The motive underlying these concessions is to gain the aid of people with specialized knowledge who can contribute to the nation's development. Chervenkov, when referring to the September release of internal political deportees and labor camp inmates, said:***

"I should like to say a few words about former members of the opposition. Some of them have been in prison and are now free. First of all, [these persons] must correctly appreciate the government's decision to pardon them and let them go free. It has been proved that . . . the government is not revengeful. . . . Let those who opposed the People's Government five or six years ago think things over, see whose side justice is on; let them see the developments in the world and in our country, and let them draw conclusions."

To the people in general, Chervenkov promised protection from calumny and slander practiced by Party informers. "Signed and anonymous reports against honest people are a dangerous disease in our development and must be mercilessly eradicated," he said, and those who

indulge in such activities deserve to be "expelled from the Party, removed from responsible posts, and jailed." The terrorist practices of Party and police agents have contributed greatly to the people's distrust of the regime, and by attempting to dispel the atmosphere of suspicion and fear, the Communists hope to win the people's confidence.

The Party

While attempting to gain a greater measure of popular support, the regime has also taken steps to transform the Party into an efficient tool. The new membership policy, as announced by Chervenkov, is to stiffen requirements and emphasize caliber rather than quantity of candidates. Since the last Party Congress in 1948, Party membership has decreased from 495,658 to 455,251 (368,142 regular members and 87,109 candidate members) as a result of purges; the percentage of workers has increased from 26.5 to 34.06 percent, while peasant representation has decreased from 44.74 to 39.76 percent.* Thus, while 75 percent of the people belong to the peasantry, the peasant class comprises only one third of the total Party membership. Although Chervenkov emphasized that kolkhoz members should be enrolled in the Party, it is doubtful that with the present high requirements their ranks will be greatly increased, particularly since the main source of anti-Communist resistance has been in the countryside.

From Chervenkov's analysis of conditions within the Party, two facts are clear: the Party has neither succeeded in gaining mass confidence nor in becoming an adequate instrument for carrying out regime commands. Chervenkov stated frankly that the Party had no grounds for complacency: "capitalist elements" have not been eliminated; bureaucratism still exists; "petty bourgeois and middle-class elements" are strong; and people's "political consciousness lags behind the nation's economic development." The Party's chief task is to overcome these weaknesses by improving ideological work, developing criticism and self-criticism, establishing collective leadership, intensifying and expanding Party activity, and forging closer ties with non-Party workers and mass organizations. Chervenkov summed up present Party shortcomings as *bureaucratism, official-*

Political Work:

" . . . Slighting non-Party people, and refusing to strengthen the ties between Communists and non-Party people is harmful. . . . In spite of successes achieved, mass political work has not yet achieved a permanent character nor included all strata of the working people. . . . Most agitators in villages have inadequate general education . . . and have not mastered the necessary minimum of agro-technical and zootechnical knowledge. . . . Very often [these agitators] turn out to be lagging behind everyone when it is necessary for them to mobilize peasants for fulfillment of economic and political tasks."

Vulko Chervenkov, February 25

* The New York Times reported on April 2 that Bulgaria had approached Yugoslavia to re-open trade relations. This was the first concrete sign of a breach in the economic blockade imposed on Tito's regime by the Cominform in 1948, and may be expected to open the way for similar proposals from other Satellite regimes.

** See April 1954 issue, pp. 53-54. The large-scale purge of 3,500 Army officers began almost immediately after the end of the war, and all but 200 were sent to prison or labor camps.

*** Radio Sofia, February 25.

* Chervenkov, February 25. State employees comprise 17.94 percent and others 8.24 percent of the total Party membership.

dom, negligence, sycophantism, careerism, formalism, egoism, liberalism, greed, theft and waste—conditions, he said, which provide a breeding ground for enemy activity. That inefficiency clogs the State machinery was evident from Chervenkov's comment that the "enemy" had infiltrated almost all economic sectors:

"At present, enemies do not dare act openly against the regime. . . . They stay hidden [although their tactics have not changed and have even intensified]. . . . They sneak into our State machinery, our industry, our transportation, trade, collectives and enterprises. They cunningly try to damage and break machines, squander fuel and electric power, waste raw materials, produce poor-quality and sub-standard goods, misappropriate funds, and hamper fulfillment of State plans."

In view of the need for strict economy in the Second Five Year Plan, it is evident that the regime is counting on the Party to campaign against negligence and passive resistance.

A striking revelation of Party weakness was Chervenkov's admission that local organizations not only commit serious errors, but exhibit "morbid tendencies," such as internal strife, opportunism, complacency and flagrant violation of State commands. Party officials "succumb to anti-State urges and yield to kulak pressure," interfere in the work of State and economic organizations, and suppress criticism by persecuting workers because they fear that criticism will undermine their authority. Even more serious are the signs of factionalism:

"It is imperative that everybody understand that there is no place in the Party for such [warring] elements. Complete and actual unity must be created in our Party from top to bottom. In order to achieve this, we must mercilessly eliminate . . . certain careerists and suspicious elements. . . . We must deal a severe blow to unprincipled cliquishness, to all tendencies to strengthen petty-bourgeois influence . . . and to all enemy attempts to transplant and instill harmful practices alien to our working class and Communism."

In conclusion, Chervenkov insisted that the Party must tighten discipline, extend propaganda work, sharpen revolutionary vigilance, and exercise responsible leadership of the people. That the present leadership is far from satisfactory is more than amply illustrated by Chervenkov's complaint that:

"Some [local] leaders do not know what is happening in international politics; they are not acquainted with the achievements of the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies; they do not know how to find their bearings in our internal situation. Such leaders are unstable and subject to all kinds of extraneous influences. Such leaders go from one extreme to the other, and are never capable of proper leadership."

Considering all the Party diseases listed by Chervenkov, it is clear that radical improvements are required if the Second Five Year Plan is to be successful.

Class Enemy:

"Capitalist elements [which still exist] . . . have not ceased their struggle, and will not stop unless they are finally and resolutely crushed. After having been deprived of their enterprises and capital, these former industrialists, bankers and businessmen, as well as their tools and agents, have not disappeared into thin air. They are still among us. Some of them have found refuge in various plants, enterprises and offices, on construction projects, collectives and machine tractor stations. They have converted themselves into working people, but they have not changed. They have not lost their mortal hatred of the people's regime and Socialism, have not given up their determination to do harm in all possible ways."

Vulko Chervenkov, February 25

II. Economic Program

The economic problems of the country were the main topic of the Sixth Party Congress. Two economic plans—the Two Year Economic Plan (1947-1948) and the First Five Year Economic Plan (1948-1953)—had already laid the foundation of Bulgarian "Socialization." The Second Five Year Plan (1953-1957), in effect since January 1, 1953, but not published, had been intended to pursue the same course. When it was announced early in February, it offered only slight concessions to a lagging agriculture and consumer goods sector. But the State Budget for 1954, announced in the middle of February reflected a growing concern with agriculture. And finally, at the end of the month, at the Party Congress, both Premier Chervenkov and State Planning boss, Chankov, acknowledged for the first time that the past policy of overemphasis of industry at the expense of agriculture had had serious consequences.

Investments

When Premier Vulko Chervenkov originally announced the New Course, he stated that in the Second Five Year Plan the tempo of industrialization would be considerably reduced in order to promote the development of consumer goods production and agriculture. (See October 1953 issue, p. 30). He claimed that within five years workers would be assured of having groceries and other consumer goods, particularly meat, butter, sugar, milk, cheese, clothes, shoes, furniture and kitchen utensils. From an analysis of the Second Five Year Plan, however, it appears that the regime intends no major redistribution of investments but rather increased investments in all branches of the economy. The general purpose of the new program, as indicated in official statements, is to strengthen previous achievements and eliminate specific weak spots; in doing this, the regime is devoting an even greater proportion of investment funds to industrialization than hitherto.

The chief goals of the Second Five Year Plan were outlined by Vice-Premier Georgi Chankov in a speech to the

Party Congress on March 1.* Chankov listed the major industrial targets as increased electric power and coal output and expansion of consumer goods production; in agriculture, the foremost problem is to raise yields and livestock production:

"The great achievements in fulfillment of the first Five Year Plan created conditions which will allow a further development of the Bulgarian national economy in the Second Five Year Plan on the basis of improving the material and cultural welfare of the working class. In order to achieve this, however, it is necessary to achieve a sharp rise in the rural economy and eliminate the lag in livestock breeding. Bulgarian industry must intensify electrification and coal output, improve production of non-ferrous metals, and expand consumer goods production. These are the main tasks of the Second Five Year Plan."

To attain these goals, the regime is increasing capital investments twofold over the First Five Year Plan; investments in industry and agriculture will be increased twofold, and in construction and public institutions threefold. The new investment policy is based on reduction of economic targets and concentration of funds in fewer projects. In this respect, Chankov said: "In spite of the fact that the volume of capital investments in the Second Five Year Plan is almost twice that of the First Five Year Plan, the number of planned projects is much smaller if compared with the previous period."

In the Second Five Year Plan, investments will be allocated as follows, compared to the First Five Year Plan fulfillment (in percentages on the basis of 100)*:

	First Five Year Plan Fulfillment	Second Five Year Plan
Industry	46.8	52.
Agriculture	16.3	13.1
Agricultural Cooperatives	—	8.3
Transport and Communi- cations	17.2	12.
Housing and Living Standard	19.7	14.3

The proportion of investment expenditures in industry is being increased by 5.2 percent and agriculture by 5.1 percent. Closing the gap between agricultural and industrial development is further documented by a comparison of the annual economic plans for 1953 and 1954, as set forth in the "Law of the State Plan for 1954," published in *Rabotnichesko Delo*, April 10, 1954. Capital investment for industry is to increase by 11.8 percent as compared with 1953; and capital investment in agriculture is to

* Sources: Chankov's March 1 speech (Radio Sofia) and *Rabotnichesko Delo* April 30, 1953.

The comparison is complicated by many factors. There are actually three points to be compared: the First Five Year Plan, the First Five Year Plan fulfillment and the Second Five Year Plan. For the First Five Year Plan there are absolute figures; for the First Five Year Plan fulfillment, there are only percentage figures; for the Second Five Year Plan only percentage figures. Furthermore, in comparing these, one must also take into consideration the Bulgarian currency revision (old *leva* to new). An added complication is the fact that the areas of allocation are not clearly demarcated, so that, for example, the 19.7 percent allocated to housing and living standard is never broken down into proper fiscal classifications.

increase by 58.8 (!) percent as compared with 1953. This is further reinforced by the planned volume increases, which call for a heavy industrial increase in volume of 13.9 percent and an agricultural-industrial volume increase of 41.2 percent (!). Vice-Premier Chankov gave no breakdown of investments in light and heavy industry, but it is likely that a large amount of money will be concentrated in the raw material and power base. According to Chankov, as much as 28 percent of the total capital investments earmarked for industry will go to electrification, and coal investments will increase fivefold over the First Plan.

The emphasis now being placed on hard coal output and electrification is an effort to overcome serious power shortages caused by ruthless industrialization. As a result of having overextended their raw material base, the Communists in the Satellite area recently have been forced to limit power consumption in industry as well as households. On February 3, the Bulgarian regime issued a decree stating that industrial enterprises may consume electricity only four days a week; households are permitted to use electricity only for lighting, and each family is allowed a maximum of three kilowatts. Knowing that these shortages will have a damaging effect on production for some time to come, the regime is making an all-out effort to prevent waste. In his speech to the Congress, Chankov harped on the necessity of exercising strict economy in electric power consumption and, referring to the coal situation, he said: "In spite of the [planned] increase in coal production, the coal shortage will continue for quite a time. We must therefore exert all efforts to prevent waste. . . . All coal consumers must apply a strict regime of thrift . . . and must adapt the technical equipment of many plants and enterprises for the use of low calorific coal." Considering these difficulties, it seems unlikely that the regime will be able to effect any immediate rise in production or expansion of consumer goods industries. In view of the recent power cuts, the Communists are in no position to establish new plants or even to run existing ones at normal, not to mention maximum, efficiency.

Light Industry

That improvements in the living standard will depend largely on stepped-up coal and power production was indicated in the plan for light industry. Chankov said that by 1957 the regime envisages a 48 percent increase* in consumer goods production as compared with a 78 percent rise in capital goods production. The reason for the latter's higher rate of increase, he implied, was the need to concentrate first of all on developing the raw material base. "The greater increase in the AAA [capital goods] group is explained by the fact that production of hard coal, electric power, calcinated soda . . . chemical fertilizers, ferrous and non-ferrous metals, and other goods will be considerably stepped up. . . . Our light, local, food and cooperative industries could produce much more, and more cheaply

* The First Five Year Plan ended December 1952 and increases are based on the 1952 level. By 1957, the regime claims that industrial production will total 56.4 percent of overall production. In 1952, it represented 55.9 percent. See March 1954 issue, p. 38.



Title: "In ministries and directions, bureaucratic methods of management are still strong. . . ." (from V. Chervenkov's report).

Caption: Bureaucrats may also be effective rationalizers. (Piles of paper marked "Instructions" litter the place.)

Sturshel (Sofia) March 5, 1954

for the people, if they could rely on a sufficient and uninterrupted electric power supply."

While Chankov elaborated on plans for new electric power projects, he mentioned only few projects connected with expanded consumer goods production (for instance, a new textile combine which is expected to be put into operation before 1957). He stated that the light and food industries would have to be developed and new factories built, but his emphasis was on more efficient production:

"The variety and quality of goods for general consumption are, by far, not proportionate to our possibilities. Arguments to the effect that our machines are old and unproductive are not well-founded. Our light and food industries must be reorganized in such a way that will allow them to produce goods which will answer to the constantly increasing needs and tastes of our people. The struggle for a greater variety of goods and for better quality must become a permanent and very important task for our light and food industries, for Party organizations, and for leading State, economic and Party officials."

As compared with the First Five Year Plan,* light industry in the Second Five Year Plan is marked by a slowdown in tempo. By 1957, textile production must show a 53 percent increase over 1952: cotton fabrics 34.4 percent and woolen fabrics 53 percent. Rubber production must increase by 90 percent, porcelain by 75 percent, production of leather and rubber shoes by 39 percent, and production of glass and furniture must be doubled. However, according to Premier Chervenkov,** in his February 25

* Chervenkov said that consumer goods production had increased twofold over 1948 and that industrial production had increased at an average of 22 percent yearly in the First Five Year Plan.

** Radio Sofia, February 25. Chervenkov also said: "The data for 1939, 1948 and 1952 have been re-estimated according to the unified system established on January 1, 1953, in order that they can be compared with the data for 1953. This explains some differences with respect to the data I gave in my September 8, 1953 speech for 1952 trade. I use this opportunity to stress that all data in this report have been taken from and checked by the Central Board of Statistics."

speech to the Congress, textile production in the First Five Year Plan increased 2.3 times over 1948 and threefold over 1939. Similar increases were effected in sugar, soap and cheese production. The 1954 plan states the light and food industry production must increase 5 percent, while electrification must increase 17.1 percent, and heavy industry 13.9 percent. Despite Chankov's denial that light industrial machinery is dilapidated, few new machines have been provided for consumer goods production in the past ten years and, according to press reports, little repair work has been done. Even assuming that the regime is now allocating funds for light industrial machinery, the large quantity of obsolete machines still in use will continue to hamper consumer goods production for some time to come.*

Agriculture

The regime's agricultural program is designed to insure higher and more stable yields and to increase livestock breeding. In outlining efforts to be made in the next five years, Premier Chervenkov said:

"To continue strengthening the kolkhoz system in rural districts, the collectives, State farms, tractor stations; to ensure rapid elimination of the lag in agricultural development, especially stockbreeding and industrial crops; to insure an increase in the number of cattle, particularly collectively-owned cattle; to insure at the same time an increase in cattle productivity; to create a solid fodder basis and expand animal improvement work [are our goals]. Measures should be taken to insure that, if possible, every collective member's household receives one cow for personal use, thereby helping to cover the needs of our people for animal products and those of

* In any discussion of consumer goods production, it must be remembered that, according to trade agreements, Bulgaria works over raw cotton and other textiles imported from the Soviet Union, and then re-exports the finished products, keeping only a small percentage for internal consumption. The same principle is applied in food, canning, etc., so that under present trade agreements increased consumer production will not greatly benefit the Bulgarian consumer.

our industry for raw materials. To increase the yields of all agricultural crops by further implementing mechanized soil cultivation, by applying modern science and by following the example of our most successful farmers, and by including private farmers in this struggle and giving them assistance."

According to Vice-Premier Chankov, capital investments in agriculture and stockbreeding will be 2.3 times greater than in the First Five Year Plan—amounting to more than three billion *leva* (\$450 million)*—and production of agricultural machinery will be doubled. Industrial crop production will be centered in cotton, sugar beets and tobacco. The planned increases are: cotton fourfold, sugar beets about threefold, and oriental tobacco twofold. In addition, wheat production is to increase 14 percent over 1952 and grain fodder crops by at least 80 percent.

The serious livestock shortage was recently underscored by Chervenkov, Chankov and Minister of Agriculture Stanko Todoroff, who admitted on December 1, 1953** that although collectives own 60.5 percent of the arable land, they own only 22.3 percent of the cattle population, 28.8 percent of the sheep, and 13.3 percent of the hogs. In other words, the private sector of agriculture still supplies the bulk of animal products, despite the fact that it constitutes less than half the arable land and peasant households in Bulgaria. Further, Chankov revealed that by the end of the Second Five Year Plan, livestock breeding will reach only the 1939 level. In absolute figures this means that by 1957 there must be 2,100,000 head of cattle, 2,200,000 pigs, and 9,700,000 sheep. Chankov said that the number of horses in collectives and State farms, as compared with the total number in the country, must increase from 43.5 percent in 1952 to 63 percent in 1957. Cows and steers must increase from 25 to 45.4 percent, water buffalo from 9.6 to 22 percent, sheep from 32 to 47.6 percent, hogs from 17.6 to 41.4 percent, and poultry from 12 to 26.8 percent. These figures indicate that even by the end of 1957, collectives will still own less than half of the nation's livestock, and that at present they own only one fourth of the cattle and sheep and one seventh of the nation's hogs. The current shortage is even more striking if one takes into account the fact that in 1939 the livestock population figures did not include Southern Dobrudja, which contains the best farm land in the country and is famous for its cattle.

Independent farmers own most of the nation's livestock because the regime's collectivization drive was concentrated in the large, fertile plains of Northern Bulgaria*** (Dobrudja and the Danubian plain) and in the Southwest (Stara Zagora, Yambol and Burgas), where huge areas of pasture and fodder-growing lands were used by the TKZS for intensive crop production, particularly industrial plants. The majority of independent farms are in the Balkan and sub-Balkan regions, where it is easier to secure

fodder, especially green fodder, in the forest clearings. The livestock problem has been aggravated further by peasant attempts to hide and slaughter livestock in order to reduce their delivery quotas and fodder obligations. The regime is therefore concerned particularly with boosting stockbreeding on collectives, which can be subjected to close Party control.* Owing to peasant resistance, the regime was forced to take a livestock census three times in 1953, and from recent information in the Party press, conditions apparently have not improved since then. The following report on the Plovdiv region, which used to be the richest area in cattle and fowl, typifies the present state of affairs:

"Stockbreeding for personal use . . . is in poor condition. Out of 61,738 households, 29,613 do not own even a single cow, water buffalo or goat; 13,048 households have no pigs; 23,726 households have only one chicken, and 39,812 have no fowl at all. Yet the Statute allows each household belonging to the collective one cow, two goats, up to five sheep with their lambs, two pigs, and an unlimited number of fowl, for which reason, they can use up to five decares of land for their personal needs."***

In an effort to increase the livestock population, the regime announced a farm expansion program on October 13, 1953.*** According to this plan, the area sown with fodder crops in 1954 will be increased by at least 100,000 hectares, and the forestry board will supply the Agricultural Ministry with 500,000 hectares of pasture land from highlands and forest lands to serve as a State pasture reserve. However, Vice-Premier Chankov indicated that the problem of increasing the fodder-producing area is still serious. "By 1957," he said, "the area producing green and fresh fodder must reach no less than 630,000 hectares, and the area producing grain fodder 1,230,000 hectares [i.e., a total of 1,860,000 hectares]." Taking into account the planned increases in grain and industrial crops as well, it would seem that the regime hopes to extend the cultivated land area considerably. However, Premier Cherven-

Kulaks:

"The position of the kulaks as a class has been strongly undermined. The capitalist elements in the villages are subjected to continuous limitation and liquidation. Their number in the rural economy is becoming smaller and smaller. . . . Collectives are taking a dominating position. . . . The ties between poor and middle peasants are growing stronger. The collectives are making possible the complete liquidation of capitalist elements . . . and the total victory of Socialism in the rural economy. On this basis, the union between workers and peasants . . . the moral and political unity of the working people led by the Communist Party, is being continuously consolidated."

Vulko Chervenkov, February 25

* Independent farmers suffer more from these quotas than collective peasants whose obligatory deliveries of milk, wool and meat are smaller.

** *Otechestven Glas* (Plovdiv), February 23, 1954.

*** November 1953 issue, p. 9.

* This figure does not include investments in collective farms.

** *Zemedelsko Zname* (Sofia), December 2, 1953. See March 1954 issue, pp. 15-17.

*** See March 1954 issue, p. 18.

kov indicated that little land was available, when on February 25 he said:

"In 1952, the surface planted with all types of crops increased by 290,000 hectares as compared with 1948, and by 307,000 hectares as compared with 1939. In 1953, the area planted with cereals amounted to 91.7 percent of the surface planted with such crops in 1939. This decrease is due to the great increase in the area sown with industrial crops, which was achieved at the expense of cereal crops."

Chervenkov had also commented on the land situation in his September 8 speech. He said that the area sown with cereals was 3,400,000 hectares in 1939 and 3,157,000 hectares in 1952. Within this period, the surface sown with industrial crops had increased from 332,342 to 600,000 hectares.* Furthermore, at the end of 1952, there were 2,747 collectives in the country comprising 2,512,000 hectares or 60.5** percent of the arable land. This means that the total arable land in Bulgaria should be 4,152,000 hectares. However, Chervenkov maintained that in 1948, collectives comprised 292,000 hectares, or 6.2 percent of the arable land—which, in that case, should have totalled 4,716,000 hectares.


The difference between these figures only proves again the unreliability of Communist statistics. Assuming that the actual arable land is 4.62 million hectares (as quoted by *Statistika*, 1948), regime plans for land cultivation are extravagant. If, by 1952, 3.75 million hectares were devoted to industrial and cereal crops, and if, by 1957, fodder crops are to comprise 1.86 million hectares, it is clear that, even without taking into account planned increases in industrial and cereal crop cultivation, Bulgaria would presumably have 5.6 million hectares of arable land. In short, the regime requires some one million more hectares than it says it has to carry out its present plans.

Collectivization and Concessions

Although Chervenkov stated that the regime now intends to aid private farmers in its effort to bolster farm production, the concessions granted to peasants in the New Course have been more moderate than those granted elsewhere in the captive area. The reasons for this can be explained partly by the fact that collectivization is far more

* Radio Sofia, September 8.

** This figure is definitely misleading. If the figure given for the total amount of hectareage included in the kolkhozes is correct, then the percent of total arable land included in the kolkhozes should be approximately 51.7 percent. The only other possibility is that the total amount of land classified arable might have been decreased, by a paper transaction. The figures for 1950 and 1949 indicate that the total amount of land classified as arable at that time was approximately 4.87 million hectares. Using the 1953 figure, the total amount of arable land would equal 4.15 million hectares. These figures compare to a total of 4.62 million hectares of arable land for 1946 given in *Statistika* (Sofia) 1948. It is doubtful that the total arable land area has actually decreased, since the regime constantly boasts of the achievements in reclaiming land. In all probability this figure was jacked up to conform with the percentage of arable land supposed to be collectivized under the Five Year Plan (60%)—which was reported to have been completed and successfully fulfilled at the end of 1952, one year ahead of schedule.



Title: Some farmers consciously cripple pure breed calves and slaughter them so that they have more milk left for free market sale.

Caption: The door is marked with signs reading "No Smoking" and "Veterinary."
The calves to each other: "What are you sick from?"
"From the ax. And you?"
"From the shovel!"

Sturshel (Sofia), March 12, 1954

advanced in Bulgaria than in the other Satellites. The "kulak" class was virtually eliminated in the 1946 land reform and few farmers can be classified as middle peasants.* Some concessions, however, have been made to encourage livestock breeding. These applied primarily to collective farmers and included the lowering of meat, milk and wool delivery quotas for kolkhozes and kolkhoz members, reduction of income taxes, irrigation taxes and insurance premiums, cancellation of certain debt arrears, and increased financial aid in 1954. Certain independent farmers benefitted from cancellation of debt arrears and reduction of irrigation taxes and wool delivery quotas, but in general these measures were designed to make kolkhoz farming more attractive to the independent peasantry.

Changes in the field of grain deliveries also revealed the regime's focus on the collective sector. On December 25,** the regime cut compulsory grain deliveries for the private plots of collective farmers on an average of 66 percent. Payment in kind to machine tractor stations (used exclusively by collectives) was cut from 25 to 50 percent. At the same time, compulsory grain delivery quotas for independent farmers were raised. By this means the regime intends to force independent farmers to merge their small, uneconomical holdings, join collectives, or shift production from grain to vegetables or industrial crops, such as tobacco, cotton, oilseeds and flax. Hay delivery quotas were also raised considerably for both private farmers and collectives, but the private plots of kolkhoz members were exempted.

The regime's attitude towards independent farmers was

* See March 1954 issue, pp. 14-18, and November 1953 issue, p. 9.

** *Izvestia* (Sofia), December 25.

enunciated by Vice-Premier Chankov, who said that they must be considered future kolkhoz members. The current policy, however, is to exploit private farm production.

"It is known that the Socialist sector is predominant in our rural economy. But this does not mean that the private sector does not play an important role. . . . We should not forget that private farms represent no less than 47 percent of the total number of farms in the country. They supply about 30 percent of grain deliveries and contain more than half the cattle and domestic animals. . . . While our Party's general line calls for universal and many-sided support and strengthening of collectives, the Party has assisted and will continue to assist private farmers because they are not only important producers . . . but future kolkhoz members."

Work Productivity

Coordinate with the current emphasis on easing conditions for the masses, the regime is relying on a large increase in worker productivity. According to the Party Directives on the Second Five Year Plan, published in *Rabotnichesko Delo* (Sofia), March 6, 1953, the Communists estimate that with mechanization, work reorganization, intensified "Socialist competitions," and more highly skilled labor, work productivity in 1957 will increase over 1952 by 35 percent in industry, 45 percent in building, 16 percent in transportation, 39 percent in State industry, and no less than 30 percent in retail trade. Increased labor productivity combined with strict economy is expected to bring about a 16 percent decrease of production costs in industry, 15 percent in transportation and 35 percent in State Farms. On the basis of these plans, the regime claims that by 1957 the national income will be 60 percent higher than it was in 1952—a rather optimistic estimate considering past experiences in worker absenteeism and bureaucratic waste.

Vice-Premier Chankov explained that productivity increases will be made possible by machinery imports from the Soviet Union and other Satellites. However, if the 1957 targets in production and work productivity are compared, the large gap between them suggests that the regime has overestimated future achievements: not only is it improbable that a sufficient number of machines will be provided to make up the difference between productivity and production targets, but it is also doubtful that the skilled labor to run these machines and cut production costs will be available:

Sector	Labor Productivity Increases (in percent)	Production Increases (in percent)
Industry	35	60
Building Materials	45	80
Transportation		
Railroads		50
Waterways	16	77
Trucking		200
Retail Trade	30	70

Кар. Г. Анастасов



Title: A conversation with the President of the Chervena Voda TKZS (Russe County).

Caption: — Did you receive the Plan?
— Yes, we did. Now we have to look it over.
— Do you have the seeds?
— Sure, now they only have to be cleaned.
— And how is the cattle?
— Fine, only now we have to feed them.
— How about the horse and oxen harnesses?
— We must fix them.
— Where is the agricultural machinery?
— It's here. The snow must melt first, otherwise you cannot see it.
— Otherwise we are fine. What do you think?
— You are all right. But the job must be fulfilled by itself.

That the regime is depending primarily on strict labor discipline for fulfillment of the Second Five Year Plan was indicated by Chankov when he said:

"So far our raw material expenditure norms and our labor norms have not been based on progressive technology. As a result, large overexpenditures of raw material and the wage fund were allowed to occur. It is absolutely necessary that the practice of underrating the importance of scientifically-fixed norms be liquidated. We must intensify the struggle for strict adherence to technological discipline."

The Party Directives stated the matter even more bluntly in an appeal to all Party organizations, Trade Unions, People's Councils, Fatherland Front and Youth Organizations "to secure full mobilization of the working class and peasant forces, as well as the people's intelligentsia, for fulfillment of the plan . . . to intensify Socialist competition, increase vigilance, . . . and to strengthen even more State and labor discipline."

Living Standard

Shortly after the Party Congress ended, the regime announced price reductions on foodstuffs and consumer goods. This measure, the most concrete step to improve the people's living standard in the New Course,* was apparent.

* In December the regime remitted back insurance fees and dues owed to the State; in February, it announced that it would help collective and private artisans. But neither decree was far-reaching. See March 1954 issue, pp. 51-52.

Ideology:

"The Augean stable of bourgeois ideology has not been properly and fully cleaned. We must not forget that we are working in an atmosphere where bourgeois ideology still has not lost its class significance and is widespread. This significance is growing in certain sectors as a result of our negligence. . . . Domination of Marxism-Leninism on the ideological front must be strengthened . . . by showing concrete evidence to the effect that Marxism-Leninism has incomparable logical and scientific advantages over any other ideology."

Vulko Chervenkov, February 25

Criticism:

"One must not employ the practice of dismissing people for the smallest error. . . . Criticism of errors and shortcomings must not always be accompanied by disciplinary measures. Criticism is there to help us correct matters, to learn from past experiences and to work better in the future. Criticism has become a driving force in our development. Who will criticize us if we do not criticize ourselves? If we do not criticize ourselves, we will disintegrate, rot, become infested with weeds; we will destroy our great cause." Vulko Chervenkov, February 25

ently designed to demonstrate the regime's "benevolent intentions." The Party decree, published in *Rabotnichesko Delo* (Sofia), March 28, cut the price of bread and flour by 12 percent; animal fats by six percent; beef and veal by five percent; lamb by ten percent; wiener sausage by six percent; salami by ten percent; ham by eight percent; potatoes by 13 percent; dried plums by ten percent; wines and brandies by ten percent; cotton and woolen fabrics by 25 percent; hosiery by 25 percent; footwear by five percent; and furniture by 12 percent. The price cuts on food are less significant than those on textiles and, considering the exorbitantly high prices of meat (See July 1953 issue, pp. 28-29) and the shortcomings in animal husbandry, will only slightly relieve Bulgarian consumers.

The regime claimed that this price reduction would result in an alleged annual savings to the people of 970 million *leva* (\$140 million). This measure followed an earlier price reduction on August 2 (see September 1953 issue, pp. 24-25), which supposedly raised the national purchasing power by 900 million *leva* (\$130 million). However, it is significant that immediately prior to the Congress, the Communists floated a new compulsory State loan. This step, announced on February 9, reduced the subscribers' purchasing power by some 8.5 percent (each worker had to subscribe to at least a month's pay).^{*} Thus, the State loan offsets to some extent the benefits derived from reduced consumer prices. According to a February 12 government announcement, subscriptions to the State loan had "exceeded regime expectations" and had amounted to a total of 501,330,000 *leva*. Furthermore, even with these price reductions, the average Bulgarian citizen must still pay an excessively large part of his wages for food and clothing.

The ratio between investments in the various sectors of the economy—heavy industry, light industry and agriculture—remain fairly constant in Bulgaria with the exception of a great investment increase in the fuel and power base and in housing construction. However, literal acceptance of the Communist plan targets and statistics would be

exceedingly naive. Discrepancies appear throughout—often in the same paragraph of a speech or report—and are especially contradictory, or incomprehensible, in the planned increases for consumer goods. Firm conclusions must therefore wait on more evidence, particularly on evidence of what is *actually done*, rather than planned, in the Second Five Year Plan.

Chervenkov's 34,000-word, six-hour report to the Sixth Party Congress showed that the Bulgarian Communist regime had more problems in all sectors than it could handle. The Premier made thoroughgoing criticism of all aspects of the economy and polity. In industry he scored administrative, production and financial difficulties, particularly inadequate variety and defective and substandard goods, overexpenditure of wage funds, poor cost accounting, unrealistic norms, high labor turnover, inefficient use of production funds, bureaucratic leadership and management, nonrhythmic production, improper analysis and application of new industrial techniques, poor maintenance and lack of full use of machine plant. In agriculture, he flayed frequent changes and corrections of plans, inadequate crop rotation and use of forest belts to prevent soil erosion, inadequate use of fertilizer and irrigation, poor MTS work and bad maintenance and use of MTS machinery, as well as lack of spare parts. Everywhere, he criticized inadequate experience in managing large-scale collective economy, negligence toward "Socialist" property, waste, improper use of means, men and material, and general organizational and technical irresponsibility.

And throughout, there were no solutions he had to offer other than intensified Party activities and criticism and self-criticism. It was fairly obvious that, like the other Communist regimes, the Bulgarian one was anxious to stabilize internal and external relations, but that could be done only by a price the Communists will not pay—restoration of certain basic liberties at home and relinquishing of imperial outposts abroad. Much as they insisted—in their own peculiar jargon—that they wanted to "normalize" relations with their own people and with the Free World, their authoritarian system and their dictatorial leadership would not permit it.

^{*} See April 1954 issue, p. 54.

Economic Report: Albania

ALBANIA, the least known and most remote of the Satellites, more than any other country in the Soviet orbit resembles an overseas province of the USSR. Despite a population of 1.2 million and considerable natural resources, Albania has always been an economic liability, a condition unaltered by Communist domination. Its industrial expansion is dependent on receipt of capital goods and equipment from other Satellites. Its agriculture is patterned on the USSR, with Soviet-type corn and cotton planted exclusively and Soviet irrigation, cultivation and planting methods used. More than any other Satellite, Albania is overrun by Soviet technicians and advisors, and of course, all official announcements credit the USSR for its "brotherly help."

I. Planning

Coordinated planning was formally inaugurated in 1948 with a One Year Plan, and followed by a Two Year Plan in 1949. The planning and investment program was originally directed by Yugoslavia* but after Tito's break with the Cominform (1948), Albania's economic plans had to be drastically overhauled. According to *Bashkimi* (Tirana), April 1, 1952, the Two Year Plan was only fulfilled by 91.4 percent, a fact attributed to "Yugoslav sabotage." Significantly, the Plan failure was in petroleum, refined oil, soap, leather, shoes, and wood products. When the Plan was completed, a new ambitious Five Year Plan was promulgated (1951-1955) calling for great economic expansion. Three main lines were developed in the Plan:

* Albania was for a time considered a Yugoslav sphere of influence, the nucleus of an area Tito hoped subsequently to incorporate into a Balkan federation. Yugoslavia assisted Albania both in industrialization and in transportation development. Even the lion's share of armed forces expenditure was paid by Yugoslavia (according to Yugoslav Vice Premier Kardelj), so that Albania could otherwise allocate its meager investment resources.

1. to further increase consumer goods production facilities by expanding existing facilities, particularly in sugar refining, textile manufacture, petroleum refining and handicrafts;

2. to improve Albania's balance of payments position by expanding raw materials production (mineral and agricultural) and those processing industries which could be counted on to provide exports;

3. to improve Albania's retarded educational development.

As in the other Satellites, Albania under Soviet (*Kommon*) pressure was forced to stress industrialization. Owing to the limited means at its disposal, it was impossible for Albania to do so to the same degree the more developed Satellites did. Instead, Albania attempted—under Soviet supervision—to concentrate on consumer goods and mineral production, initiated prior to or during the war. Particular emphasis was placed, significantly, on petroleum production and refinement.

In a speech on the Five Year Plan, Albanian Vice Premier Mehmet Shehu declared that Albanian industrial production had increased four times between 1938 and 1950. The following table taken from his speech (*Bashkimi*, April 1, 1952) shows the relationship between capital goods production (including small tools) and consumer goods production in millions of *leks* at 1950 prices.

Industrial production was reported to have increased at

	1938	1946	1947	1948	1949	1950	Plan 1955
industrial production	826	801	1,317	2,101	2,527	3,266	*11,100
consumer goods	640	584	913	1,575	1,930	2,505	8,131
capital goods	186	217	404	526	597	761	2,941

* Probably rounded figure.

an average annual rate of 10.5 percent during the Albanian Two Year Plan (1949-1950) but during the Five Year Plan (1951-1955), annual growth was scheduled to be 27.7 percent. By the end of the Plan, therefore, industrial production would presumably be more than tripled. The following table compares the annual goals under the Five Year Plan with actual production figures (where available) in billions of *leks* at 1950 prices.*

	Five Year Plan Goal	Revised Annual Goal	Actual Production
1950	—	—	3.266
1951	4.18	4.56	4.80
1952	5.34	5.44	5.76
1953	6.82	7.48	7.03
1954	8.71	8.06	—
1955	11.10	—	—

The above chart indicates how Albanian industrial planning has evolved during recent years. During the first three years of the Plan, industrial goals were revised upwards so that they were actually scheduled to increase 30 percent annually rather than 27.7 percent. During the first year of the Plan (1951), industrial production was reported to have increased even faster, at a rate of 47.1 percent. However, the rate of increase the second year (1952) was slightly less than 20 percent. During the third year (1953) industrial production actually fell below the revised annual goal, although it exceeded the original Plan goal by 3.1 percent. Industrial production during 1953 was still below the projected 27.7 percent and was reported to have reached 22 percent, well below the 30 percent revised annual average increase. A real scaling-down of industrial production goals was not clear until the 1954 budget announcement, where it was stated that industrial production was scheduled for only a 14.7 percent increase.

During the twelve year period (1938-1950), agricultural production was reported to have increased only 30 percent although it was scheduled to increase 70 percent during the Five Year Plan at an annual rate of 11 percent. The following table charts the relationship of industrial to agri-

cultural production (in percentages) and compares it with the 1955 planned goal.*

	Industrial Production	Agricultural Production
1938	18.3	81.7
1946	16.2	83.8
1947	21.3	78.7
1948	29.2	70.8
1949	35.5	64.5
1950	40.6	59.4
1953	59.6	40.4
1955 (Plan)	57.5	42.5

Under the Five Year Plan the proposed ratio for 1955, 57.5 percent for industry to 42.5 percent for agriculture, had already been further accentuated in favor of industry by 1953. This situation is further demonstrated by the following chart which compares agricultural and industrial production with total production in billions of *leks* at 1950 prices.*

	1938	1950	1953	Plan 1955
industrial production ..	0.826	3.266	7.030	11.100
agricultural production ..	3.688	4.778	4.770	8.200
total production	4.514	8.044	11.800	19.300

The above table indicates that agricultural production has not advanced since the beginning of the Plan in 1950, and may in fact have decreased, and that total production is considerably below the half-way Plan mark although the Plan is three years old. Possibly New Course policies will narrow the industrial agricultural gap and this is born out somewhat by the announced increases in agricultural investment. Radio Tirana, April 13, 1954, announced that 32 percent more investments than in 1953 would be allocated to agriculture and that the proposed increase in industrial production for 1954 would be lessened.

Although the figures for industrial production seem impressive, it must be remembered that they are gross figures and probably include a considerable proportion of processing. The regime also classifies such things as mining and handicrafts as industrial undertakings, which further complicates the meaning of the statistics. Perhaps most revealing is the fact that it is estimated that at the end of 1955, at least 70 percent of the Albanian working population will still be employed in agriculture.

Investment

The general pattern of investment originally set for Albania under Yugoslav guidance emphasized industrial, mining and transport investments. The present plan also calls for a greater proportion of investments to be devoted to industry and mining and slightly less to agriculture. The former emphasis on transport investment has been abated.**

* Sources: Mehmet Shehu speech, *Bashkimi*, April 1, 1952; Radio Tirana, June 4, 1952; Hysni Kapo speech, Radio Tirana, November 28, 1953.

** This is to some extent logical since it was in the Yugoslav interest to develop communications and transport in extending its control over Albania.

* Sources: Annual Five Year Plan goal figures are computed at an annual production increase of 27.7 percent as set forth for the Five Year Plan (Radio Tirana, June 4, 1952). Actual production figures for 1950 were taken from *Bashkimi*, April 1, 1952, while 1951 figures were computed on the basis of production increasing 47.1 percent over 1950 (*Bashkimi*, February 12, 1952). The 1951 annual goal was computed on the basis of the 1951 industrial production plan being fulfilled by 105.4 percent (Radio Tirana, February 10, 1952). Production for 1953 was computed on the basis of "the production plan was fulfilled 94.3 percent, 122 percent as compared with 1952, and 103.1 percent as compared with the third year of the Five Year Plan" (Radio Tirana, February 13, 1954). The actual production figure for 1952 was computed on the basis of the 1952 plan being fulfilled by 105.8 percent (Radio Tirana, June 4, 1952). The revised goal for 1952 was computed on the basis of actual 1952 plan fulfillment, and from a revised 30 percent increase over the original Five Year Plan goal for 1951 (Radio Tirana, March 29, 1953). The revised goal for 1953 was computed on the basis of actual 1953 production results and of a 30 percent increase over actual production in 1952. The revised goal for 1954 is computed on the basis of the statement that "in 1954, industrial production will be 14.7 percent higher." (Tuk Jakova's Budget Report, Radio Tirana, April 13, 1954.)

The Pattern of Albanian Investment*

	1946/50 Actual		1951/55 Planned		1951/55 as % of 1946/50
	Value	% of total	Value	% of total	
Total Investments	6,824	100.0	20,943	100.0	306.9
Industry & Mining	2,136	31.3	8,943	42.7	418.7
Agriculture	961	14.1	2,821	13.5	293.5
Transportation	2,410	35.3	3,002	14.3	124.6
Social & Cultural	780	11.4	3,460	16.5	443.6
Not Allocated	537	7.9	2,717	13.0	506.0

As New Course policies throughout the orbit have called for reducing the gap between industry and agriculture, and as all recent Plan reports and budgetary announcements call for increased agricultural investment, it seems likely that the proportion of agricultural investment will be increased in the future, and has been slightly increased in the past year. The above table compares Albanian investments during the 1946-1950 period (in millions of *leks* at 1950 prices) with those contemplated under the Five Year Plan.

The 1952 Plan fulfillment report (Radio Tirana, February 4, 1953) revealed that the proposed volume of investment for 1952 was fulfilled by only 87.3 percent. Proposed investments in industry were fulfilled by 116.7 percent, for mining 79.6 percent, for education 94.6 percent, and for agriculture only 70.5 percent, indicating how severely agricultural investments were cut back while industrial investments were expanded. Nonetheless, 1952 agricultural investments were 29.6 percent greater than 1951, while industrial investments were 7.5 percent less. Overall investments during 1952 showed a 28.4 percent increase over 1951. Proportionate to overall investment, then, agricultural investment increased only slightly.

In this connection, and in general investment policy, it is important to remember that in Communist economies the percentage of national income devoted to investment was usually increased from year to year until the inception of the New Course. At that time, it was stated that the percentage of national income devoted to investment would remain constant, but the volume of investment would increase proportional to the increase in national income.

The 1953 Plan report (Radio Tirana, February 15, 1954) stated that in 1953 the general volume of investments was fulfilled by 108 percent over 1952. If the 1952 investment plan was fulfilled by only 87.3 percent, then the 1953 investment plan was even less fulfilled. The Five Year Plan called for a 106 percent increase in the national income by the end of 1955, an eight percent increase in the annual volume of investments hardly proportional to the proposed annual increase of national income. The report also pointed out that the 1953 volume of agricultural investment was equivalent to 138.7 percent of 1952. This is considerably less than the 99 percent increase called for under the 1953 budget (Radio Tirana, March 29, 1953). Moreover, the 1952 agricultural investment plan was only 70.5 percent fulfilled. The following chart traces the

development of agricultural investments with respect to total investment since the beginning of the Five Year Plan.†

	Total Investment		Agricultural Investment		
	Volume	Plan Fulfillment	Volume	Value (million of <i>leks</i>)	Plan Fulfillment
1951	100.0	—	100.0	285.1	—
1952	128.4	87.3%	129.6	369.5	70.5%
1953	138.7	—	179.8	512.5	—
1954 (Plan)	—	—	237.3	676.0	—

The large increase in the volume of agricultural investment since 1951 is chiefly the result of the very small amount of funds originally devoted to agricultural investment in that year. If the total sum earmarked for 1954 agricultural investment were actually invested, it would mean that a total of 1,843.1 million *leks* was invested in agriculture during the first four years of the Plan. This would leave almost one billion *leks* still to be allocated to the agricultural sector for 1955 (the last year of the Five Year Plan), which is highly unlikely. It is also relevant to remember that the Five Year Plan was computed at 1950 prices, while the annual budgetary figures are computed at current prices.

Public Finance

The current 1954 budget anticipates lower expenditures and receipts than those planned for 1953. This is a result of implementation of various New Course policies. For example, the 1954 budgetary announcement (Radio Tirana, April 13) stated that "taxes will be reduced 137 million *leks* as compared to last year; those on collective farms will be reduced 20 percent," which, in turn, means that State income will be reduced and budgetary expenditures therefore comparably scaled down. Other New Course policies that would be bound to effect State receipts similarly are: decrease of compulsory State delivery quotas, raising of State purchase prices for agricultural commodities, reduction of consumer prices, sale of some consumer goods to farmers at reduced prices, etc.

The chart on the following page traces budgetary receipts and expenditures since the implementation of the Five Year Plan. Actual expenditures and receipts are generally slightly below those originally planned for.

† Sources: Radio Tirana, February 5, 1953, February 15, 1954, April 13, 1954.

* Source: *Bashkimi*, April 3, 1952.

Distribution of Income and Expenditure in the Albanian State Budget*

	1951	1952		1953		1954
	Actual	Plan	Actual	Plan	Actual	Plan
State Income	9,500	10,300	9,400	11,350	10,340	10,200
Supplied by Socialized Sector of Economy	**3,750 (slightly under 40%)	4,635 (45%)	4,982 (53%)	**6,243 (more than 55%)	5,630 (55.8%)	6,732 (66%)
State Expenditure	9,100	10,200	9,380	11,250	9,760	9,900
Expenditure on National Economy	2,988 (32.8%)	***3,995 (39%)	3,800 (40.5%)	5,437 (48.8%)	—	—
Social and Cultural Services	1,526 (16.8%)	2,225 (23%)	2,150 (22.9%)	2,400 (21%)	—	2,000 (20%)
National Defense	1,056 (11.6%)	1,122 (11%)	—	1,250 (10%)	—	1,128 (11%)
Local Budgetary Expenditures	—	—	1,400 (14.9%)	†1,834 (16%)	—	1,716 (17.3%)

* Sources: Radio Tirana, March 3, 1952, March 28, 1953, March 29, 1953, April 13, 1954. Statistics given in million of *leks*.

** Estimated.

*** It was stated that an additional 415.5 million *leks* was being appropriated for financing of investments.

† The 1953 local budgetary allocation was divided as follows: 42 percent to the people's economy, including 560.2 million *leks* for local investments and 229.5 million *leks* for housing, and 44 percent for education and health.

Analysis of the above table indicates that:

1. The percentage of State income derived from the "Socialized sector" of the economy is increasing steadily. This is the result of increased investments in State and local industry, increased collectivization of agriculture and handicrafts, and the "Socialization" of internal trade. Although a complete breakdown of government receipts is not available, State revenue derived from the people at large during 1951 (taxes, etc.) was reported as approximately 12 percent (Radio Tirana, March 3, 1952). However, a considerable portion of the income contributed by the "Socialized sector" is derived indirectly from high State profits from the sale of consumer goods, equipment and services by the State to the people. In addition, the people are also forced to contribute to the compulsory State loans used to finance the budget. The report further stated that regime revenue from imports during 1951 and 1952 was 15 and 20 percent respectively. The imports were "contributions and aid afforded by the USSR and the People's Democracies." What Albania had to give in exchange for this "aid" was not made public.

2. Expenditures for the national economy include all expenses connected with the operation, development and investment of the national industries and agriculture. Under this heading are all investments affecting the economy as a whole. For example, the 1952 budget provided for

financing several important enterprises of the Five Year Plan such as the Nako Spiro Timber Combine in Elbasan, the rice-cleaning factory in Valona, the cotton factory in Rrogozhina, the Shkodra tobacco-curing factory, and the Peqin-Kavaja irrigation canal. Similarly, in 1953, the budget provided for the following Five Year Plan investments: 413.5 million *leks* for the Enver hydroelectric power station, 399.3 million *leks* for a petroleum refinery, 195 million *leks* for a cement factory, and 325.5 million *leks* for improving irrigation canal projects (Myzeqe, Viosa-Levan, Korca Fields, and the completion of Peqin-Kavaja).

3. The proposed 1954 budgetary allotment for social and cultural expenditures is being decreased both percentage-wise and monetarily as compared to 1952 and 1953.

4. Under the heading of local budgetary expenditures, the State includes all provincial, municipal and district administrative expenses, as well as investments in local economy. For example, a portion of the social and cultural allocations of the State budget is contributed to the local budgets, the balance remaining in the national budget. In the 1953 State budget, 5.2 percent was allocated to education: 1.9 percent to the local budgets and 3.3 percent to the national budget. Local investments consist of such projects as local irrigation canals, municipal construction projects, investments in local internal trade, etc.

II. Agriculture

As elsewhere in the Soviet orbit, the Communist regime in Albania is confronted by many serious agricultural difficulties. Among the most important are: (a) the deplorable state of livestock breeding; (b) the necessity of extending the cultivated land area; (c) the need for improvement of the irrigation system; (d) the necessity of increasing the average yield per hectare and so augmenting agricultural production. The regime's farm program is directed at these problems, as is the general areawide program.

By far the most pressing problem is the adverse animal husbandry situation. The 1953 communique of the State Planning Commission (Radio Tirana, February 13, 1954) admitted that the meat collection plan was fulfilled only 94.4 percent compared to 1952. The 1952 communique (Radio Tirana, February 4, 1953) had announced that the 1952 collection plan was fulfilled by only 88.5 percent. The 1952 communique stated that results for that year were 103.1 percent for those for 1951. However, it did not compare 1953 plan fulfillment for meat with 1952. The only other comparative figures for the two years were: during 1952, the State sector was reported to have fulfilled the plan for meat by 95.5 percent and for milk by 85.2 percent. The 1953 communique reported that, as compared to 1952, the State sector fulfilled the plan for meat by 89.5 percent and for milk by 113.6 percent. This would mean that in terms of 1952 plan fulfillment, the 1953 plan for meat and milk was fulfilled 85.5 and 96.8 percent respectively.

Below are the most recent statistics available on the livestock population of Albania (in thousands of head).*

	1938	1946	1948	1949	1950	Plan 1955
cattle** ..	134	140	143	134	129	139
sheep	1,574	1,835	1,730	1,639	1,707	1,844
pigs	15	27	22	30	47	127
goats	932	1,065	847	800	830	847
oxen	168	142	156	148	149	162
mules and asses	55	67	68	65	67	} 124
horses	54	55	53	50	51	

Since the livestock situation has deteriorated since 1950, it can safely be assumed that present livestock population, except for pigs, would be below 1950, and perhaps even under 1938.

The New Livestock Program

To spur production of animal products, the regime announced (Radio Tirana, January 29 and February 7) new programs to increase poultry breeding and dairy production. The January 29 statement said: "The joint decision of the Council of Ministers and the Central Committee

* Source: *Bashkimi* (Tirana), April 3, 1953, January 29, 1953. It is noted that while the census of livestock is considerably below the pre-war period, the population of Albania has increased from 1.03 million persons in 1937 (FAO *Yearbook of Food and Agriculture Statistics—1952*) to more than 1.246 million (UN estimate, *Population and Vital Statistics Reports*, January 1954) in 1952.

** Includes buffalo.

of the Albanian Workers Party demands that government and Party agricultural organs consider poultry breeding an important State problem, and that they inform the farming masses of the necessity of broad extension of poultry breeding." The report went on to say that poultry breeding—despite favorable conditions in the country—had been seriously neglected by collective farms and Party agricultural organs. The February 7 report stated: "During the current year, a maximum rise in milk production must be achieved to supply the market with more cheese, butter, etc., thus providing the workers with necessary supplies." Milk supply contracts should be drafted with kolkhozes, breeding farms and independent farmers. Particular stress was laid on drafting contracts "with those independent peasants who have a large amount of milk." The advantages of milk delivery to dairy produce centers "should be made clear to stockbreeders. Besides a reasonable price, they will also receive bonuses." The report also mentioned that "linked with these measures, peasants should be provided with advance credits so that they may fulfill contractual obligations on time." Moreover, they "should be supplied with industrial goods, especially utensils for sheep milking, for milk transportation, etc."

Agricultural Production

Voproski Ekonomiki (Moscow), October 1953, announced that 1952 grain yields in Albania were 12.6 quintals per hectare in the kolkhozes and 8.5 quintals per hectare on independent farms.* On January 6, Radio Tirana reported,

"During the past year, yields of various crops were on an average much higher than in 1952. Thus, for example, the wheat yield exceeded that for 1952 by 2.5 quintals, the rye yield by 2.3 quintals, the oat yield by two quintals, the barley yield by 3.7 quintals. In 1953 the average wheat production was 49 percent higher than in 1952 and 27 percent higher than envisaged by the plan. 1953 was the best wheat year. Production of barley was 66 percent larger than in 1952 and 20 percent larger than planned."

Other percentage increases in production over 1952 were: cotton—19 percent, sugar beets—50 percent, tobacco—75 percent. These production increases are attributable not only to increase in yield but to increase in area sown. Cotton has increased 10.5 percent; sugar beets 9.7 percent; and tobacco 16.2 percent.** A subsequent report announced over Radio Tirana on January 12 declared that 1953 tobacco production was 49.9 percent higher than in 1952 and constituted an excellent example of the unreliability of Communist statistics. If this is true, the results are hardly extraordinary since, as Premier Hoxha publicly admitted (Radio Tirana, March 28), last year's crop results were good only "after three years of drought."

* The average grain yield for the five principal grains during the 1934-1938 period was 12.8 quintals per hectare (FAO *Yearbook of Food and Agriculture Statistics, 1952*).

** Source: Communique of the State Planning Commission for the second quarter of 1953 (Radio Tirana, July 25, 1953).

The chart below compares Albanian agricultural production* (in thousands of metric tons) during recent years with production results (where available) planned for 1955.

Commodity	1938	1946	1947	1948	1949	1950	Plan 1955
corn	144	136	207	160	150	109	—
wheat	39	7	49	70	91	85	—
rye	3	5	5	8	7	8	—
rice	1	2	3	3	2	3	—
cotton	—	—	—	—	—	7	24
sugar beets	—	—	—	—	—	6	100
tobacco	—	—	—	—	—	1.6	5.2

The table below indicates that 1955 planned yields for corn, rye and tobacco are below those for the prewar 1934-1938 average. It also shows that the 1950 yields are in all cases below those for the prewar period. Since the general agricultural situation has deteriorated since 1950, it is probable that 1953 grain yields were not much better than those for 1950.

Proposed Yield Increases Under the Five Year Plan**

Commodity	1934-38	1950	Plan 1955	Planned Percent of Increase
wheat	10.5	9.7	11.5	18.5
corn	14.3	8.8	12.5	42.0
barley	10.4	9.8	10.5	7.1
rye	10.8	7.4	9.0	21.6
oats	9.4	9.0	10.0	11.1
rice	—	17.6	25.0	42.0
cotton	—	4.4	8.0	81.8
sugar beet	—	45.1	200.0	343.4
tobacco ***	8.2	3.5	7.0	96.0
potatoes	—	72.2	100.0	38.5

Collectivization

Albanian collectivization has proceeded relatively steadily since 1949. The height of collectivization was reached toward the end of May 1953, when 129 kolkhozes were reported in existence. Since that time, collectivization has not progressed appreciably (as indicated by the following

* Source: *Bashkimi* (Tirana), April 3, 1952.

** Source: *Bashkimi*, April 3, 1952; *FAO Yearbook of Food and Agricultural Statistics*, 1952. Yields given in 100 kg/hectare.

*** A March 25 Radio Tirana broadcast on the Elbasan tobacco growers' conference, quoted the chairman of the Executive Committee of that district: "The tobacco sowing area in 1953 totalled 1,886 hectares, producing an average of six quintals of tobacco per hectare, while in 1938, the sowing area was 340 hectares with an average production of 3.2 quintals per hectare." He also said that the 1954 area to be sown to tobacco will be 2,215 hectares, with an average yield of 6.2 quintals per hectare. A March 19 Radio Tirana broadcast quoted a speech given by the secretary of the Executive Committee of the Shkodra District at the conference of Shkodra tobacco growers: "The area cultivated with tobacco in 1953 was five times greater than in 1938, and tobacco harvested in 1953 amounted to 10 quintals per hectare." *FAO Yearbook of Food and Agricultural Statistics*, 1952 gives the 1934-1938 average tobacco yield for Albania as 8.2 quintals per hectare. Since the abovementioned districts are the leading tobacco-producing areas, the average country-wide yield has shown very little increase and more than likely has decreased. In any case, these figures are considerably higher than those given for the 1950 yield of 3.5 quintals per hectare for the country as a whole (*Bashkimi*, April 3, 1952).

chart). In a November 28 speech, Vice Premier Hysni Kapo indicated that 12.8 percent of the total arable land was in the collectivized sector, 5.7 in sovkhoses and more than seven percent in kolkhozes.

Land in Producers' Cooperatives*

	Number of Kolkhozes	Household Units in Kolkhozes	Number of Members	Agricultural Land Collectivized (in hectares)
1949	58	2,281	5,433	11,389
1950	90	4,500	—	—
Dec. 1951	94	5,561	—	—
Dec. 1952	113	6,291	17,122	—
Apr. 1953**	118	—	—	27,451
Nov. 1953	128	—	—	***32,100

Regime policy toward collectivization was aptly expressed by Premier Hoxha (over Radio Tirana, March 27) at the National Conference of Leading Kolkhoz and MTS Workers. Hoxha said: "The agricultural cooperatives should become an example to the independent peasants." Collectivization would continue, he said, on a "voluntary basis." Hoxha gave no indication that collectivization would be abandoned. In fact, he said: "Considering the path charted by the Central Committee, we shall neither tarry nor stop where we are. The Party will constantly create favorable conditions for the further advance in the drive toward collectivization."

The Sowing Plan

As in the other Soviet Satellites, the principal elements in Albania's sowing plan are: (a) the attempt to extend the total arable land surface; (b) the stress on cultivation of industrial crops such as tobacco, sugar beets and cotton; (c) the arable land surface sown to grains—particularly corn—has been cut back recently (the present program calls for some slight grain reemphasis); (d) rice cultivation is being stressed.

A recent decree of the Albanian Council of Ministers and the Central Committee of the Albanian Party (reported over Radio Tirana, February 8) said that the 1953 autumn sowing plan was 101 percent fulfilled. The plan for food crops, fodder crops and vegetables was satisfactorily fulfilled but the plan for alfalfa, flax and fruit trees was unfulfilled. The decree also called for full use of organic fertilizers and exploitation of alluvial soils. As in Romania and Hungary, the directive called for 100 per-

* Source: *Rinia* (Tirana), April 4, 1952; *Bashkimi* (Tirana), April 21, 1953, May 13, 1953; Radio Tirana, April 20, 1953, November 24, 1953, November 28, 1953.

** *Bashkimi*, May 13, 1953, reported 129 kolkhozes in the country.

*** This figure is estimated by taking slightly more than seven percent of the farm land reported collectivized (Kapo's November 28 speech). On April 20, 1953, Radio Tirana broadcast Kapo's report to the Second Congress of Agricultural Cooperatives. He stated then, "Today, our collectives have 27,460 hectares of land at their disposal, 6 percent of the total agricultural land of the nation." He was using approximately 457.7 million hectares as the total from which figure the area of agricultural land collectivized in November may be computed.

cent use of the square-cluster method of corn cultivation in the sovkhoses* and not less than 80 percent in the kolkhozes. Potatoes were also to be sown according to the square-cluster method.

The following chart, though incomplete, gives some idea of the area sown to the principal crops (in thousands of hectares).**

Commodity	1938	1949	1950	1953	Plan 1955
Total sown area	223.0	323.0	330.0	362.0	***400.0
irrigated land	—	—	39.0	†60.0	83.0
grains (total)	212.0	278.0	269.0	—	284.7
corn	††93.0	143.0	124.0	85.0	—
wheat	††38.0	84.0	87.6	—	—
rye	††3.0	—	1.0	—	—
oats	††10.0	21.0	—	—	—
barley	††5.0	—	—	—	—
rice	—	—	12.0	—	15.7
vegetables	4.0	9.0	12.0	†††—	15.8
industrial plants	3.0	21.0	31.0	—	46.0
cotton†	0.3	10.0	15.8	—	—
tobacco	2.6	3.0	4.6	††7.3	—
sunflowers	—	4.4	6.6	—	—
sugar beet	—	1.1	1.4	—	—
fodder	2.5	11.0	18.0	—	38.5

Olives

Cultivation of olives is one of the principal farm pursuits in Albania. To improve olive cultivation, the regime outlined an ambitious 15 year program on February 21, 1953 (Radio Tirana, April 4, 1953). This program pointed out that olive tree cultivation was unsatisfactory, and lack of progress was evident. The new program called for the Ministry of Agriculture to draft an annual plan for each district so that within five years—1953-1958—present conditions of olive cultivation will be improved. The pro-

* The square-cluster seeding of corn is a planting method common in developed agricultural countries. It allows for cultivation of plants through the period of vegetation.

**Sources: FAO Yearbook of Food and Agricultural Statistics, 1952; Radio Tirana, May 20, 1952, July 6, July 7, and August 15, 1953, February 8, 1954; Rinia, April 4, 1952; Bashkimi, April 1, and April 3, 1952; Bolshaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopedia, vol. 2 Moscow, 1950.

*** The 1955 Plan originally called for 385,000 hectares of cultivated land area. The figure was reported to have been revised upward to 400,000 hectares.

† 72,000 hectares were to be under irrigation by 1954, 9,000 of them in cotton.

†† Average cultivated area for 1934-1938.

††† Area under vegetable cultivation was supposed to be four percent more than in 1952.

† Radio Tirana, January 20 broadcast that "the area cultivated with tobacco in 1953 was three percent larger than in 1952, and 39 percent larger than in 1950. In 1954, 21 percent more than 1953 is planned.

†† An article entitled "The Development of the Albanian Cotton Industry," published in Hlopkovodstvo (Moscow), No. 8, 1953, declared that agrarian reforms undertaken in Albania made it possible at the beginning of the first Five Year Plan (1951) to increase the total area under cotton by tens of thousands of hectares compared to 1938. (In 1938 acreage under cotton was insignificant). At the end of the Five Year Plan (1955), the harvest of raw cotton will "surpass that of 1951 five times." The report also said that at the end of the Plan "the growth of cotton will reach a point which will enable Albanian exports."

gram's principal plans are:

1. The Ministry of Agriculture must provide additional cadres and agronomists experienced in olive tree cultivation to the various districts.

2. A total area of 36,711 hectares of land is to be allotted to olive raising, while 5,903,700 olive tree saplings are to be planted by the end of 1965. Of this number, the State sector is expected to plant 3,565,700, while the collective and private sector is to plant 2,337,940. 75 percent of the saplings must be those types of olives with high oil production, and the balance are to be devoted to large size olives good for food.

3. The Ministry of Agriculture is to create olive grove collectives in Lushnje and Durres districts and in the future several groves are to be created on State lands in Fieri, Valona, Saranda, Tepelena, and Tirana districts.

No definite results on this cultivation program have been given in recent reports. However, a March 24 Radio Tirana broadcast quoted Agriculture Minister Hysni Kapo as considering the delivery quota under the plan satisfactorily fulfilled. As a result, the regime has allowed the free sale of olives and olive oil surpluses by collective and individual farms throughout the country.

Apiculture

On March 4, Radio Tirana announced a Council of Ministers' decision on a seven-year plan for developing apiculture. The announcement said: "All the necessary conditions for large-scale development of apiculture exist in Albania and it can become a good source of income in producing honey and aiding plant fertility." Apiculture has, however, "not progressed satisfactorily," because of dryness of climate, lack of technical knowledge on the part of beekeepers, continual destruction of honeybees, diseases, prejudices and keeping of bees by old methods.

The seven-year plan calls for increasing the number of beehives by 1960 as compared to the end of 1953, as follows: State sector by 166 percent, collective sector by 173 percent, private sector by 150 percent. In addition, it outlines a modernization plan for existing beehives. To implement this program, the decision calls for drafting a plan to standardize beehives and apicultural tools, improve honeycomb production in the existing processing centers and create a new processing center in the Gjinokaster district, assign beekeeping specialists to each district to give short practical courses on apiculture, extend medium-term credits to beekeepers, and to establish an apiculture section in the Agricultural Scientific Research Institute by 1955.

III. Industry

The chart on page 20 presents in detail the relationship between capital and consumer goods production, as originally set forth under the Five Year Plan. Certain revisions have taken place in the annual plans, particularly in handicraft production, which will be discussed subsequently.

Value of Industrial Production*

	1950 Actual		1955 Plan		1955
	Value	% of Total	Value	% of Total	in % of 1950
Total Industrial Production	3,266	100.0	11,100	100.0	339.9
Capital Goods	761	23.3	(2,969)	26.7	390.1
Metals & Minerals	452	13.8	1,382	12.5	305.8
Mechanical Industry	54	1.7	181	1.6	335.2
Electric Power	56	1.7	(323)	2.9	576.8
Construction Materials	179	5.5	682	6.1	381.0
Other	(20)	0.6	(401)	3.6	600.0
Consumers' Goods	2,505	76.7	8,131	73.3	324.6
Food Industry	339	10.4	2,048	18.5	604.1
Clothing & Shoe Industry	198	6.1	1,936	17.5	977.8
Ministry of Trade & Ministry of Procurement**	243	7.4	800	7.2	288.0
Local Industry**	95	2.9	413	3.7	434.7
Consumer Cooperatives**	1,017	31.1	1,279	11.5	125.8
Artisans Cooperatives	353	10.8	1,511	13.6	428.0
Other	(260)	8.0	(144)	1.1	55.4

Handicrafts

One of the principal economic sectors the New Course is intended to bolster is handicrafts. In Albania, control of handicraft production is exercised by the Central Union of Handicraft Cooperatives. Among the many products produced are: construction and building materials (timber, bricks, tiles, lime, electrical equipment, etc.); agricultural implements (plows, cultivators, harrows, etc.); consumer goods (furniture, straw mats, brooms, stoves, silk fabrics, table flatware, etc.); irrigation pipe, and many other articles. It is obvious then that handicraft production will influence such important sectors of the economy as farming and construction, as well as consumer goods production. A recent decree of the Council of Ministers stated (Radio Tirana, February 8, 1954) that handicrafts have not produced farming tools in sufficient quantity, of adequate quality, or at proper prices. The decree called for supplying the independent peasantry with 3,750 plows, 2,000 cultivators, and 2,000 zigzag harrows in the first six months of 1954 to spur agricultural productivity.

In a joint meeting of the Council of Ministers and the Politburo on February 10 (Radio Tirana, February 18, 1954), it was announced:

"By the end of 1953, and as compared to 1948, the Two Year Plan and the first part of the Five Year Plan

* In millions of leks at 1950 prices. Sources: Radio Tirana, June 4, 1952, May 20, 1952, *Bashkimi*, April 3, 1952. Figures in parentheses are estimates which represent either an adjustment of official figures to reconcile their discrepancies, or, as in the case of electric power production, an attempt to calculate value figures where Albanian sources give only physical production figures. All other value figures are as given in the Five Year Plan. Percentage figures have been calculated.

** Apparently a considerable proportion of processing, clothing and shoe manufacture, as well as other consumer goods production, is under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Trade, the Ministry of Procurement, local industry, consumer cooperatives and artisan cooperatives. Production listed under food industry and clothing is actually only that part of production under the jurisdiction of nationalized industry itself.

were generally fulfilled by a sixfold increase in volume of production, repair and service. In addition, new articles have been produced, quality improved, and costs of some articles have been reduced from eight to fifty percent. . . . But . . . the following shortcomings have been noted: the Plan has not been fulfilled as regards assortments. Similarly, the struggle for increased types and variety of goods was neither well-organized nor properly directed. In services, the need of the people are unsatisfied because some trades have worked solely for the State sector."

The report continued by attacking the cooperatives for their "tendency to overfulfill norms to the detriment of quality," and for their inefficient use of internal reserves to reduce costs. It was also revealed that "*it has been noted that some cooperatives have shown strange tendencies to obtain as much profit as possible.*" [italics added]

According to the 1952 and 1953 plan reports (Radio Tirana, February 5, 1953 and February 13, 1954), the handicraft cooperatives had fulfilled their overall production targets by 119.2 and 125.8 per cent respectively.

Under the 1954 Plan, the proportion of handicraft production to total industrial production will rise to the unprecedented height of 22.9 percent, considerably more than the 13.6 percent for 1955 originally projected under the Five Year Plan. An increase in handicraft production is a simpler method of raising the overall industrial production figures than an increase in textile production. Comparatively speaking, the investment required would be much less and further personnel, facilities and equipment for the expansion of handicrafts are more easily available.

To implement the expanded handicraft program, the regime has announced concessions to artisans. On September 27, 1953, handicraftsmen were provided with industrial scrap and other raw materials, short-term credits, and tax reductions (See November 1953 issue, pp. 10-11). Details of the tax reductions were not announced until they appeared in the decree concerning overall tax reduc-

tions in the January 6, 1954 *Bashkimi* (see February 1954 issue, p. 56).

The expansion of handicraft production may be observed in the following chart.

Handicraft Production*			Percent of Total Industrial Product
Index	Annual Goal	Actual Production	
	(million of leks, 1950 prices)		
1950	100	353.0	10.8
1952	346	1,024.6	21.2
1953	435	1,220.7	21.8
1954 (Plan)	523	**1,846.2	22.9
1955 (Five Year Plan Goal) ..	428	1,511.0	13.6

Handicraft investments have necessarily been increased in recent years. During 1952 these investments totalled 14,466 million *leks* and in 1953 they were increased to 19,633 million *leks* (Radio Tirana, December 14, 1953). The total sum allocated to this sector in 1954 is not yet available, but it is likely to be considerably above the 1953 figure. A February 18, 1954 Radio Tirana broadcast announced that "the State Planning Commission and the Ministry of Finance should add 13.5 million *leks* to the 1954 plan which will be used for machinery investments, construction sheds and buildings used by the new [handicraft] cooperatives, and for buying a total of 66 tons of automotive transport." These added funds are to be used to establish three specialized cooperatives and twelve branches by the end of 1955. Further, service handicraft cooperatives are to be established in the towns of Tirana, Shkodra, Korca, Durres, and Valona. The program also calls for similar cooperatives established elsewhere at a later date.

Consumer Goods

Both the Two Year and Five Year Plans had provisions directed to the expansion of consumer goods production, particularly textiles, shoes, tobacco and foodstuffs. The general program calls for reducing Albanian demands for consumer goods imports and thereby minimizing its demands on the USSR and the other Satellites in meeting Albania's annual deficit in her balance of payments. To carry out this program, the following new enterprises were incorporated in the Five Year Plan or carried over to completion from the Two Year Plan: the large Stalin Textile Plant in Tirana (with a reported 1955 annual production

potential of 20 million meters of cloth); two cotton-ginning factories, one in Fieri (open in 1951) and the other in Rrogozhina (opened in 1952), with a reported production potential of 10.5 thousand tons each; a wool textile factory in Tirana, with an annual production potential of 190 thousand linear meters (Radio Tirana, August 25, 1953 reported construction in the final stages, while the 1953 plan report announced it has gone into operation that year); a rice-husking factory at Valona (reported completed in 1952); a tobacco curing factory in Shkodra, with a capacity of 1.5 thousand tons annually (reported completed in 1952); a sugar refinery in Korca with a 10 thousand ton capacity (reported completed in 1951).

The following table shows projected increases in production of selected consumer goods (in thousands of metric tons) for 1955, as compared to the production figures for 1950*.

Commodity	1950	Plan 1955	1955 Plan in % of 1950
refined sugar	0.61	11.00	1,803.0
macaroni	4.70	9.50	202.0
olive oil	1.30	5.15	396.2
laundry soap	0.95	3.70	389.5
cotton textiles**	1.10	21.50	1,954.5
woolen textiles**	—	0.85	—
shoes***	272	598	219.9

During the first year of the Plan (1951), the following production increases were recorded: shoe industry—49.8 percent; cotton textiles—362.1 percent; sugar refining—304.8 percent. The extensive increase in cotton textile production seems to be the result of the new plants going into operation that year. However, they were not yet in full operation until the following year, as may be noted below†:

	cotton textiles (millions of meters)	sugar (thousands of metric tons)
1950	1.10	0.61
1951	5.08	2.47
1952	26.72	7.09
1953	50.15	7.56
1955 (Plan)	21.50	11.00

Extractive Industry

The principal minerals commercially exploited in Albania are petroleum, chromium, copper, lignite and asphalt. As previously mentioned, the 1950 mineral production was reported equivalent to 452 million *leks* (13.8 percent of total industrial production), while the percentage of in-

* Sources: Radio Tirana, June 4, 1952, February 4, 1953, February 13, 1954, February 15, 1954, April 13, 1954.

** A February 18, 1954 Radio Tirana broadcast announced that "during 1954-55, the handicraft cooperatives should supply the market with mass consumer goods, agricultural implements, and construction materials to the amount of 700 million *leks* above the figures anticipated by the Five Year Plan." However, the chart figure is computed by taking a 20 percent proposed increase in handicraft production, as announced in the 1954 budget report (Radio Tirana, April 13, 1954).

* Source: Radio Tirana, June 4, 1952.

** Given in millions of meters.

*** Given in thousands of pairs.

† Sources: Radio Tirana, February 4, 1953, February 13, 1954, June 4, 1952. The figures for the table were computed by taking the original production figures for sugar and cotton textiles in the Five Year Plan announcement and multiplying them by the annual plan results. Actual production figures for sugar are probably accurate, but those for cotton textiles inaccurate. This latter is probably due to inflated plan pronouncements on annual achievements.

crease planned for 1955 (end of the Five Year Plan) was projected at 305.8 percent. Therefore, 1955 mineral production was projected as equivalent to 1,382 million *leks*, or 12.5 percent of the total industrial production. The following chart compares the proposed increases in mineral production planned for 1955 with the reported 1950 production (in thousands of metric tons)*:

Commodity	1950	Plan 1955	1955 Plan in % of 1950
petroleum	131.8	263.0	199.5
natural asphalt....	26.3	80.0	304.5
chrome ore	52.0	120.0	230.8
copper ore	14.2	145.0	1,024.0
refined copper....	0.9	2.5	277.8
lignite	28.3	168.3	594.7

Mining is probably the weakest link in overall industrial production, as is apparent from the fact that annual fulfillment figures for the Ministry of Mines are consistently the lowest announced results of industrial plan fulfillment. For example, the 1951 goal for the Ministry of Mines was fulfilled only by 72.7 percent. The following year mineral production improved somewhat and the plan was reported fulfilled by 97.7 percent (Radio Tirana, February 4, 1953). However, the 1953 second quarterly report on plan fulfillment (Radio Tirana, July 25, 1953) announced that mineral production plans had been fulfilled only 81 percent. It also stated that production plans for petroleum, gasoline, kerosene and copper were not fulfilled.

The annual 1953 plan results proved even less optimistic. Results for the mineral industry were not even announced. How poor they actually were was revealed in a Radio Tirana broadcast of February 13, 1954 stating that 1953 mineral production was only 85.7 percent of 1952, a not particularly outstanding year. Annual plans call for production increases from year to year, a condition obviously not being met.

Petroleum

The development of Albanian petroleum deposits to their present output level is due to emergency factors, the scarcity of fuels created by the economic blockades during the Ethiopian War and during World War II. Under normal trade conditions, Albanian deposits would likely remain untapped since they produce a heavy (19 degree API gravity) and costly crude, twice as high as the international quotation.

Two thirds of the crude output comes from Kucova (near Berat) and the balance from Patos (near Fieri) and Pekisht (near Peqin). Additional deposits are between Maliq and Fieri along the Devolli River. These are too insignificant to be developed even under the current conditions of the Soviet orbit.

The Albanian oil industry is at present directed by Soviet

technicians, and the little equipment needed supplied by the USSR and Czechoslovakia. Processing of crude is done in three small skimming plants located at Kucova. Their cumulative in-take capacity is about 30 thousand metric tons per year, which is below domestic oil consumption levels. By 1955, the regime intends to finish construction of a new processing plant at Cerrik with an in-take capacity of some 150 thousand metric tons a year (Radio Tirana, June 6, 1952). This would give the country a total planned refining capacity of 180 thousand metric tons by 1955.

From recent reports in press and radio—as well as from reliable refugee reports—it is apparent that the petroleum industry is not progressing according to the plans laid down for it. Shortages of equipment, especially in replacement parts, and lack of technical know-how and trained personnel continued to plague the Albanian regime's efforts to step up oil output.

IV. Patterns and Conclusions

Albania has made economic advances during the past few years, particularly in industrial production. The Soviet Union has been willing, to some extent, to send capital equipment to the country, chiefly so that it could extract some of Albania's mineral wealth. But consumer goods have not followed in logical sequence, and with a farm production well below prewar levels (and a smaller post-war population), the Albanian standard of living is grievously low.

Overall 1955 industrial goals under the Five Year Plan will probably be met, at least statistically. However, the extractive industries will no doubt be forced to admit underfulfillment, although the handicraft and industrial sectors will probably report overfulfillment. Handicraft production will be appreciably expanded over the Five Year Plan goals in order to expand production of consumer goods, construction materials and agricultural implements as part of the Albanian New Course. Agricultural production will continue to fall short of the goals and food crops and animal husbandry (hogs excepted) are likely to be little more than the 1950 figures. Industrial crop production will increase due to the additional arable land surface devoted to these crops. Increased emphasis will also continue to be placed on expanding the cultivated land area by more fertilizer and irrigation. Agricultural investments will probably be increased, but not appreciably enough to effect substantial increases in production.

Soviet plans for Albania have not projected a large-scale industrialization program, but instead have striven to reduce Albania as a deficit area and an economic liability while capitalizing on the political and strategic importance of the country, and all at a minimum of investment allocation.

* Source: Radio Tirana, June 4, 1952; *Bashkimi*, April 3, 1952.

The House of the Seven Windows

This is the story of a thirty-three-year-old Albanian from a formerly well-to-do family whose lands were confiscated by the Communists. Arrested as a "reactionary" by the Communists in 1945, his father is still in Valona prison. The source himself was conscripted by the Italians in 1943, deserted their army and joined the nationalist Balli Kombetar resistance movement. The story is in his own words although it was impossible to retain the flavor of the original in the translation.

FOR TWO years I was imprisoned at the former fortress of Gjinokaster in Southern Albania which under the Communists has become the most infamous prison in the country. It was in May 1949 that I was arrested at my home in the village Peshkop by the *Sigurimi* (the secret police), who immediately sent me to the prison in Valona. There I found that more than 200 people had been arrested the same night; all were residents of the districts of Valona and Gjinokaster. The only accusation made against me was that I had been seen in the company of some people who were known as anti-regime activists. They kept me for some time in Valona and afterwards I was sent to Gjinokaster. In both of these prisons I spent more than 20 months suffering various kinds of torture.

At the fortress, where I stayed more than seven months, I was always in solitary confinement from which I was let out once every three days for my personal necessities. This was the general rule. Only twice was I taken from my cell in an unusual way, once to be shaved for the first time after four months of arrest; and second when my trial began in a building not far from the fortress. For seven months my daily fare consisted of a cup of cold water and 400 grams of bread [a little less than a pound] which I had to eat immediately, otherwise my cell became a headquarters for rats.

During the first four months at the fortress I saw no one except the same guard who daily brought me the same cup of water and the same quantity of bread. Only at the beginning of the fifth month in solitary confinement did the officers of the *Sigurimi* begin to visit me. My



The fortress of Gjinokaster

interrogation began then and continued for an entire month. At the end of each day, they told me, "We are coming again tomorrow. You had better think it over well." As I had nothing to tell them, my situation became more and more difficult and the *Sigurimi* began physical torture to make me confess something which I didn't know.

Some few days before the trial began, I had the special honor of being visited by the Chief of the *Sigurimi* of the town, Major Gjon Banushi. In the most brutal manner, he insisted on my signing a prepared statement about my uncle who had been hanged in 1945 by the Communists. Because my uncle had not supported them, they accused him of being a traitor. The statement was supposed to make me declare that my uncle was a real traitor and that the regime hanging of him had been a job well done. I refused to sign the statement and then the worst for me began.

After being confined for seven months—three of them of much suffering—I was finally taken before a court martial composed of the President, Captain Papouli, two members and the Prosecutor, all *Sigurimi* officers. I had already lost a third of my former weight and was unable to recognize any of my friends, who were in the same condition I was. But one thing I remember well: we were surrounded by looks of pity even from the prison guards. Two Lieutenants of the *Sigurimi* were our defense lawyers and the President referred only to them when the Prosecutor was done with his six days of inquisition. They were asked if they had anything to say for us. Their immediate answer was no.

The seventh day—the last of our trial—the President sentenced the prisoners, including myself. I was sentenced to two years, in spite of the fact that the prisoners who had denounced me under torture retracted their denunciations before the court.

After the sentence I left the fortress forever, moving to the “House of the Seven Windows” of the Gjinokaster prison, a room famous because it has been occupied by political prisoners for many years. The room was only 13 by 18 meters [about 42 feet by 60 feet] in dimension and was always occupied by not less than 260 political prisoners, all packed together like sardines.

At the “House of the Seven Windows” our daily fare was water and about a pound and a half of bread. In March 1951, a soup of boiled corn was substituted for half of the bread ration. During the nights we slept on a stone floor and during the days we worked with the ordinary prisoners at breaking stones. This continued until the summer came, when those of the political prisoners who were in good health were sent to work on the State farms, labor camps and other State projects. The work there

was very hard and many of them died there. Those prisoners whose health was bad were permitted to stay in the prison during the summer and there 30 of them also died of tuberculosis that summer.

In the two years I was in prison, only once did I have the chance to be visited by my mother and youngest brother. They walked 90 miles to see me for the five minutes which was the rule for treating “reactionary people.”

When I was set free, I returned to my village to work the land again. But I could not support my wife and two children and so I went to Valona to work as a digger of draining ditches. In the first days of October 1953, I was warned that the *Sigurimi* wanted me and I decided to escape at once. I crossed the river and went towards Greece. At nightfall, in a little village near the border, I saw an officer and two soldiers of the frontier guards, leading a loaded mule, and I hid in the forest for two hours to avoid them. When they had gone I continued until, at dawn, I crossed the border into Greece.

Hold That Mannequin

The art of commercial advertising in a Communist country is based on principles rather different from those in a free country. A young man who took a course in window display design before he left Czechoslovakia described these principles as they were taught in his classes:

1. A shop window should display only those goods which are “in demand by the people;” i.e., which are utilitarian, and will therefore catch the eye of the passer-by.
2. Interest should be attracted by a central motif, preferably political. A poster illustrating one of the current government propaganda themes—if possible, related to the nearest Communist commemoration or holiday—is desirable. This attracts the attention of those who oppose the regime as well as its followers. It should also arouse the curiosity of those who are “indifferent.”
3. Bourgeois methods of display should be avoided. For example, a hand wearing a glove does not belong in a Socialist display. Such a hand appears never to have worked, implying that it is possible to live without working. Similarly, moving mannequins who nod their heads are non-Socialist—“would any worker have the time for such unnecessary gestures? This kind of advertisement is effective only in the capitalist world, where unproductive work is rated above productive. . . .”
4. Window lighting is frowned upon. “It wastes electricity needed for the factories, and distracts people on their way to work or meetings. . . .”
5. The display must stimulate interest in the work process which went into the merchandise. Aside from the political poster, it is advisable to show a picture of the factory which produced the merchandise or a picture of the worker working on the item.

Command Performance

"New plays, successful performances—the development of our whole theatrical life rests on the development of our People's Democratic society, and at the same time, supports it."

Szabad Nep (Budapest), September 25, 1953

WHEN THE Communists seized control of the countries of Central and East Europe their avowed intent was a complete re-education of the people. They imposed an Iron Curtain to isolate their captive peoples and ultimately to cause the disintegration of all critical faculties by isolation from the free circulation of free ideas. In the place of free ideas, the ready-made Communist ideology emanates from every possible source of communication and influence. To further their ends, the Communists use, among many other devices, the actual curtain of the stage.

I. Theater as Communication

In each of these countries, the State has nationalized the theater, fostered the writing and production of new plays, built new playhouses, and promoted all aspects of theatrical activity. According to Radio Sofia, December 7, 1953, the number of theaters in Bulgaria has increased from 10 to 22 under Communist administration. In Czechoslovakia, the government budget for theater in 1952 was 661,000,000 *koruny* (13 million dollars). In Warsaw, reconstruction of theaters was given post-war priority even over civilian housing, and today Warsaw has 14 theaters including two new ones with seating capacities of 8,000. Three new Budapest theaters have opened since last Christmas.

In addition to urban expansion, particular effort has been made to extend theater to the rural districts where Communism's hold throughout the orbit is weakest. The Communist concept of drama as a medium of indoctrination (rather than as an art form or entertainment) is behind their emphasis on plays in the countryside where peasants with little or no schooling, who cannot be reached through printed matter, can be influenced by the visual and spoken appeal of theatrical representation. This rural program has led to a substantial increase in the number of touring companies, provincial professional theaters, and

most of all to amateur theatricals.* The amateur groups are formed by the Trade Unions directly in the factories, mines and collective farms. The task of such groups is to combat lack of work discipline, dramatize work methods and competitions, and create resistance to the "class enemy." They are based on a technique of "role-playing" somewhat similar to the group psychotherapy of Western science. As a Romanian worker quoted in *Munca* (Bucharest), April 5, 1953, defined the purpose of these so-called Artistic Agitation Brigades, they are meant to "unmask and ridicule certain deficiencies of our production processes, and at the same time to glorify those of us who aim high [Stakhanovites and other shockworkers]." Amateur theatricals are, in the words of this article, "a mobilizing factor in the struggle for the fulfillment of the Five Year Plan." Not only does the local group sit passively and become indoctrinated, but it is persuaded to take active part in its own indoctrination and hence makes the process more effective and rapid, so that the Hungarian Party daily *Szabad Nep* can write

* In almost all the captive countries, these groups participate each year in nation-wide contests. *Munca*, April 18, 1953, declared that "the annual contests are the greatest stimulating factor in the activity of the amateur theatricals." The same newspaper announced that 9,400 Trade Union members were "drafted into the program" of the 1953 (third annual) contest in Romania. In a medium-size town such as Bacau, in Moldavia, nine brigades of workers performed. The contest was divided into three phases, and the third phase alone called for "the participation of 89 choirs, 67 theatrical teams, 78 dance groups, 27 orchestras, and ten brass bands."

In Bulgaria, amateur theatrical groups participated in a National Dramatics Contest, held in 1953 from March 10-April 3. *Literaturen Front* (Sofia), April 23, 1953, claimed that during the contest, the number of theatrical collectives increased from 340 to 700, but observed: "Most of the trade union organizations did not help the newly-formed theatrical collectives, and many of them were discontinued. Of the 20 groups organized by the Sofia textile trade union, only 10 remain, while in the Blagoevgrad district, the number fell from 40 to less than 20." The probable explanation is that many of the collectives were formed on order for the National Contest, and were immediately dissolved at its close.

(September 25, 1953) "... that the provincial theaters are becoming increasingly successful in fulfilling their responsible and worthy task: the education of our working people."

Proscenium Bureaucracy

Nationalization of the theater has engendered the growth of a massive bureaucracy to deal with theatrical activities. In Poland, authority is vested in (a) the Ministry of Arts and Culture; (b) the Committee for Cultural Problems, of the Council of Ministers; (c) the Cultural Department of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Communist Party.

Below these top administrative bodies are eight separate theatrical enterprises, each with its own budget supported by the central governmental budget. There is the CZT which controls 25 theater groups; the CDPT which manages the marionette theaters; the POLIA ARTOS which organizes theatrical tours; the COPA which rents wardrobe items and sheet music, and prints tickets; the CZPB which makes scenery and costumes; and the CZPM which produces musical instruments and other musical accessories. There are also other organizations which exert some influence on the theater, such as the Trade Union of Employees and Workers of Culture and Art, and the Association of Stage and Film Artists.

The Bulgarian theater is under the administration of the former KNIK (Committee for Science, Art and Culture), which was elevated to Ministry of Culture by an act of the Bulgarian National Assembly during its recent session (February 1-5, 1954.)

With minor variations this is the structure of the theater bureaucracy in all the captive countries. Romania has a two-man Soviet Commission for Theater. Acting as a consulting and censoring body, it is appointed by the Soviet Ministry of Arts but supported by the Romanian government. These two men, Matveyev and Kovalenko, have final authority in all theatrical matters. Their efficiency is somewhat hampered by the fact that neither one can speak or understand the Romanian language.

Production Line

The new director of Prague's National Theater, Drahos Zelensky, declared upon taking office in October 1953: "We shall set up a long-term plan for performances, subdivided into concrete plans for the enterprise, for the quarters of the year, and for the groups [of performers]. All employees must be concerned with Plan fulfillment and its control. We must endeavor to arouse the interest of all workers by persuasion, so that everybody will contribute work and suggestions."

This kind of production-line jargon used in reference to the theater, while ludicrous to Western minds, is perfectly consistent with Communist mentality. Theater under Communist administration is a "collective," differing only in content, not in form, from an industrial enterprise or agricultural collective. The theater in Poland, for instance, car-

ries out its activities within the framework of the Six-Year-Plan; its so-called Plan of Theatrical Services specifies the "anticipated" (i.e., required) increase in the number of theaters, plays, performances, and even the number of spectators. Personnel, whether playwrights, actors or ticket-sellers, are subject to the ubiquitous "norm" standard of work output.

II. Theater as Art

Drama, if it is to be moving and effective, must engage human emotions about human concerns. This rigid mobilization of theater cannot be satisfying to audience, playwright or critic precisely because Communist use of drama as propaganda denies them its emotional power; because doctrinal restrictions prevent the playwright from imbuing the play with his own emotional conviction. The doctrinal fount from which their dramatic creation springs is "Socialist realism" in writing and staging, the Stanislavsky method (which is both Russian and realistic) in directing. Satellite dramatists follow the line set by Soviet drama, and they are inexorably entangled in the various theoretical controversies which from time to time rock Soviet theater policy. Of these, the most important in recent years has centered on the place of "conflict" in drama. The now-discredited "no-conflict" theory condemned all plays containing negative characters (the villain) for "typifying the negative" and thus depicting people who are "not typical of Soviet society." It demanded that only the positive, the "life-asserting," the ideal should be portrayed, that "contradictions" should not exist. This theory rapidly led to an impasse in dramatic writing; and in 1952, strong protest against the no-conflict theory began to emerge in the Soviet press. In a declaration published in *Pravda* (Moscow), April 26, 1952, playwright Nikolai Virla, one of the originators of the theory, frankly explained that he had developed the no-conflict play as a reaction against the "barbed-wire obstacles" put in the path of his previous plays by the "agencies [officials, censors] in charge of repertoire."

Conflict in Communist drama is supposed, above all, to be taken from daily life. As Stanislavsky called for a natural, unstylized communication between actor and audience, so the Communist ideologists call for an organic unity between the theater and the "working masses." Conflict now permitted in Communist plays is crude and highly simplified: in plays with political themes, it "rages" between "good" (Soviet Communism) and "evil" (Western imperialism); in plays with economic themes, between "good" and "better" (higher productivity).

The failure of Communists to make their drama a living art lies partly in this dogmatic preoccupation with explicit themes: their unwillingness to recognize that universal truths about human beings can be dramatized within the framework of an enormous range and variety of situations and points of view. Since all Communist plays are written, directed and acted from the same viewpoint—and that a political one—it is hardly surprising that the plays seem "flat, unreal, stereotyped." Communist drama critics and

THE BIRTH OF THE POSITIVE HERO



The playwright is the mother holding the "new-born child"—the hero of his play—in his arms. The dramaturgists appear as nurses and ask for the baby: "Let us have the little one; now we must do our work too."



The remoulded "positive hero" appears:

"... and even his mother does not recognize him."

from Ludas Matyi (Budapest), November 15, 1953

playwrights themselves recognize the deficiency, if not the cause. The Romanian *Viata Romaneasca*, March, 1953, published an extract from *Soviet Comedy*, a book (then unpublished) by the Soviet writer V. Frolov; which quoted no less an authority than Malenkov:

"Our artists and writers, in their effort to create artistic images, must always take into consideration the fact that the pattern [for artistic representation] is not merely the lowest common denominator of all the situations one can find in life, but a formula which expresses most deeply and convincingly the essence of socialist force. According to Marxist-Leninist concepts, the pattern is *not* meant to represent an average computed from statistics. The pattern corresponds to the essence of the socialist-historical event; it is not the mere repetition of daily occurrences. . . ."

Less abstractly, a critic in *Pravda*, (Moscow), October 20, 1953, wrote: "Why has our dramaturgy become so monotonous?" and answered his own question: "When hints of grayness appear, we are compelled to wonder if the causes do not lie within our creative arrangement which hinders the development of diversity in our drama."

The elusive problem was pursued further in *Pravda*, November 3, 1953: "The oversimplified categorizing of plays as 'industrial,' 'collective farm,' etc., reflects an extremely limited, superficial knowledge of life, and an incomplete view of the tasks of artistic creation. Some writers seem to think a knowledge of life means a cursory study of particular and random phenomena and facts." The article denounced "superficial illustration" as the weakness of Soviet dramaturgy. The Romanian newspaper *Contemporanul* (Bucharest), April 11, 1952, charged that "the new Socialist man," in the interpretation of contemporary playwrights, "is often shown as a man solely engaged in improving his technical skills for the increase of production. While modern man must be shown as participating fully

in the fulfillment of State plans, he must also be presented in his daily surroundings and outside activities. . . ." *Teatr* (Warsaw), No. 6-7, 1953, declared: "We have watched too many plays in which characters of the same social origin or trade are virtually identical: they can sometimes be distinguished from each other by occasional differences in the clothes they wear or the color of their ties. It is not surprising that when they move around the stage the spectator pricks up his ears; he can almost hear the rustle of paper. . . ."

The popular failure of a play from which much had been expected was attributed to similar causes by a critic writing in *Zycie Literackie* (Cracow), November 1, 1953: "The coolness of the public reception to the play [*Bancrofts*, by J. Broszkiewicz and G. Gottesman] is surprising and significant. The play is about international politics, dealing with the danger which American imperialism constitutes for world peace; it is a play in which the authors, wanting to fully describe the horror of this danger, have used many a strong word and picture. Seeing that I also share the public's feeling of indifference, I tried to find the reasons for this general negative reaction. I checked the impressions of another critic, Jurij Zawadski, who having seen the play in Poznan, wrote: 'I would define the performance as subdued, neutral, cold.' So it appears that both performances of *Bancrofts* produced the same effect, aroused the same emotional response. Or rather, they failed to arouse any response at all. . . ."

In Search of an Audience

What has provoked so much criticism in the press is that the new productions are not functioning effectively as vehicles for popularizing the "new" ideas; in fact, they are meeting with the universally baffling and ignominious experience of playing to empty houses. One of the ways in which the regime tries to fill up the theaters, to provide an

audience, is through a special system of ticket distribution. Tickets to regime-favored plays are distributed directly in the places of work: factories, offices, etc. They are given away without charge, or are sold by compulsory subscription. This, however, does not guarantee an audience; according to refugee reports many of the workers simply do not use their tickets. Another method of forcing people to attend performances is to organize a discussion, based on a current play, in which Party and labor union members are requested to participate; those expected to take an active part in such a discussion are of course obliged to see the play, no matter how dull it may be.

But public boycott of bad plays is impossible to combat by practical measures. *Train to Marseilles*, a Polish propaganda play about the Indo-China war, was so unpopular that even the trade unions refused to distribute tickets for it in the plants. People in Warsaw began saying that it was "impossible to get seats for it [the play], only sleeping accommodations were available." This joke stemmed from the fact that the theater management, in desperation, had asked the State tourist office [Orbis] to bring in those visitors from the provinces who were taking part in group excursions to Warsaw. These visitors, exhausted after a day of sightseeing, slept soundly in the comfortable chairs of the Ateneum Theater.

Comrade Joe Miller

On another level, the ideologists are trying to tempt stubborn audiences by promoting the genre of comedy. Budapest's cabaret theater, the *Vidam Szinhaz*, is sold out weeks in advance. *Irodalmi Ujsag* (Budapest), January 30, 1954, announced that a second cabaret theater, the *Fovarosi Kis Szinhaz*, had been opened, to satisfy "the extraordinary interest of our workers in the comic genre, the incredible demand which could not be met by the one cabaret of the capital, the *Vidam Szinhaz*." A vaudeville theater, the *Budapest Variete*, opened on February 6.

The program of the *Vidam Szinhaz* is made up of satirical skits, some of which, according to recent refugees, are bold to the point of audacity. A skit called "School Selections" (the title refers to the system of sending "carefully selected" workers from the plants to ideological and technical schools) parodies a meeting at which various trade union officials discuss whom to send to school. Several suggestions are made, but are not accepted because the suggested candidates are members of the plant soccer team, or the reading group, or are indispensable for some other reason. Finally the officials hit upon one man who "is not intelligent, not useful in the plant, not enthusiastic and not in any way gifted—but soon it is discovered that he has already been sent to the school. . . ." This can be interpreted as "constructive criticism, aiming at correction"—the only kind of criticism permitted in Communist countries—but in fact it is a rather broad dig not only at the bureaucracy, but at the Party and regime itself.

Of the new plays tried out in Hungary during the festival last autumn, three were comedies, a larger number than in previous years. According to *Szabad Nep* (Buda-

pest), September 25, 1953, the production of two comedies [*Not A Private Affair* and *Alpine Horn*] "gave a clearly positive answer to the hitherto unsettled question of whether the Stanislavsky method can be applied to comedies and musicals." This was undoubtedly a relief to concerned comedy lovers, but *Szabad Nep* cautioned against extremes: "It would be wrong to assume that the literary directives of the government program call for the production of nothing but comedies."

Don't Be Half-Safe

The presentation of original plays has become such an attenuated and risky business in the Iron Curtain countries that theater managements try to evade it. Playwrights too have found a way of sidestepping the complex and equivocal responsibilities imposed upon them by the theorists and censors. This was pointed out in an article in *Teatr* (Warsaw), November 10, 1953.

"Escaping from the present is an obvious and striking feature of our theatrical life. This applies both to the writers and the theaters. Our playwrights try to escape by choosing foreign settings for their plays or going back to a distant medieval-feudal past. Our theaters have begun to substitute historical plays for contemporary-life plays. What does all this mean? It means that a chasm has appeared between all that is happening around us—expressed in the growth of new cities, factories, production cooperatives—and the ideological and political content of our theater."

This is a serious charge against the Communist theater, confirmed, albeit obliquely, in the Romanian press. A long article in *Scanteia* (Bucharest), January 30, 1954, was devoted to a recapitulation of the principles laid down by Lenin for writers. This was obviously intended as a cautionary note to dramaturgists who might be entertaining delusions of increasing independence: "Lenin criticized most severely the Proletcult, an organization whose tendencies were oriented toward permitting the artist to break



Ladislav Mnaček (a Slovak playwright whose State Prize-winning play *Bridges to the East* has not been produced by any Czech theater despite the shortage of contemporary plays):

"Now it seems I'll have to build bridges to the Czech theaters." from *Dikobraz* (Prague), January 31, 1954

away, which did not want to recognize the authority of Party guidance in literature, which aspired to autocracy." *Scanteia* also warned against escapism from contemporary themes: "Lenin condemned the artist's tendency to detach himself from the tumult of events of his historical period; the participation of the artist in the common cause has always led to the creation of many cultural values"; and gave a gentle tug on the leash: "In our country [Romania], the writers' best friend is the Party of the working class. . . ."

And in Hungary, *Magyar Nemzet* (Budapest), February 9, 1954, declared: "The unwillingness of the authorities to assume responsibility hinders the development of Hungarian drama. . . . We sincerely hope that the time will come when our theaters will not consider the production of new Hungarian plays a disagreeable task which they have to get over with as soon as possible. . . ."

Wherefore Art Thou?

Because performances of the classics ensure a thriving box office, the theater managements rely increasingly on their classic repertoire. There are a good many restrictions here too, of course. In Romania, Racine and Corneille are banned as "too pessimistic," Sophocles, Euripides, Aeschylus and Aristophanes as "too conservative." Moliere, Gorki, Chekhov and Gogol are acceptable, and plays by Shakespeare are invariably sold out well in advance. However, like all other playwrights, the Bard of Avon is subject to ideological editing, and this leads to some interesting effects. Two examples of how Shakespearean texts are revised give an indication of how classic plays in general are "housebroken."

In a Czechoslovak production of *Romeo and Juliet*, the final act was altered by inserting a speech, held over the dead bodies of the two lovers, in which the audience was instructed that the two lovers "had to die because their families belonged to the exploiting class and did not appreciate the longing of the youth for a world of peace and mutual love." The Prague daily *Lidove Noviny*, February 13, 1951, gave an account of this "adjustment":

"The theatrical group in Hradec Karlove attempted to adjust E. A. Saudek's translation of *Romeo and Juliet* to conform to the correct social line. The director accomplished this by two devices. He cut out the original explanation of why the tragedy of the lovers had occurred, as well as the final conciliation of the two families. In the early part of the play, he inserted several verses explaining to the audience that the Capulets had forced Juliet to marry Paris because, since he was related to the Duke, they hoped to gain wealth and power in Verona through his influence. The new conception of the play correctly emphasizes that pure love must end tragically if the loving union of human beings depends on social and power considerations."

Romeo and Juliet was also presented in Bucharest with a "Socialist twist." The nobles of the older generation were presented as capitalists, exploiters and reactionaries; the young people, including Romeo, as the progressive elements of the Middle Ages. Whether or not the Romanian director

adopted the exact "revisions" of the Czech version is not known, but certainly the "emphasis" was the same.

A refugee has reported on the fate of a production of *Hamlet* taken under consideration by the National Theater in Bucharest. All the actors were invited to attend a special private showing of the Laurence Olivier movie, which was not shown publicly in Romania. After the showing, a discussion was held in which the problem of the ghost was raised. Some argued that since ghosts do not exist, it would be "unrealistic" to show one on the stage. Others insisted that without the ghost, the story makes no sense. It was finally decided to adopt the irreproachable course of following the Soviet example—which in this case was to present the ghost on the stage. However, Party agitators who were present pointed out that there is a great difference between audiences in Moscow and those in Romania. The Russians are more "progressive" and can understand that the ghost is merely a fantasy of the author's, a literary device, and does not actually exist. But the Romanians are much behind the Russians, they said, and still have to be educated for such experiments. In the end, it was decided not to produce *Hamlet* at all.

III. Theater and Politics

During the last year, demands for a change in the direction of a more "national" drama have appeared with increasing frequency in some of the captive countries. Last October 17, the Bulgarian newspaper *Rabotnichesko Delo* (Sofia) complained that the main shortcoming of the 1953-54 theatrical schedule was its lack of new Bulgarian plays, and cited the obvious truth that "the theatre cannot be a national one without a certain number of good Bulgarian plays."

Any survey of the national origin of plays produced in the Satellites establishes the fact that the overwhelming majority of foreign plays are Soviet Russian. According to Radio Sofia, December 7, 1953, the ratio of Soviet to Bulgarian plays during 1953-54 was two to one. The Prague News Letter, November 7, 1953, lists as the program of nine Slovak theatres this season ten Soviet plays, six original Slovak plays, five classics. In 1953, the plays produced in Romania were overwhelmingly Soviet in origin. According to a listing of plays being performed in Bucharest during March and April, 33 were Soviet, 12 Romanian and three classical.

In Hungary, a nationalist trend in theater became high policy when Premier Nagy declared in his speech to the National Assembly on January 23, 1954: "A greater emphasis must be given to the national and popular character of the theater by showing more Hungarian plays, both new and old." This was presaged by a critic writing in the literary magazine *Irodalmi Ujsag* (Budapest), October 24, 1953, who claimed that "our inconsistent theater activity stems from the peculiar fact that Hungarian drama does not constitute the core of our theatrical culture. I do not know of one theater which bases its season's programs on Hungarian plays."

While these attacks against a derivative and second-hand

theatrical culture are not explicitly anti-Soviet, the effect is precisely that. In 1952, more than 50 percent of all plays produced in Hungary were Soviet. A list of plays running in Budapest at the end of December 1953 showed the drastic drop: five Soviet plays, five Hungarian plays, five Hungarian classics, and 13 foreign classics.

Theater, like all State-controlled arts, is a barometer highly attuned to political atmospheric changes. This principle of action and reaction can be seen not only in a general line, as in Nagy's speech, but in particular instances. A Romanian play called *The Wolves* by Radu Boureanu is a case in point. Produced at the end of the 1952 theatri-

cal season, its object was to foment hatred against "Western imperialists," represented in the script as Titoists supported by Americans. It played throughout the country and at the National Theater in Bucharest continuously from February 7 to March 30, 1953, then intermittently until the close of the season in June, but was withdrawn from the repertoire in the fall of 1953, just before Yugoslavia was received back at the table of the Danubian Commission in a gesture of apparent conciliation. In January 1954, through an "unofficial" article in the Cominform newspaper *For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy*, Yugoslavia was invited to resume membership in the Cominform.

IV. *The Play's the Thing*

Fragments of key scenes from four original plays recently written and performed in the Soviet bloc show in microcosm the nature of the current pastiches created for internal propaganda purposes in the captive countries. Each of these plays has a "contemporary theme," suggested, possibly assigned, or at the very least approved by the Communist Party and the appropriate Ministry of Culture. Each is typical of a particular Communist view of modern life, and each is designed to "illustrate," to "enlighten," and to "orient" the captive audience.

The Wolves

by Radu Boureanu

The Wolves is a typical play in what might be called the Communist "genre of paranoia." The plot tells of attempts made by agents of Tito to recruit help for their subversive activity in Romania from among the Serbian minority group on Romanian soil. The Serbian villagers fail to respond to the Titoists' threats, and actively aid the Romanian authorities to crush the conspiracy.

The action takes place in Timisoara, a major city in

the Banat not far from the Romanian-Yugoslav border; then in the private office of a Yugoslav diplomat in Bucharest, and finally in a border village. Reprinted here is part of Act II, Scene 2, which takes place in the office of the man (Sapungin), who is chief of the local Yugoslav Naval Commission and a Titoist spy. He has made contact with a professor's daughter (G.), who has previously been active in this underground conspiracy and is now helping to organize the transfer of arms and ammunition from the Yugoslav Embassy in Bucharest to safety near the border. Also, in this scene are two local kulaks (I. and II.) who have been directed by Sapungin to enroll the Serbian villagers living on the Romanian side of the border in the plan to smuggle arms into the mountains.

(Sapungin pours out brandy for his visitor, G., and they talk)

- G. This is French brandy; the sort of thing a woman like me is entitled to enjoy in the West. . . . I *must* get there. I love luxuries, parties. Here, I feel stifled.
- S. Don't think about it now. Our job is not an easy one.

GREEDY CAPITALISTS



Two scenes from a recent play, *The Just People* by K. Brandy, which had a successful run in Warsaw during the 1952-53 theater season. Its theme was the class struggle during the 1905 Revolution.

EXPLOIT OPPRESSED WORKERS



from *Teatr* (Warsaw), July, 1953

Today, our time is taken up with trivial matters. Tomorrow, we shall organize sabotage actions; blow up furnaces, bridges; incite the population to rebellion. We have big plans. Not only the Banat, not only this country, but the whole of the Balkans will be ours. Tito is not alone; he is backed by men much more important than he is now. When our plans materialize, there will be a place for us at the big table! (While G. is listening, she knocks an ashtray off the table. The ashtray hits the floor with a loud noise. S. leaps from his chair and draws his gun.)

G. It's all right. Just dropped the ashtray. (S. subsides into a chair and drinks his brandy.)

S. Tell me, G. Have you heard any more from Dusan?

G. (surprised) What Dusan are you talking about? How do you know about Dusan?

S. Now, now, don't bother to pretend. You were in love with him. (G. is silent.) I know you worked with him. You began three years ago when he was still in Timisoara. I ran into him later, in Zagreb. He told me about you. I understand he is now in Budapest, doing big things.

(Coded rapping on the door is heard. S. and G. glance at each other.)

S. It must be I. and II. About time!

G. Wait—don't open it yet. I don't want to be seen by anybody. I've got to leave. (S. shows her the door behind the draperies.)

S. You can go out through that door. Follow the corridor, but don't turn right. Keep left, and you'll be out on the street, behind the Cathedral. Salute! (Exit G. The pounding on the door is heard once again. S. goes to the door and opens it. Enter I. and II.) At last! What's happened to you two? I've been imagining everything under the sun. What's the matter? Why do you look like that? Where are the others? All of you were to be here two days ago. Tell me, what happened? Can't you open your mouths?

I. I can open my mouth all right, but I just missed having my head broken.

S. How come? Who? Where?

I. The peasants in the village of Genad.

S. You must have done something wrong.

I. (Indignantly) I didn't do a thing wrong. I just opened my mouth, and I nearly had it shut forever by the peasants. "You," they told me, "don't come to us with that kind of talk. We know from the Serbians who flee Yugoslavia what things are like there, and if you have anything good to say about Tito, we'll know what kind of a man you are. And you'll be through!" So, I kept my mouth shut. I would even have swallowed my tongue. They were ready to beat me up and turn me over to the militia—I know they were.

II. It's a tough job! It's still easy to leave pamphlets un-

der doors. . . . But to talk, to persuade, to recruit men for this kind of action—that's tough. It's like sticking your head in a lion's mouth. This can't go on, S.

S. You just don't know how to go about it. You're a couple of frightened women.

I. Look who's talking about frightened women! Why don't you go around the villages and see what it's like? The housewives who curse us are even worse than the men. "We want peace," they shout at us, "we want to work, we want to raise our children, we don't want war. . . ."

S. (looking out into the street through the curtains at the window, walking nervously back and forth, then turning contemptuously on the two men) You're not men, you're rags. . . . I would riddle you with bullets if I could. (Enraged) I have a mission to carry out! Those who entrusted me with it will hold me responsible for your failure. How can I carry it out? With what? With two idiots like you? What have you accomplished since you signed the contract? Because you did sign a contract, you know, which is now in a safe place. Just try to wriggle out, and we'll know how to handle you. So, you want to save your skins, do you? Cowards!

II. What do you mean, I haven't done anything for the cause? All the wine I bought to give the peasants and weaken their resistance. . . . They drank three barrels of wine in one village. It's not my fault if they don't give in afterwards? I would gladly poison them, when I think of how they took my land away from me, how they now work my fields. I still have my tavern and my vineyard, but who knows for how long? I didn't do anything, didn't I? I don't know my own interests, the interests of those like us, don't I? I did everything I could—the peasants are just not in the mood to listen to us. Me, especially. They keep calling me "kulak."

S. If they won't cooperate willingly, force them.

I. Force them—how?

S. Frighten the weak ones. Threaten them with the A-bomb! Threaten them with a possible invasion, with the army Tito is forming to punish all those who went over to the Communist side! Tell them they'll be taken from their homes at night, that they'll be brutally murdered, and their children too, if they don't work for us. Why don't you do that? What do you do? Have you set the peasants' crops and barns on fire? You haven't done anything. . . . All you do is wonder through the villages like beggars.

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Why Honza Did Not Become King

by Jiri Marek

The Czech play *Why Honza Did Not Become King* is a verse comedy for children, not without its own wry charm. Described as a "non-fairy tale," its satire is ap-

parently intended to dispel the appeal to youthful imaginations of pomp, pageantry, and the glamor of kings. (Attacks on royalty are not a major propaganda preoccupation in Czechoslovakia, which has not had a monarchical form of government since 1918.) Part of Act I, Scene 4, is quoted here.

King: You, dear Honza, are a hero,
Nevertheless, you could do with some education in behavior.
How to talk, how to bow, your table manners. . . .
Here the teacher
Will tell you all, give you lessons. . . .
(Honza yawns deeply)

Minister (furious): You are not permitted to yawn here!

King: Gentlemen, begin! And we shall watch.

Teacher: Let us start with a bow. A man of standing
will reveal his spirit by the way he bows.
You must learn to make your compliments,
Because the world is based on compliments.

Honza: And all along I thought
that the world was founded on honesty and work. . . .

Minister: Psst!

Teacher: A deep bow, your head up,
A smile, no worries on your face,
Your back curved, shift your foot,
You eyes cast down. . . .

Honza: Just a moment Sir: to whom, do you think,
I should bow so deeply?

Minister: To everyone, that is the custom.
To everyone of high standing.

Honza: Is that so? I think it should be to people who deserve it, regardless of their standing. To a worker who does his job, a mother who raises children. . . . Well, in fact, to him who lives honestly and to the satisfaction of his neighbors. And in that case no one needs to shift his foot, bend his back and all that nonsense. . . .

Minister: To bow to a worker! How shameful!

Teacher (uneasy): Let us please pass to Lesson Two.
You must talk like a nobleman,
Therefore let us proceed to verse.
I shall say a word—let it be “wit”,
You try to find a rhyme—see? perhaps “bit”.
Now, Sir, do try again, please: “wit”!

Honza (shaking his head in despair, because he cannot think of a rhyme, then saying quietly and shyly): I shall hit!

(The teacher, frightened, draws back.)

Honza (smiling): Don't be scared, it's just a rhyme!

Teacher: I know, Sir, I am not scared.
And now, a sentence, Sir: “A messenger
came to the king. . . .”

Honza: “. . . and claimed he was an ass. . . .”

King: Who is an ass?

Honza (smiling, while the teacher faints): The messenger, of course; he did not knock before he entered. . . .

Teacher (in distress, to the King): I think we should end the lesson now. . . .

King: Oh, by no means! He must be educated,
How else could he live here at the palace?

Honza (cheerfully): I am amazed, Sir King, that you worry about these rhymes. One hardly can be sincere in verse—one cannot talk heart to heart.

Teacher: Heart to heart may talk the people
laboring in the King's fields.
The educated man, the nobleman who need not work,
looks for amusement, drinks, and composes verse.

Honza: As long as the workers let him. And then—

Teacher (to change the subject): The gentleman is tired.
Beyond my hopes
he has proved excellently gifted. . . .
But now he should have a rest. . . .

King (impatiently): No, better try another lesson.
Now, to my mind, it is high time
We taught him to rule as a king.
Dear Honza, you may trust my words—
To be a king is hard work,
To sit on a throne all the long day
with a polished crown on your head,
holding the polished scepter and the apple. . . .
To be a king means hard work, honestly. . . .

Honza: And don't you think, dear King, that on the fields
the workers have much harder work to do?

(The Master of Ceremonies has entered the scene and lifts his baton. Two chamberlains enter, carrying on cushions the crown, the scepter, and insignia. The teacher takes the insignia and passes them to Honza.)

Teacher: Let us try right away. Sit on the throne!
Here, hold the scepter. Here the apple and the crown. . . .
Don't move. Sit still . . . with dignity. Be composed!
A serious mien . . . and . . . sit up straight.
That's better . . . this way. . . .

(Honza amused, smiles, moves his head, shifts around)

Teacher: What's the matter now?

Honza: A fly. . . .

Teacher: That cannot bother a king.

Honza: But it sits on my nose . . . (tries to shoo it away,
the crown on his head goes askew)

Teacher: It's undignified to be scared by a fly.

King: Look more severe.

Teacher (addressing Honza): Certainly, Sir! A king
Must look severely at his subjects!

Honza: At the fly?

Teacher: What's that again?

(Honza waves the scepter).

Teacher: That is a mistake!

You aren't supposed to move the scepter!

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The Mole

by Jerzy Lutowski

The Mole is a play with an "industrial" theme—its setting is a mine in Poland and its purpose is to define the proper roles of, and attitudes toward, workers, Stakhanovites, management and Party. It is worthwhile to note the characterization of the mining engineer in charge of work safety. A non-Party man from the former bourgeoisie, he is shown in conflict with a dishonorable shockworker and an errant Party bureaucrat. The sympathetic nature of his characterization points up the Polish regime's need for and concern with non-Communist skilled professional workers, as long as they are socially repentant and economically useful.

The second act focuses on a case of cheating in fulfilling the norms on the part of Stakhanovite Kotula, who orders his work brigade to build the mine shoring (lumber supporting the ceiling of a mine shaft) carelessly and rapidly in order to save time and win the work competition. Kotula is backed by a naive local Party secretary, Kubica, who knows little about the technical aspects of mine work and foolishly underestimates the danger of Kotula's methods. Horatynski, the mining engineer and non-Party man, responsible for work safety, is aware of Kubica and Kotula's schemes, but reluctant to start any trouble. In Act II, Scene I, Horatynski is questioning one of the workers, Gawrych, whom he has assigned to make some investigations in Kotula's section of the mine. Kubica, who has just been arguing with Horatynski, is present at the interview.

Horatynski: Did you inspect the sixth level today?

Gawrych (glancing quickly at both men): Yes.

Horatynski: And did you go to Kotula's section?

Gawrych: Yes.

Horatynski: How is it?

Gawrych: All right. Fine. They do their work very well.

Horatynski: Did you also check the shoring?

Gawrych: Yes, I did. They're putting it up.

Horatynski: According to the regulations?

Gawrych: The posts are everywhere . . . perhaps . . . perhaps some of them are too far apart. But the ceiling is firm. . . .

Kubica (triumphantly): You see? Didn't I tell you?

Horatynski: It isn't for the miner to say what's safe. (To *Gawrych*) Why haven't you reported your observations?

Gawrych: I thought . . . there was nothing to report.

Kubica: Of course! (To *Horatynski*) You would have ordered the work stopped. You would have begun to count, measure, put up more posts . . . and in the meantime Kotula and his men would have had to stop working—stop now, when every hour counts!

Horatynski: I am primarily concerned with safety. I am responsible for it.

Kubica: But you've heard what *Gawrych* said. There's absolutely no danger. (He rises) And as for responsibility—I also have mine. And I will not allow the work competition to fail because of your whims! (More violently) No, my dear man. Don't expect that from me! I'll defend the workers' and the Party's interests even if you pile under my nose a ton of your books on your . . . some prewar regulations.

Horatynski: There is nothing further to discuss!

Kubica: That's right. No use pouring from an empty bucket. We'll go down into the mine, see for ourselves, and then we'll talk. (He goes toward the door.)

Horatynski: Are you coming down with me?

Kubica: What did you think? Of course! I have to see for myself (emphatically) so that nobody will fool me later. (Exit *Kubica*.)

(A moment of silence)

Gawrych: Do you still need me?

Horatynski: Yes. You'll come with us.

Gawrych: All right, but first I'll have to change my clothes. (He goes toward the door).

Horatynski: *Gawrych*!
(*Gawrych* stops and turns around).

Horatynski: How was it really with the shoring?

Gawrych: Well, you see. . . .

Horatynski: Come, tell me the truth!

Gawrych: Kotula's work is not too good. . . .

Horatynski: Oh, I see?

Gawrych: There is no danger so far, but. . . .

Horatynski: Yes?

Gawrych: Mister manager! I don't want to be mixed up in this. I don't want to get a knife in my back. . . .

Horatynski: What do you mean?

Gawrych: I don't trust that fellow Kotula. He'll do anything. He has even made threatening remarks about you. But he won't stop at talking. He will back his words with deeds.

Horatynski: Why haven't you told *Kubica* about it?

Gawrych: He would accuse me of blackening the man's character. He would say I'd done it out of spite. . . . Mister manager, I'll be frank! I don't think we can convince *Kubica*. When he sees that there's nothing too terrible about the shoring . . . will he think about

what will happen there tomorrow? No, sir. He'll immediately try to rationalize. And in the meantime—God forbid—if the ceiling should cave in. . . .

Horatynski: I won't allow that! I'll order the work to stop at once!

Gawrych: And Kubica will immediately accuse you of sabotaging the competition.

Horatynski: An investigating commission will check that!

Gawrych: Whatever you want, Mister manager. But what if the commission says there was no danger?

Horatynski: But you said. . . .!

Gawrych: I was talking about what *might* happen. It is difficult to say for sure. Anyway, you'll see for yourself.

Horatynski: What shall I do?

Gawrych: Do I know? It is difficult to fight Kotula alone and here you have to consider Kubica as well. (He goes toward the door)

Horatynski: *Gawrych*! (coughs, hesitating) You say . . . that there is no immediate danger?

Gawrych: Immediate? No, definitely no.

Horatynski (looking down): Go and change your clothes. (Exit *Gawrych*. *Horatynski* sits for a while motionlessly, holding his forehead with his hand. A knock is heard at the door.)

Horatynski (reluctantly): Come in.
(Enter *Gorzelok*, a worker)

Gorzelok: I just wanted to ask whether I should continue fixing the roof today or start on the pipe lines?

Horatynski (absently): Start on the pipe lines.

Gorzelok: There's another thing . . . Was *Basiura* here today? [Ed: *Basiura* is the man who first informed *Horatynski* that there was something wrong at *Kotula's* section of the mine]

Horatynski (surprised): How did you know?

Gorzelok: Because I sent him here myself when he told me about everything. He didn't want to come at first. . . . What are you going to do?

Horatynski: I don't know. I don't think I can do much. . . . I'll go down, look around.

Gorzelok: And what?

Horatynski (wearily): If I see there's no imminent danger, I'll let *Kotula* do whatever he wants.

Gorzelok: You can't do that! You'll be acting against your conscience.

Horatynski: And what can I do when my conscience doesn't agree with *Kubica*?

Gorzelok: You must persuade him that you're right! What else can you do if you want to fight for what is right?

Horatynski: Fight? Against whom? The Party?

Gorzelok: *Kubica* is not the Party!

Horatynski: For you he isn't, for me he is. . . .

Gorzelok: He isn't for you either. There's the district [Party committee] over *Kubica*, and over the district there's the town; and over the town, the Provincial Committee. . . .

Horatynski: And over that the Central Committee itself. You don't have to teach me about the pyramid. I know about it! But all this isn't for me. I am a non-Party engineer in the *Swit* mine, and in the *Swit* mine, *Kubica* is the Party!

Gorzelok: No! Here, just as everywhere else, the Party means the people. *Kubica* is only one single man. He can make a mistake. But when he does, somebody should point it out to him.

Horatynski: And what if it doesn't work that way?

Gorzelok: I told you—one must fight!

Horatynski: Listen to me, *Gorzelok*. We've known each other some twenty years. We are almost friends. I'll tell you frankly: before, I used to fight for every rule and against every kind of violation. And what happened? Everywhere I turned obstacles were put in my way. They called me a bureaucrat, alien to the working class—practically an enemy. Perhaps it's true that I am an alien here; I don't know. I'm so bewildered. It's a fact that my parents rented land, my father was a doctor. Perhaps this hangs over one so that there is no way out? I do feel our new reality, I—please don't laugh—I do believe in this new, better Poland! But what should I do? Should I shout at meetings that I love the People's Poland? Would they believe me? Would they? That's all very well for somebody else; I wanted to work for this Poland honestly. But they won't let you. . . . You see, *Gorzelok*, I have a family—a wife, a son, two daughters. My son is studying at the Polytechnic. Should I risk all this, knowing beforehand that I will lose? No! I only want peace! I have suffered enough, fought enough. . . . Let anything happen, anything at all! I have no more strength, *Gorzelok*, no more strength. . . .

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Energy

by Gyula Hay

Energy enjoyed considerable box-office success in Hungary. Its theme is the American-Soviet controversy over atomic energy. It is a stereotyped propaganda play, with two main lines of attack: American atomic energy policy, and Hungarian emigres. It is sentimental and crude, its interest lying solely in its exploitation of a real conflict, and its apparent reference to living persons. Thus, in the figure of *Pereszlenyi* (depicted in the play as a scientist who fled to America from Hungary after failing to take over control of the Hungarian post-war government) may be recognized Professor *Szentgyorgyi*, a Nobel Prize (1937)

winner who has been living in the United States since 1947. The figure of Eperjesi may represent either Professor Pal Gombas or Professor Janossy, both atomic physicists who left Hungary for the West and later returned to Hungary as "faithful patriots." (At the time of their return, it was assumed that both were involved in the Fuchs case.)

The play opens in a Budapest research laboratory. Professor Eperjesi has been working in atomic research for nine years, and discusses his findings with a Polish scientist, Gribb, who fled to America from the Germans and became one of the developers of the atom bomb. Eperjesi feels responsible, not for the bomb dropped on Japan, but for "the consequences." He decides to go to the West in order to turn atomic research into peaceful channels. Another scientist who wishes to escape is Professor Pereszlenyi, a megalomaniac who wanted to take over control of the Hungarian government after "the war." Through an official in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, both manage to obtain passports and leave for America.

In America (Act II) they discover the true face of "corrupt, warmongering capitalist imperialism" in the circle of atomic researchers. All research work is financed by an old American millionaire, Mr. Morton. Non-American researchers do all the work for small salaries under the supervision of one American scientist, Mr. Hard. The group is concerned only with producing sensational copy for the newspapers and seeing to it that atomic power is used solely for military purposes.

At a Physicists' Convention in Paris (Act III), the characters declare themselves and split into two factions. Professor Eperjesi, an American woman scientist named Barbara Hilton, and the Polish scientist Gribb choose the "correct" (Communist) side, while Pereszlenyi and his American backers choose the "wrong" side. The final scene showing the climax of this clash is quoted below.

Hard: Speak up, Gribb.

Gribb: In a minute. First let me call in two of my friends. (Hard nods, Gribb calls into the next room) Would you mind coming in? (Juhasz, a Hungarian scientist, and Buda, a Hungarian Communist official, enter.) Dr. Juhasz, Councillor, Mr. Hard.

Pereszlenyi: What does this mean?

Gribb: This is the moment when I would like to repay a debt. You all know that I left my home country in flight from Fascism. America offered me asylum and made it possible for me to use my knowledge for the destruction of Fascism. I was privileged to participate in the great work—using also the outstanding ideas of my friend Eperjesi—which resulted in the development of the atom bomb. . . .

Hard: Bravo!

Gribb: That is what a large part of the world said when, as a result of our efforts, 40,000 people died in Nagasaki and 80,000 in Hiroshima within an instant. I, however, cursed that instant.

Eperjesi (excitedly): But why?

Gribb: Because later I learned, my friend, that our bombs were not dropped to destroy Fascism. Only Japanese Fascism was smashed.

Eperjesi: What are you talking about?

Gribb: The lords of the Japanese empire wanted to lay down their arms so that the fallen Japanese Fascism could be replaced by the new American Fascism. And for this purpose they needed our bomb, our knowledge.

Gribb (seizing an American flag lying in front of him and taking it over to a side table): I thank this flag for what it gave me. (He picks up the Polish flag and puts it on the table in front of him.) And now I'll return for the rest of my life to the flag of my own people.

Hard: Are you out of your mind? A push of the button and. . . .

Gribb: I know that button. . . . And I know what will keep your hand from pushing it. The fear that our "push" may be stronger. And from now on, I'll try to increase that fear in you.

Eperjesi: Gribb, I don't want to give up our scientific collaboration. . . .

Juhasz: Scientific collaboration, nonsense. Mr. Hard has just now practically heard the falling of the iron curtain between you two.

Hard: I have only heard that right here there is a very lucky man, Gabor Eperjesi. He has just inherited a lavishly equipped scientific institute with a terrific salary. The institute formerly headed by Mr. Gribb . . . unless Mr. Gribb declares that the whole thing is a joke.

Gribb: No, it's no joke.

Hard: Gabor, congratulations. All your wishes have come true, you will live like a king.

Eperjesi (dully): But for what?

Hard: Science; after all, you are a scientist.

Eperjesi: And what will be the purpose of my science? I want to know what they need me for. I want a guarantee. A guarantee that they will not force me to do anything I don't approve of.

Hard: Ha, you want the power of the President and the wealth of Ford. For nothing short of this would give you a guarantee of this kind.

Juhasz: Remarkable. I am not the president of even a bowling club and own less than a corner of a field—and yet a whole State guarantees that I can do what I think is right.

Eperjesi: Don't murder science. Don't force me into villainy. Can you guarantee this? Can you?

Buda: You are not fair. Without thinking, you agreed to conditions in a new country and now you demand a guarantee to which you would have a right only in your homeland—if you had not left it.

Barbara Hilton: But why don't we, whose home it [America] is, have this guarantee?

Hard: That's enough. There is no reason for me to listen to all this. (To Eperjesi) You are a stateless person without documents, enjoying the hospitality of our country. We never took advantage of this. We gave you documents, you were free to travel to and fro. We have offered you an excellent job. At this moment our offer still stands.

Eperjesi (proudly lifting his head): By what right do you call me homeless? (To Buda) You, Miklos, once you sent me a message through Professor Gribb—about my passport. Does it still stand?

Buda: Yes, it does.

Juhasz: You have a place in our new laboratory, Gabor. A great many beautiful projects to work on.

Hard: Ah, yes. Folding paper bags in a jail.

Barbara: Would they punish you?

Eperjesi: I cannot ask. Making conditions would be out of place in this matter. I want my passport.

Buda: To tell the truth, I anticipated this request. (Pulls a passport out of his pocket) I've brought your passport with me.

Pereszlenyi: Don't put yourself in their hands. Think of our scientific standing.

Eperjesi: When can I start home?

Buda: At the end of the convention.

Pereszlenyi: A way of life is at stake, Gabor. . . . Unrestricted individualism . . . scientific independence . . . the sacred character of family life. . . .

Hard: That's enough. Pereszlenyi, you're responsible. Put things in order.

Pereszlenyi: Yes. (he drinks the drink which he poured some time before) Home! . . . What about me? Am I not a patriot? Are there no Hungarian patriots in America? They came to see me. . . .

Eperjesi: And you turned your back on them.

Pereszlenyi: I made them wait. Now I'll reach out my hand to them.

Hard: Bravo!

Pereszlenyi (going over to Eperjesi): My father was a physician. He used to say that the man who doesn't

want to get well cannot be cured. Humanity doesn't want to get well. . . . But I want to be happy. I am an old man and I want to die happy. And you, Barbara, you should seek happiness—with him, Gabor.

Barbara (close to Eperjesi): No. Don't use me as bait. I love you very much, Gabor. But you are capable of much greater emotions than this love. I won't go with you and you should not come with me. . . . You will hear from me yet. There are many problems of common interest. . . . Send me your formulas in your letters. . . . I shall be looking for the correct use for them. . . . This is true unity: the ocean between us, and yet we'll always be together. (Goes over to Eperjesi offering her hand)

Eperjesi (shaking Barbara's hand): I have never felt such strength in your hand, Barbara—nor in my own.

Barbara: Our love could not have ended more beautifully.

Pereszlenyi: I am going. . . .

Eperjesi: Wait, I want to say good-bye. I won't say "till we meet again," because what will have happened to you by the time of the next conference? You have given up science and betrayed your country. Family, happiness, all will leave you. And where does my path lead? I have offended my country, I know. It was hard for me to find the road of faith, but finally I did find it. If the two of us—at one time close friends—meet again, we won't know each other. (He takes a step toward Buda to get his Hungarian passport, but stops first and, taking out his American papers from his pocket, puts them on the table. Then he takes his Hungarian passport from Buda and looks at it with deep emotion.) My whole life, which I have just regained, is before me, in which to become worthy of my mother's forgiveness.

Barbara: You haven't disappointed me, Gabor.

Hard (pockets Eperjesi's documents): Don't kid yourself into thinking we have no more trumps. Let's go, Pereszlenyi. (Exit Hard and Pereszlenyi. Singing by French Communist demonstrators is heard offstage.)

Eperjesi (drawing himself up to his full height, holding his passport with both hands): I'm going home. The day after tomorrow I shall see the Danube from the plane. It was a long way round to reach this point. . . . Words fail me . . . (turning to all present) We shall save man . . . we and (pointing out to the window to the singers) they. . . . We shall have the strength . . . the power . . . (suddenly embraces Buda) Thank you . . . (Music louder. All turn to the window. Then, from nearby, shots are heard in the streets. They look at each other and then turn their intent eyes again to the window).

CURTAIN

The Wolves, published by Literature & Arts State Editions (Bucharest), 1952

Why Honza Did Not Become King, published by Osteva Publishing House (Prague), 1951

The Mole, quoted in the bi-weekly *Teatr* (Warsaw), September 1, 1953

Energy, quoted in the literary magazine *Csillag* (Budapest), January, 1953



Kobietai Zycie (Warsaw), July 1, 1953

"It was early in the morning before working time at the Ganz Factory, but the plant day nursery was already buzzing with activity. Janoska and Kata Timar were accompanied by their mother to the entrance. She kissed them farewell and hurried to work. In a few minutes the machine she operated was humming at full tilt.

"Whoever enters the day nursery looks around in astonishment. The children are immaculately clean, they do not talk baby talk and neither does the kindergarten teacher. Three and four year old human beings who must be taken seriously live here. How could anyone use baby talk to little Andris who knows that the new subway now being built under the Danube between Buda and Pest will be one of the most beautiful subways in the world, second only to the wonderful Moscow metro; or to little Joska, who has decided to be a miner when he grows up. . . . These children are very different from what we were. They are the children of the new life, who are brought up in the spirit of political consciousness, discipline and enthusiastic love for the Party and the Fatherland."

Radio Kossuth (Budapest), February 10, 1953

Soviet educational plans for Eastern Europe have not been altered by the New Course recently adopted by Satellite premiers. The master plan—that is, the creation of a new type of citizen popularly called the "new Socialist man"—is still in force. Schooling for the "Socialistically-oriented youth" starts in the creches where every toy is designed to teach. It progresses in kindergarten where the child is "collective-trained" through group play, and continues in youth organizations and schools, ultimately flowering in the adult's Party membership. "Children should be brought up as collectivists, not as individualists . . . in this manner our educational methods are different from those of the bourgeoisie." Extracted from the hyperbole of Communist pedagogical literature, this succinct sen-

Infant Communists

In the Soviet orbit, from cradle to grave refers to indoctrination, not to security. The following article briefly explores the aims and methods of Communist educational techniques for pre-school and young children.

tence in a Polish teachers' handbook* clarifies Satellite educational goals and techniques. The importance of early political indoctrination is stressed in all such textbooks. According to *Predskolni Vychova*, an official Czechoslovak monthly, "even the smallest child must know who leads our country to glory. We shall teach the young to love the Communist Party. We must acquaint them with leading Party members in their communities and we must stimulate their eagerness to become valuable Party members when they grow up. There must be more political education in kindergarten."

Ends and Means

The theoretical basis for training infant Communists is the same as that for the school child, or for the adult who must be "re-educated." It is based on the principles of dialectical materialism, particularly on the second principle, that "matter is primary." The Communist theorist, assuming that the human mind is "a derivative" [of matter], applies these principles to the question of mind formation and education.

Rukovodstvo Za Detskite Gradini (Sofia), a handbook for kindergarten teachers, makes the following points:

"The education and formation of the new man—the future builder of Communism—can only be achieved by Socialist methods and it must start in kindergarten.

"Scientific psychology states that the teacher's guiding role does not consist in finding the psychological characteristics of the child, but rather in understanding the development of the child's total psychology in order to shape it.

"During the pre-school age, experiences are a motive power. Therefore the teacher must follow every activity (playing, drawing, modeling, etc.) very carefully.

"In order to create a foundation for [the child's] polit-

* *Pedagogika* (Warsaw), 1951.

ical education and a Marxist-Leninist attitude toward the world, we must create, incite and demonstrate an emotional attitude characteristic of Socialist reality and society. As a result of such an atmosphere the child will include this reality with what already seems real to him. . . . In this manner, according to the tenets of scientific psychology and pedagogy, the child's entire development is a result of education and Party training and includes an ideal, revolutionary concept. It is not a maturing or developing of his own biological and inherited characteristics."

In October 1953, *Zasady Nauczania*, Poland's standard textbook on education since 1930, was severely attacked for its stress on self-realization. An article by M. Gluth, published in *Nowa Szkoła* (Warsaw), No. 5, found that Nowaczynski, author of the textbook, holds that the aim of education is "the development of personality" and that "education should be a cultural function of society."

Although the Communists themselves authorized a new edition of this textbook as recently as 1948, they have now discovered that the principles of education laid down in this book contradict basic Marxist principles. Gluth calls Nowaczynski's theory "capitalistic and bourgeois." Education centered on the development of personality is faulty, because it hinders man in fulfilling the tasks of dialectical materialism: dialectical materialism advocates perceiving the laws of Nature first, and then establishing an education which would enable man to change both environment and society according to the laws of Nature. Thus, "education is not a cultural function but a function of the material laws of nature." And an education which develops man's personality "does not conform to the theory of evolution, on which dialectical materialism is based."

Mind and Matter, Pavlov and Makarenko

The deceased Ivan Pavlov* and Anton Makarenko** constitute the two strongest influences in the education of Satellite youth. Pavlov's doctrine of conditioned reflexes provides the basis for character forming, and Makarenko's use of the collective as a unit for play, education and work is emulated in school and kindergarten alike.

An article in the May, 1953 issue of *Ovodai Neveles*, a Budapest magazine on kindergarten affairs, paraphrases Pavlov's educational theories and includes a quotation from Makarenko's works. This equation—three parts Pavlov, one part Makarenko, with its variables, $2P + 2M$ or $3M + 1P$ —represents the scientific basis for Satellite education. Advising teachers as follows, the article declared:

"According to Pavlov's doctrine a child's every step must be watched. We must strive to build up reflexes and impressions in children which will form the basis for positive characteristics. . . . By systematically exposing children to certain stimuli, certain changes can be brought about in their nervous systems and these changes may be directed toward the desired goals.

"Pavlov's doctrines on the types of nervous systems and on their unlimited possibilities for change is the

basis of Soviet pedagogy, wherein the teacher's influence in character molding is of great significance. . . . Guiding a child's attention and energies toward the most important goal in life is prerequisite to a correct ideological education. To achieve his goal a child must become a true builder of Communism, an enthusiastic Party worker and an ardent patriot. A good education not only molds the mentality, but also coordinates the whole nervous system in a favorable manner."

Touch Control

Pavlov's methods, as used in the Communist education of children in State kindergartens, were spelled out in the February 1954 issue of *Wychowanie w Przedszkolu*, official publication of Poland's Ministry of Education. An article, based on a lecture delivered at a special course for the heads of the preschool sections of the Polish schools, reviewed in detail Pavlov's "first and second signal system" and showed how this could be applied in teaching.

Pavlov divided all stimuli affecting man into two categories: 1. Real objects and phenomena acting on the senses—sight, hearing, touch, smell, taste—constituting the first signal system; 2. Words standing for objects and phenomena, constituting the second signal system. Pavlov's teaching method calls for the establishment of "associative connections" in the mind of the child; i.e., every idea or abstraction should be linked with an example of something concrete and readily comprehensible. The themes of such identifications should be "most carefully selected," said the article, and the selection must be made "from the political point of view."

Examples of how this should be done were given. For instance, when it is explained to 3 year-old children that "Boleslaw Bierut loves them," a photograph of Bierut surrounded by smiling children should be shown to them. When children are taught that "the Soviet Union is a friendly nation," they should be taken to see the peasants at work with the agricultural machines. The children should be told that these machines are gifts from the Soviet people "who put the machines on a train which carried them through many, many cities, towns and villages, in order to make the work of the Polish peasants easier."

Nursery School Arithmetic

Despite implications that nursery schools are established for the sole purpose of removing young children from their families' influence and placing them in an ideological hothouse, this is not the only factor. Under a Communist government infant- and child-care institutions play a dual role. They represent an essential part of the national economy as well as mind-forming media; even Malenkov emphasized their economic significance in his report of August 1953. Satellite planners are preoccupied with the pressing need for women in industry and agriculture. Nurseries and kindergartens represent the only means which will permit a large-scale recruiting of women workers. Consequently there are frequent references in the press to the need for new child-care centers. To sugar-coat the

* Russian physiologist, 1849-1936.

** Ukrainian educator, 1889-1939.

pill, recruiting campaigns for women workers are usually carried out under such slogans as:

"To sit at home all day long is no pleasure."

"Who would dare suggest today that the vocation of women lies in spoiling their men?"

"A progressive woman should renounce for good and all that stupid and confusing circle of church and children."

"We must make it possible for women to demonstrate their capabilities in commerce, transport and industry, everywhere in the building of Socialism. Those are the fields where women find their greatest satisfaction."

Women Must Work

As there has been no indication that children behind the Iron Curtain are less responsive to home care than their Western counterparts, the Communist campaign to wrest women from their homes and employ their best energies in outside labor is meeting opposition. The following press quotations from the Baltic countries, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary illustrate the regime viewpoint, while the people's attitudes may either be read between the lines—or directly, as in this first example:

"Women should stop lamenting; a day nursery must be set up and mothers must work. Thus may we fight for a good harvest this year." (*Radio Kossuth*, Budapest, 1953.)

"Little Aavo says to his mother in the evening: 'You

know, Mother, last year you were only able to work for the kolkhoz for a few days during all of four months, but now that I go to kindergarten and you work every day it will be 24 days each month.' . . . This illustrates Stalinist care for the well-being and happy future for Soviet women and children." (*The Estonian Woman*, Tallinn, 1950.)

"The network of children's institutions is yearly being expanded. . . . The more comprehensive this network can be, the more women will be able to take part in farm work on the collectives." (*Tiesa*, Kaunas, 1952, Lithuanian Communist Party organ.)

" . . . in Vitkov street in Prague-Karlin, a day and night nursery has been opened, which will even operate on Sundays and State holidays. This will be of great help to women employed in Karlin factories who will now be able to work night shifts undisturbed by the thought that their children are not being cared for." (*Prace*, Prague, 1953.)

"It was formerly the custom of the women on the *Kiskunhalas Rakoczi* Collective Farm to stay at home. Last year the first day nursery was set up on the farm. It has proved such a success that 50 women have already reported for work. . . . By April 15 another day nursery will open and the forming of more women's brigades may be expected." (*Radio Kossuth*, Budapest, 1951.)

Child care institutions are roughly divided into the following groups: creches for babies from six weeks to three years; kindergartens for children from three to six or

*Monthly Cost for Child Upkeep in Poland**

Total monthly wages, computed after Jan. 1, 1953.	Town creches	Weekly creches	Town kindergartens [9 hours]	Town kindergartens [5 hours]	Children's community centers [board incl.]	Summer camps	Seasonal camps and town camps	Vacation houses [per season]	Children's health homes
to 510	15	25	15	12	7	15	12	45	30
from 511 to 640	18	30	18	14	8	18	14	52	35
from 641 to 750	22	35	22	17	9	22	17	60	40
from 751 to 990	26	40	26	20	10	30	20	67	45
from 991 to 1210	30	45	30	23	11	40	25	75	50
from 1211 to 1440	35	55	35	27	14	50	30	90	60
from 1441 to 1780	40	67	40	31	16	60	36	105	70
from 1781 to 2390	50	80	50	39	18	70	42	120	80
from 2391 to 2850	60	100	60	47	20	80	50	150	100
over 2850	75	125	75	58	25	100	60	210	140

* Cost is covered by parent or guardian. Figures are given in *zloty* as of January 1, 1953 from *Przegląd Zagadnień Socjalnych* (Warsaw), April 1953. All figures, with the exception of vacation homes, which are given per season, are calculated by month.

seven; hostels which care for homeless children from six weeks to nine or ten years; and a variety of mobile nurseries and seasonal kindergartens which are set up "on location" for special projects. In Poland, for instance, creches are divided between those established under municipal or provincial councils and those organized on work locations for the exclusive use of employees.

Statistics on the number of pre-school children receiving institutional care are incomplete; however the following figures will give some indication of the extent of the child care program. *Wola Ludu*, a Warsaw daily, wrote on August 22, 1952:

"A new kindergarten opens on September 1. Poland will then have 8,125 kindergartens in which conscientious and professional care will be provided for some 379,000 children. . . . Teaching cadres will be strengthened by some 2,000 new, fully-qualified persons. . . . Thanks to the expanding network of kindergartens every fifth child between three and seven years of age will be able to take advantage of this pre-school education and attention. . . ."

Government figures on the increase in the number of Polish kindergartens run as follows: in 1948/49, 5,239 kindergartens handled 240,839 children; in 1949/50, 6,227 kindergartens handled 287,516 children; in 1950/51, 7,258 kindergartens handled 316,999 children; and in 1951/52, 8,125 kindergartens handled 379,700 children.

On May 29, 1953, *Rude Pravo* (Prague) quoted Professor Vana, Chairman of the Czechoslovak Committee for the Protection of Children, as follows: "Care for children begins before they are born. The result is a steady decline of the mortality rate. All children up to the age of one year receive free medical care. We are intensifying care for

children up to three years in babies homes, nurseries and kindergartens. Almost one quarter of a million children enjoy life in nurseries. . . ."


Pre-school child care is not a free service, but is computed on the basis of a worker's monthly wage (see chart on preceding page). A Polish worker earning 510 *zloty* a month will pay 15 for the same period if he places his baby in a town creche. His more affluent co-worker, who earns 2,850 *zloty* or more a month, will pay 75 of these to a town creche or kindergarten.

Is it advisable to separate young children from their home atmospheres, form their characters and tame their psyches through the medium of institutional care? This question is never approached in Satellite publications except from the point of view where the hygienic, environmental and educational advantages of creche and kindergarten are continually lauded. A sampling of world opinion on this matter indicates that the majority of educators oppose institutional care on the scale that is now practiced behind the Iron Curtain. What Communist theorists describe as infant bliss is referred to as "maternal deprivation" in a 1951 publication of the World Health Organization. Satellite educators, however, must perforce turn a deaf ear to all theories which do not emanate from Moscow.

Countless infants are thus being taught the meaning of "proletarian democracy," an inexorable educational process continuing without change even while the political scene changes. Using the motto of education in the collective, through the collective and for the collective, the schools of East Europe are turning out children reared in a tradition contrary to the world's great Western cultures, and they are the citizens of tomorrow with whom the non-Communist world must negotiate.

Too Young To Know

The spectacle of small children agitating for Communist policies whose meaning is far beyond the scope of their understanding has finally been recognized as absurd by the Communists. *Rude Pravo* (Prague), November 22, chided the Pioneer Organization (Communist Youth League) for sending its members (aged 9-14) on missions such as: visiting farmers to "persuade" them to set up agricultural cooperatives, recommending technical literature which "they themselves could not possibly understand," and writing letters to factory workers challenging them to undertake work competitions. "What this overemphasis on children's 'initiative' can lead to is shown in the case of the Klatovy Pioneers, who wrote a letter to the President [Zapotocky] pledging themselves to guide their parents to 100 percent fulfillment of the Plan, and to induce the miners of the Pioneer pit in Ostrava to overfulfill the coal quota."



Radio Free Europe


Tonight, in the countries behind the Iron Curtain, men, women and children will gather around radios tuned to the voices of their countrymen in the West, bringing them the news of the free world, the knowledge that they are not forgotten, and the hope of their future liberation. Radio Free Europe, operating as a home service from abroad, broadcasts over a network of 22 transmitters to Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Romania, competing directly with all Satellite Communist stations.

This is the Voice of Free Czechoslovakia . . .

Hidden Opportunities in the Elections

When the regime at long last; i.e., after six years, announced its intention of holding elections for the national committees, we considered for some time what attitude to adopt, how to advise you—if you permit us to advise you; what to ask of you—if we have a right to ask for anything. The question was: to boycott these elections, or to attempt putting them to good use? Insofar as elections to the National Assembly are concerned (for these also are scheduled), everything is plain to everybody: nothing can be done, for the regime is going to announce in any case that 99 percent of the votes were cast in favor of its candidates—and the three hundred puppets, whose every word and every move can be minutely controlled by the regime, will go on eating their bread, thickly buttered. So it follows: don't concern yourselves with the elections to the National Assembly. But the plant councils and the national committees—they are quite a different matter. There hundreds of thousands of functionaries will be elected and the regime cannot possibly place a policeman alongside every single one. While the National Assembly resembles a brilliantly lit playground, the national committees resemble a thicket. Three hundred thousand people will be elected to them—a considerable percentage of the nation, and it always matters what a considerable percentage of the nation is doing. They will not be three hundred thousand devoted Communists, because the regime is not backed by three hundred thousand devoted Communists. Here the regime is about to create a gigantic body which it can control only with difficulty. If the people have objectives other

than those of the regime, the national committees are probably the place where it is possible to try to put them through. If opposition against the regime does exist, it can find expression in the national committees. In the years past, when reading the manifold complaints of *Rude Pravo* against the local national committees, we saw clearly that the national committees had already been used as the place where the true will of the people comes to the fore and where the people already assume the attitude of opposition.



But first, we have to congratulate you. After six years, and only after six years, the regime has deigned to stoop and issue the decree for elections to national committees. And it is quite certain that the regime was not the first to conceive the idea, but that it was you who did so. The regime would have managed to rule another six, twelve, or eighteen years, with the help of the national committees to which it nominates those whom it fancies.

To have renounced this most convenient and most cherished dictatorial method is the consequence of effectively demonstrated dissatisfaction; it is the triumph of the opposition, and don't let yourselves be talked into believing anything about the "democratic" nature of the regime. In short: you have forced the regime—it is possible to force the regime. . . .

Therefore, and after much deliberation, the regime issued the slogan: let's have elections to national committees! May all the best people go into the national committees! Simultaneously, of course, the regime made its preparations to see that these "best" people were not the best people at all, or that they are kept powerless. The thing now afoot falls into two periods: first period—the regime is compelled to issue the decree for elections to national

committees; second period—the government tries immediately to falsify the elections.

So far the intent of the regime. At times the regime now shyly admits to having initiated a "new course." When the wolf donned grandma's clothes and laid himself in her bed—that was the wolf's new course. The regime announces elections to the national committees but concurrently proclaims that the organization of the Communist Party must "devote great care to screening every single member." In other words, not the electorate but the Communist Party will decide about who has been elected. . . .

What is now at stake is whether or not the opposition can confer upon the coming elections a meaning different from that of the regime. The regime bestowed a task upon the national committees: to conform, meticulously, with the resolutions of the Communist Party. And what if the members of the national committees do not conform? Prime Minister Siroky said that the State must grow ever more powerful, while the national committees should be the extended arm of the State. But when the people disagree with the policy of the State—do they have an interest in extending the governmental arm? Havlicek said it: "to support a good government is honorable, to support a bad government is shameful."

Since the regime has so determined, it is imperative that three hundred thousand people should man the national committees. But it is not imperative—in accordance with the regime intention—that these people be an inert mass. If there is opposition in the country—and we know that there is—then it is not enough to note down dissenting opinions in one's diary; it is necessary to pursue concrete objectives. We do not challenge anybody to outright revolt. Start by endeavoring to bring about better labor conditions, by asking the regime to stand by its promises—of which there are many. The regime will have no weapon against you once you pin it down by its own words. If you work legally for the improvement of your condition, the regime—though gnashing its teeth—will not dare to penalize you.

The regime has not endowed the elections with any meaning. The opposition must endow them with such meaning. The regime pretends it wants initiative from you. Well, give it initiative. You will be three hundred thousand. If you wish, you can be more than just that many slaves.

Spot

A new regulation forbids the use of gold for tooth inlays and crowns, unless teeth are needed for the construction of socialism. Men don't need their teeth for working, because at work they don't eat. Women have no business smiling at work, therefore they will not be permitted any gold for their teeth. Only Zapotocky has to laugh with all his teeth showing, and police dogs have to bite in the course of their duty, therefore they are allowed to have gold teeth.

This is the Voice of Free Poland . . .

The Sowing Comedy

If one were to judge from the statements of the Polish press and radio, one would conclude that sowing is one more history-making Russian discovery. It would seem that, before the Communist occupation, the peasant in Poland did not know how to sow, did not know what a seed was, and also did not realize that it was necessary to sow in order to reap. The Spring sowing has become the show-piece of the regime bureaucracy. Although there is a shortage of artificial fertilizers because the chemical industry did not fulfill the plan; although the State Farms, given so much publicity by Bierut, are not in a position to supply graded grain; although the agricultural machinery produced by Polish workers is exported to Soviet Russia; nevertheless the Communist regime gives the peasants considerable help: a bureaucratic control of farming procedure.

Exaggerating ordinary economic activity to the extent of naming it a "nationwide action" is typical of the Communist system. The Communist regime is omniscient. It teaches the miners how to dig coal, it teaches writers how to write novels, and finally, it teaches peasants how and when they should plow and sow the land.

The majority of the people on this globe have been engaged in land cultivation for several thousand years. All during this period, the farmer has known when it was time to sow. But this is not enough for the Communists. The whole propaganda machine, regime bureaucracy and Party apparatus is mobilized every year to carry out an ordinary seasonal activity. A situation of this kind simply calls for the pen of a Zoszczenko, the immortal satirist of Soviet bureaucracy. Only he could really do justice to the strenuous efforts of the naive "experts" in agricultural problems, who with poker faces teach the peasant that Spring is the time for sowing and that crops depend on the way the sowing is carried out. It is difficult to imagine anything more grotesque than mobilizing the whole Party machine only for the peasant to go to the field and sow.

But the situation is humorous only in appearance. A tragic substance is concealed beneath. The Communist regime in Poland has deprived the peasant of his interest in his own work. The peasant—whether he farms individually or whether he has been forced into a collective—is well aware of the fact that his crops are not his property. He knows that the system of compulsory deliveries has made him solely and exclusively a supplier of agricultural products to the government. The Polish peasant has an intensified reason for apathy. Whereas in Hungary, East Germany, Romania and Czechoslovakia, the compulsory delivery quotas have been reduced, in Poland not only have the quotas been maintained on the former level, but the regime further presses the peasant to fulfill allegedly voluntary deliveries of agricultural crops in excess of the fixed quota. One cannot be surprised that, in these circumstances, the peasant lacks enthusiasm for the "sowing action."

In free countries, no propaganda agitation is needed to convince a Danish peasant or a Canadian farmer that it is

time to start sowing. The government administrative apparatus is not needed to check whether the people are prepared for the sowing. No production pledges are needed for the tractors, sowing machines or combines to be repaired on time. And yet, in spite of this, sowing is completed on time and the output per acre is much greater than in Poland.

When the sowing campaign was announced, the usual shortcomings and neglect came to light. The so-called socialist sector has proved to be unprepared for the sowing campaign. But the Polish Communists do not have the courage to admit that these negligences are an outcome of the changes in the agricultural structure of the country. The decline in agricultural production in Poland parallels the expansion of collectivization, simply because collectivization deprives the peasant of his interest in the results of his own work. The problem of untilled fallow land, about which so much is printed by the regime press, has the same source. For agriculture does not have only technical aspects. It also involves the psychological problem of the peasant's material interest in production—which even Khrushchev acknowledged. And yet decrees concerning compulsory deliveries and threats of stepped-up collectivization are directed against this self-interest.

The sowing campaign is one more symptom of the sickness which eats at the economic system organized on the Soviet model. This sickness is apathy and lack of interest in—even resistance to—work; it is what we call man's crisis in the Communist system. It is quite a normal phenomenon in a nation based on slave labor.

Today, the peasant thinks about the sowing action with distaste; he knows that the sowing campaign will be followed by a harvest-threshing campaign, and later by a campaign for the fulfillment of delivery quotas to the State. The peasant still remembers last year's sowing campaign and remembers its results. In spite of the full mobilization of the Party machinery, last year's campaign was a failure. The crops testify to its results: last year's harvest was exceptionally poor.

This year's sowing campaign is again a harvest of the regime bureaucracy. Reports and statistics will pour out. But no effort of a bureaucrat will replace the tractors expropriated by the Soviets, the grain which rotted on the fields of State Farms, the artificial fertilizer removed to Russia on Khrushchev's orders. It will not give the Polish nation the additional food which the country needs so badly. This food can be guaranteed by one thing: by the free efforts of the peasant who works his own land and who has the full right to sell his crops freely to the city markets.

This is the Voice of Free Czechoslovakia . . .

"Out of the Desert . . ."

Toward the end of last summer, the National Theater in Prague, now under Communist administration, announced its program for the coming season. The proposed program listed: an opera—80 years old; another opera—55 years



Freedom Bell monument erected at Radio Free Europe headquarters in Lisbon, Portugal, by the Crusade for Freedom. Transmitters for Radio Free Europe broadcasts are in the background.

old; a play—60 years old; an opera—140 years old; still another opera, aged 70 years; and yet another, aged 170 years; a Czech drama, written 70 years ago; another Czech play, written 110 years ago; a comedy—110 years old; a contemporary Russian play—a bad one; a good Russian play—80 years old; a drama—written 340 years ago; two Czech plays, 50 and 80 years respectively. The main condition for presenting a play seems to be an author long since dead. True, they finally announced they would also produce a work of Mr. Drda. In the opinion of many, to perform a play of Mr. Drda's at the National Theater is like setting a chip of limestone into a gold ring—but let us not dwell on that today. Even that play was written eight years ago, prior to the Communist dictatorship.

From the time the Communists seized power, the National Theater has resembled a museum. The program is no homage to the classics; nowhere else do the Communists pay homage to anything classical. No, it is a mantle around nudity. If a regime seizes the rule and proclaims that zestful literary and artistic life will flourish under its care, and if it subsequently offers novelties aged fifty to three hundred-and-twenty years, then this dance of the skeletons indicates but one thing: no zestful life flourishes; contemporary spiritual life has been slain. I do not deny that the Communists build new factories; I merely point out that literature dies when they touch it—and with it die many things. On the one side they have industrial combines, on the other, not one good book as yet. Jet planes—but not one single good sentiment. The Communists copy the most advanced American techniques, but in literature, where copying is not easy, they have to fall back on Jirasek, Tyl, and Stroupeznicky, writers they not so long ago scorned. Never before, not even in the beginnings of capitalism, was such a crude, reckless and grasping industrial civilization established. Never before did anybody recite mere production figures with such enthusiasm and with eyes so bulging. I shall try to say briefly what I think: these fanatical in-

dustrialists, who prefer to return to slavery rather than to forego the fulfillment of the production plan, are not suited to care for the soul of man, for the cultural aspirations of the nation, for freedom or for feeling; they are not suited to explain what is good and what evil, what is cultivated and what rude, what is entertaining and what boring, how man should behave toward man, son towards parents, the writer toward his task. Our opposition against Communism and our faith in the ultimate victory is based on the belief that the soul cannot be permanently suppressed.

For six years the government has been wrangling with the population as to what reading and playgoing, dancing and dressing should be like—and now it capitulates and undertakes a new trend. As a most original ideological accomplishment, it proclaims that literature should also be entertaining and the theater should not be exclusively boring, that man should be permitted to enjoy reading a book. The urge of youngsters for adventure stories is said to have been “overlooked without justification”: the state publishing house now issues Jack London’s *The Iron Heel*—and the two-volume selection of London’s works is said to be a praiseworthy deed. Sundry awards, leftovers in the drawers of the government, it now hurries to pin onto the chests of the older and non-Communist artists; the government hopes they will lead the arts out of the desert, where they had drifted under the government care. Vaclav Talich again conducts the orchestra of the National Theater. The works of Karel Capek—whom the Communists cursed a thousand times—will be reissued. Amidst the overall brutishness of the government, a film will now be made of Capek’s gossamer story “The Maiden Who Wept Thinly.” It will sound like the voice of a sunken bell. The delicate and, of course, dead poet Karel Toman was granted pardon. Amnesty is bestowed upon the dead everywhere. Even some living authors who had been silent for six years are now permitted to write an article here or there or to deliver a lecture. So great then is the cultural poverty of the regime. Poems appear in the papers that would not have been published a short while ago, for instance, one about a mother camel with her camel cub, based purely on sentiment, containing no hints of unfulfilled production norms. The government, it would seem, again tolerates the cultivation of feeling and beauty. The poet is again allowed to inhale the fragrance of the meadow—without Marxist ideas interfering. Possibly it will no longer be necessary to like bad Russian books out of sheer gratitude for the Russian invasion of Prague after the Nazis had already been defeated. Possibly the government will no longer enforce on young men—futilely, of course—the unnatural feeling that womanly beauty springs from the fact that she works at a machine and not from the harmony of face and limbs, while the factory time clock poses as the judge of woman’s loveliness. While the government was indulging in this quirk, we were not angry; we rather exulted in it. We are cheered whenever the Communist government assumes a foolish position, when it acts contrary to age-old and indestructible human nature. When the citizens of Milotice arranged a social evening with violin and accordion some time ago, they were all fined and for-

Spot

They say in the Soviet Union that Beria's successor is in jail. Malenkov is said to have stated: A police chief takes wages, uses up State gasoline, and then has to be disposed of by a costly stage production in court. It is less expensive to liquidate him before he enters his office. . . . Now that the Americans have an atomic submarine, the Soviets invented an atomic plane. It can stay in the air for five years. Then it has to come down, in order to release the flyers after their 5-year military duty has been completed.

bidden to indulge in such entertainments. Now the relenting government itself devotes care to the arranging of dances and even decrees that evening dress should be worn on the occasion.

All this is politically more important than would seem from the fact that these happenings occur in literature or in the ballroom. The government does not institute these reforms out of love for you, but because it has been defeated by the persistent resistance of the population to the fare it was offered. On these examples the government was made to realize how much it had alienated itself from the masses, how widely its provisos differed from what the people wanted; it was shocked, and now it retreats. This means that even this government can be forced to yield, given a steady resistance. And your resistance was both consistent and manifest. The movie houses were empty when a Russian propaganda film was shown, but when the English film *Hamlet* was played in Domazlice, people travelled four and a half hours by train to see it. In this field then, the government has realized the people’s disgust; the next assignment is to make it realize this disgust in other fields as well. No matter how bold an air the government assumes, it cannot afford to alienate you completely. It has tossed you a crumb in the matter of entertainment, but it is imperative that it understand how you scorn it in other matters as well. . . .

Let us examine the government defeat further. This government issues from the philosophy of materialism and forces materialism on everybody. It teaches in every school that everything happens according to materialist laws. Now, however, this government, which purports matter to be everything, has been routed in literature, in the theater, and in the ballroom, by the soul of the people: of the people who refused to be bored and who, no matter how great the food ration, imagine—according to everlasting precepts—that life should be rich, and gracious, and varied, that murky drabness ought not to be the color of the human banner. The materialist government was defeated non-materialistically. There is nothing materialistic in man’s refusal to be bored. The government posted its armed men to guard matter—but it yielded to the pressure of those who wish to live and to read according to their own spirit. It is as if a stiff knight in armor were slain by germs—by the germ of life, this time.

Current Developments

Reformism simply means concessions by the ruling class, not its overthrow; it means that concessions are made by the ruling class, but the power remains in its hands.

Lenin, "Can Bolsheviks Retain State Power?"

REGIME attempts to raise worker productivity appear so far to have met with failure. After a period of relative stagnation during the harsh winter months, the Communists have had to introduce a second round of concessionary measures to enlist the captive people's help. Since the new decrees are aimed at specific results, they lack the scope of the fall concessions; on the whole, they are direct incentives in the form of price reductions on food items and consumer goods. Though the people of Bulgaria, Hungary and Czechoslovakia have all profited from such cuts in the last few weeks, in all Satellite nations the regimes have stressed that this improvement in the standard of living was largely "unearned": that productivity and production will have to go up to fill the shelves and to allow further reductions to take place.

Simultaneous with these New Course additions (also to be seen in the adoption of "collective leadership" in Romania), there is a noticeable tendency in the opposite direction, particularly in the latest rash of judicial murders and persecutions. Trials involving death sentences occurred in Romania, Albania and Czechoslovakia, and in Hungary Gabor Peter was condemned to life imprisonment. Even when the velvet glove is at its softest, there is always the reminder that it encases the mailed fist.

Poland

The second Congress of the Polish United Workers' (Communist) Party was held in Warsaw March 10-17 (see April issue, page 49). Though, much like the recent Bulgarian Congress, it dealt primarily with issues connected to the New Course, it also constituted a unique springboard for formulation and loud proclamation of Soviet foreign policy aims. The international character of the meeting was apparent both from the composition of the membership invited to the Congress, as well as from the content of the main speeches. Besides the numerous foreign delegations (including an influential Russian contingent under the leadership of N. S. Khrushchev, first Secretary

of the CPSU) the meeting was also attended by N. A. Mikhailov, until recently First Secretary of the Moscow Party District and now Soviet ambassador to Poland.

Foreign Relations

A major section of the Bierut speech was devoted to foreign policy. In essence, it appears the the USSR has assigned Poland a vital role in furthering Soviet plans for disrupting the Western alliance and preventing realization of EDC. According to Bierut, the German problem is the central security issue in Europe, and the only workable solution apparently consists in broadening the type of relationship that now exists between Satellite Poland and puppet East Germany to include the whole of Germany: these relations are "a living proof that there exist possibilities for solving the German problem by peaceful and democratic means." In this matter, according to the former Premier, Poland counts on "friendly cooperation with France." It is significant that Bierut should have linked the present economic campaign of enlarging trade agreements with foreign countries to these political goals. He stated that Poland's readiness to cooperate even with countries of a different political system may be seen in Polish signing over the last five years of 126 trade agreements with all countries for the sum total of 11.7 billion rubles.

Personnel Changes and Party Statutes

Poland has experienced relatively fewer Party purges over the last five years than has any other Satellite. The liquidations that did take place were, on the whole, milder and affected mainly leaders of secondary importance. The only really serious intra-Party struggle to emerge took place in October 1951, when the core of the home-trained leadership headed by Wladyslaw Gomulka was eliminated. At that time, the supporters of General Spychalski, a leader of the Polish wartime-Communist underground, were disposed of, having been accused of fomenting a rightist army plot. The purge seems to have ended in 1952 with expulsion

from the Party of several fairly prominent Communist leaders, many of whom had fought in the Spanish Civil War. General Wacław Komar, former intelligence chief and Quartermaster General of the Polish forces, seems to have been among the victims. Some repercussions from these purges could still be felt in the present Congress (see April issue, page 48) but, in the main, the Party did not seem faced with any current internal crisis.

Party "Purification"

The Congress therefore had little "forgiving" to do (as had been the case in Bulgaria) and instead concentrated on "purifying" Party ranks by quietly removing or demoting "untrustworthy elements" such as former Socialists, many of whom joined the Party after its fusion with the left-wing of the Polish Socialist Party in 1948. The reshuffle affected men like Stefan Matuszewski, a former priest and ex-Socialist, who has now lost his post in the Politburo; Adam Rapacki, also a former Socialist, who has been demoted from full member of the Politburo to alternate member; and Henryk Świątkowski, an ex-Socialist who lost his Politburo position in 1951 and has now been removed from the Central Committee, though he remains Minister of Justice. On the surface, Józef Cyrankiewicz is an exception to this rule, in that this erstwhile Socialist—still a member of the Politburo—has now been promoted to Premier. His elevation, however, appears to have been coupled with the more decisive assumption of Party leadership by Bolesław Bierut, the new First Secretary of the Central Committee.

The new Central Committee, elected on March 17, is now composed of 77 persons; it formerly contained 75 members. The number of alternate members, on the other hand, was decreased from 65 to 50. Some 30 percent of present members and 50 percent of the alternate members are newcomers, and most of them are former Party activists, chiefly First Secretaries of Provincial Committees. The number of Army representatives in the Central Committee has been increased from three to four.

The personnel changes in the top State and Party organs (see April issue, page 44) were effected officially in accordance with the concept of collective leadership, now in vogue throughout the Soviet orbit. This concept, however, seems to be expressed mainly in the negative sense, insofar as it entails restriction to one job for any one official. In the positive sense, the principle seems far less evident in practice. As in Hungary, the top boss is still Rakosi, and in Bulgaria, Chervenkov, so in Poland, Bierut, as First Secretary of the Central Committee, remains the undisputed top man. Bierut's decision to relinquish his post as Premier was described by Radio Warsaw on March 20 in the following words:

"Bolesław Bierut has been unburdened of his State functions and now, as First Secretary of the Party, together with Secretaries Edward Ochab, Franciszek Mazur and Władysław Dworakowski, he will be able to focus his attention on the most important sector of the work, the Party, which is the leading force of all State and social organizations."

The Party and government changes involved dissolution of the post of Chairman of the Central Committee; as in the Soviet Union, these functions are now performed by the First Secretary. Of all the changes, the most important (apart from Cyrankiewicz's appointment) is the introduction of the offices of First Vice Premiers. Hilary Minc and Zenon Nowak were nominated to fill these posts. Both these men are economic experts: Minc as a specialist of the Six Year Plan, Nowak as an architect of present farm policies. Also significant is the appointment of Jakub Berman to the post of Vice Premier (without the title of "First") to fill the vacancy created by Cyrankiewicz's promotion. Berman, long an influential man in the Party, had so far stayed in the background, holding the relatively minor position of Undersecretary of State in the Presidium of the Council of Ministers. His candidacy was first proposed by the Politburo and seems to indicate that the highest Party echelon (or perhaps Moscow) felt that Cyrankiewicz, surrounded as he was by two "economic" First Vice Premiers, should also be supported and "advised" by an experienced political hand.

The 1954 Party statutes reveal that provisions for admission to the Party are less strict than in the USSR, Czechoslovakia or Bulgaria. The rules on the subject stipulate that the candidate requires only two references from Party members with one year standing who have known the candidate for at least 12 months. This seems to reflect an urgent need to build up Party membership. More specifically, peasant participation is to be encouraged. "The percentage of peasants in the Party," commented Bierut, "has been consistently unsatisfactory . . . wavering between 13 and 13.6 percent. . . . 52,443 small and middle peasants have been accepted as Party candidates since April 1950, but almost as many have been expelled in that period." As of March 10, 1954, total membership amounted to 1,297,000 (members and candidates), or about five percent of the total population.

Concerning shortcomings in Party work, Bierut mentioned: 1. "submission to spontaneous action," that is, inability to control social phenomena; 2. underestimation of the importance of the worker-peasant alliance; 3. work shortcomings in the rural sector dealing with raising production and political tasks in villages. For all these ills, Bierut produced a remedy aped from Lenin's dictum: "tighten the daily ties with the working peasant, tighten the alliance with the middle peasant . . . and oppose the kulak." It also seems that in the future (as explained by Berman) whenever the Party needs the broad support of the masses, its work will be advertised under the old slogan of the "National Front," a concept was used by the Communists to gain power and then discarded.

Economic Situation

The main accent of the Congress fell on the present and future economic tasks confronting the country. Bierut, Nowak and Minc all referred to the subject in their addresses. In speaking about past achievements, Bierut stressed the rapid development of basic industries. His figures indicate that steel production has increased three-

fold over the prewar level—from 1,441,000 tons in 1938 to 3,600,000 by the end of 1953. The same ratio of increase occurred in coal production, which went up from a prewar peak of 38.1 million tons to a present level of 88.7 million tons. In electrical energy the increase has been even greater: from 3.98 billion kwh to 13.6 billion. Though these figures are exaggerated by including production data of the industrial area taken over from Germany at the end of the war, it is still evident that heavy industry has been developed at a spectacular pace. But as in other Satellite countries, this development has been dangerously lopsided, leaving light industry and agriculture in a precarious position. It is to this problem that the Congress devoted a great deal of its time.

As broadcast by Radio Warsaw on March 16, Deputy Premier Zenon Nowak stated that the acceleration of agricultural development, production of cereals, and livestock breeding now constitute the "key objectives" of the Party program. "The disproportion between the development of industry and agriculture," he said, "must be bridged in order successfully to carry out the task we have undertaken." To achieve this end, some investment shifts will take place, some help will be given to individual farmers and collectives, and Party activity in the countryside will be stepped up.

The shift in investment policy can clearly be seen from a comparison between figures released at the time of the 9th Plenum of the Central Committee in October 1953 and the data given at the Congress. Only a few months ago, investment increases for 1955 were foreseen as 45 percent higher for agriculture (as compared with 1953), 38 percent for light industry, 26 percent for housing and communal development, and 34 percent for the social and cultural sector. Now, as indicated in *Trybuna Ludu* (March 20), the increase in agriculture for 1954-1955 has been projected for 80-100 percent, while the rest of the economy, except for heavy industry, is to receive the percentage of investment originally decided upon. According to *Inwestycje i Budownictwo* (Warsaw) of February 1953, total industrial investment for 1953 amounted to 52.4 percent of all investment; 46.7 percent went to heavy industry and 5.7 percent to light industry. Now, heavy industry will receive only 40.4 percent and light industry investment will increase by 35 to 40 percent. Total investment, however, remains unchanged, and the help given to agriculture can only be made up if productivity increases appreciably and if costs are cut down drastically.

The present attitude toward agricultural problems was summed up in the following manner in an editorial in *Trybuna Ludu* of March 10, 1954:

"Agriculture . . . is lagging excessively behind industry. The elimination of this disproportion between the development of industry and of agriculture thus becomes the crucial task of the present period. This is being served by the government decisions of the last few months, which envisage considerably greater and all-around help to peasants farming individually, and increased assistance for the collective farm movement, which today embraces over 200,000 farmsteads."

NA TE ARTYKUŁY CZEKAMY



CZAJNIKI



SZKLANKI
SPODKI



WIADRA



ZATZASKI, IGŁY



OŁÓWKI
MECHANICZNE
PIÓRA WIECZNE




PATELNIIE



PAPETERIA



CIEPŁE
POŃ-
CZOCZY



KOSZULE
KTÓRE SIĘ NIE
KURCZĄ



SZUFELKI
POGRZEBACZE



BUDZIKI
ZEGARKI

Title: The Articles We are Waiting For.

Caption: tea kettles, buckets, mechanical pencils, fountain pens, stationery, shirts that don't shrink, cups and saucers, buttons and needles, frying pans, warm stockings, shovels and pokers, alarm clocks and watches.

Przekroj (Warsaw), March 7, 1954

That agriculture is indeed lagging far behind is perhaps most clearly apparent in Bierut's admission that "during recent years Poland had to import large and increasing quantities of grain." Before the war, grain was one of Poland's main export items.

Party Political Work

Besides the alleged material help to peasants and the dispatch of experts to the countryside ("Once and for all," said Nowak, "we must put an end to the practice, rampant both in State and Party organizations, of sending the least capable workers to the agricultural sector"), the network of village Party organizations will be strengthened. From an organizational point of view, the ground work was laid by the announcement of the dissolution, immediately before the Congress, of rural municipalities and their national councils and their replacement by smaller and more numerous village communes and Village Commune National Councils. Political control can therefore be expected to grow much tighter. As broadcast by Radio Warsaw on March 17, the regime view is:

"The experience of nearly 10 years of Party work in the countryside . . . has shown that Municipal Councils are unable to insure adequate leadership of the work of primary Party organizations in rural areas. It is necessary to avail oneself in this respect of the experience of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union which shows that a direct leadership in the countryside . . . is fully possible and appropriate. . . ."

Politburo

The following were elected to the Politburo: Boleslaw Bierut, Aleksander Zawadzki, Jozef Cyrankiewicz, Hilary Minc, Zenon Nowak, Konstanty Rokossowski, Edward Ochab, Jakub Berman, Franciszek Mazur, Franciszek Jozwiak, Stanislaw Radkiewicz, Wladyslaw Dworakowski, Roman Zambrowski. Deputy members elected: Adam Rapacki, and Hilary Chelchowski.

Czechoslovakia

On March 21, the regime announced that the April elections to trade union shop committees had been postponed until fall. This news came as a surprise in view of the fact that the shop committee elections were intended to be an integral part of the Communists' current political drive—outlined by Premier Siroky on December 15—to mobilize the masses through intensive election propaganda activities. The campaign is scheduled to reach a climax in June at the Party Congress, which is to follow shortly after the May national committee elections. In making this decision public, the trade union daily *Prace* (Prague) declared that "the experience of the past two years has shown that holding spring elections is inconvenient for trade union activities, since a change in workshop direction in the middle of an economic year frequently disrupted production [as well as other] tasks."

In postponing the elections until next October or November, the regime violated an Act of March 10, 1953, stating that shop committees cannot hold office for longer than a period of one year. The last elections were held in April 1953. Furthermore, explanations given for the postponement are not convincing: the so-called experience of the last two years actually dates back only one year. Prior to April 1953, elections were held in the fall of 1951. Also,

in Communist Czechoslovakia, production is usually most intense at the end of the year, when the Communists make a last minute effort to achieve planned targets. Thus, disruption in the fall would be more crucial than disruption in the spring.

A possible reason for the unexpected policy change appeared in the March 13 issue of *Rude Pravo* (Prague). The newspaper criticized the increasing lack of discipline in some plants and remarked about "the considerable discontent among workers and their unwillingness to tolerate further, unnecessary strain due to last minute attempts to achieve plan targets." The newspaper also complained about a growing "false solidarity" which has taken the place of "constructive criticism" and resulted in a "tolerance of shortcomings." Such unity is obviously not in line with Communist policy, and worker discontent combined with production and productivity difficulties, may have been a chief factor in the postponement. Possibly the regime lacks enough confidence to hold shop committee elections under these conditions.

On the whole, however, election propaganda has been intensified in the past month. Special committees have already been set up to supervise the national committee elections on May 16, and boards of instructors have been formed at the commissions to acquaint all "commission members with the provisions of the new election law and their duties."

In giving directives on the campaign, *Rude Pravo* (Prague), March 10, advised agitators on methods of winning the people's confidence. "It would be an unforgivable mistake," the newspaper wrote, "to be cool towards the people, to force them to accept the propagandist's view, or to call every opposing view reactionary. . . . Clarity of propaganda is one of the main conditions [for success]. Too wise an explanation of important questions has never been the Party's policy." Special propaganda centers on the Soviet pattern have been set up (Prague alone had more than 400 by April 1), and the regime is attempting to attract large audiences by offering the people entertainment and lectures on fashion and cooking along with politics. On March 26, *Rude Pravo* expressed the hope that these centers will resemble the Soviet centers even more closely by setting up special sections for children, health care advice, short films and chess tables. These efforts are undoubtedly designed to make the election propaganda palatable to the people who, by now, have been subjected to a large overdose of it by press and radio.

In addition, the regime has organized a task force of agitators who visit people in their homes in order to insure their presence at meetings where, according to *Rude Pravo*, March 30, trained propagandists can explain to them "the benefits of the People's Democracy," and reveal who the candidates are. Party groups, chiefly responsible for the success of the campaign, have been ordered to improve their work, and local conferences for this purpose were held in March. According to reports in *Rude Pravo*, March 13 and 16, Party members at the conferences confessed to such crimes as losing contact with farmers, indulging in bureaucratic practices and lacking ideological

training. In another report on March 18, *Rude Pravo* revealed that an ideological training course had been attended by only 50 percent of the selected comrades, and that even these began to skip meetings. Even more serious was the fact that in one district a conference had to be cancelled because the Party officials failed to show up. This criticism and self-criticism indicates that the Party is not functioning as the regime had hoped. Although the Communists are not in doubt about the election results, they are depending upon the campaign to win the people's support.

Price Reductions

On March 29, the Czechoslovak regime announced a second New Course price reduction affecting 53,000 consumer goods items at an alleged yearly savings to the people of 5,600 million *koruny*. In addition, a reduction of the cost of repairs and services by Communal Centers is supposed to bring about a savings of 280 million *koruny*. Effective April 1, the regime also released for sale from surplus stockpiles a large quantity of consumer goods, particularly industrial goods, which are valued at six billion *koruny*. Aside from this, "the free and unrestricted sale of gold and silver jewelry and diamond articles" was introduced. According to Radio Prague, these measures were made possible by the "success of industrial production, rising productivity and reduction of production costs."

The price cuts fall into two groups: food items and industrial consumer goods which come mostly from surplus stockpiles. According to the decree, the cost of bread was reduced by 8.1 percent; wheat flour by 10.9 percent; rice by 25 percent; vegetables by 11.5 percent; ready-cooked meals by 12-25 percent; and fish products and canned fish by 14-25 percent. The summer price of milk will be cut by 10 percent as of May 1, and the winter price will be reduced by 8.4 percent as of November 1. The price of butter was reduced by 8 percent, the summer price of eggs by 9.1 percent, and dried eggs by 22.9 percent. The average price reduction on chocolate was 10 percent, coffee 16.9 percent, tea 10 percent, powdered cocoa 7.2 percent, canned fruit 20 percent, dried fruit 5 percent, canned vegetables 5 percent, jam 10 percent, and durable pastry 18 percent. Even after these reductions, prices are still so high that a skilled lathe operator would have to work 98 hours in order to be able to buy the equivalent of an American food parcel which costs \$7.18 and contains 2 lbs. of coffee, 1 lb. of bacon, 1 lb. of lard, 2 lbs. of rice, 1 lb. of sugar, 1/2 lb. of chocolate, 1/2 lb. of cocoa, 1/2 lb. of raisins, and 1/4 lb. of tea.

With respect to industrial goods, the price of cotton textiles was reduced by 12-35 percent; stockings and socks by 26-30 percent; linens by 40 percent; work clothes by 10-30 percent; shoes on an average of 17.9 percent; leather goods on an average of 21.3 percent; silks by 45 percent; soft furnishings by 30 percent; and other furnishing textiles from 10-45 percent. Chemical products such as soap have been reduced by 16-28 percent, cosmetics by 10-20 percent, and dyes and paints by 6.3 percent. The price of cameras was cut by 30-40 percent; photographic equip-

ment by 25.5 percent; bicycles by 10-20 percent; cars by 17.2 percent; electric refrigerators by 25 percent; washing machines by 20 percent; and sewing machines on an average of 24.4 percent. Cutlery was reduced by 18.7-30 percent; porcelain and pottery by 10 percent; musical instruments by 17 percent; skates and skis by 20 percent; razors by 10 percent; fountain pens by 20-50 percent; and construction materials (woods and cements) by 10-30 percent. Before the price reduction, the bulk of industrial consumer goods was out of reach of the average citizen, which was one of the reasons for the stockpiling. Even now, prices are still high considering the fact that the average clerk gets 800 *koruny* per month, and the skilled worker is paid four *koruny* per hour. The following table illustrates how long an average citizen must work in order to purchase various consumer items:

Item	Koruny (new price)	Equiva- lent in work hours of lathe operator	Equivalent in clerk's mo. salary
cotton corduroy, 25" per yd.	57	14	
cotton broadcloth 32" yd.	14	3 1/2	
silk print 36" per yd.	50	12 1/2	
plastic handbag ...	198	50	one week
radio	1,010	252 1/2	five weeks
sewing machine....	1,450	362 1/2	seven weeks
vacuum cleaner ...	1,040	260	five weeks
men's jacket	212	53	one week
refrigerator	3,150	787 1/2	sixteen weeks
bicycle	580	145	
lady's housecoat ...	281	70	

Siroky Speaks

Although higher labor productivity and reduced production costs were said to have facilitated this latest price reduction, Premier Siroky, speaking before the Party Central Committee on March 29, revealed that this probably was not so. He cited serious shortcomings in agriculture and condemned high production costs, waste and inefficient management in industry. From Siroky's address, it appeared that the price cuts were not so much an effect of economic consolidation as an effort to give the people incentive to help achieve this consolidation. He said:

"The motion on a further extensive price reduction cannot and must not satisfy us that everything is in best order. On the contrary, we have to say with complete frankness that there are serious shortcomings. . . . It is necessary to secure the suggested extent of the price reductions in production, internal trade, transport, etc., by raising production, reducing production costs and installing financial discipline. At the same time, it is necessary to create conditions for continuing the policy of raising the living standard. We are convinced that the entire Party will comprehend what is involved and will know how to mobilize the ability and creative energy of our workers in order to accomplish these pressing tasks."



Title: And this too is a functionary!
Caption: Middle-farmer or non-middle farmer, I am for simplification!

Dikobraz (Prague), March 28, 1954

In underscoring unsatisfactory farm production, Siroky declared that little had been done to improve work on tractor stations and State farms or to secure adequate supplies of farm machinery. Siroky insisted that fundamental improvements must occur in the bulk-buying apparatus and that Party branches must ensure that delivery targets are "fulfilled unconditionally in every district and village." Following Siroky's criticism, *Rude Pravo* (Prague), April 5, announced that 271,000 acres of the planned crop lands are still untilled and that more than 25 percent of all pasture land is now covered with moss. Within the past few months, the shortage of food supplies has been alleviated by heavy foodstuff imports. However, *Rude Pravo*, March 31, stated explicitly that should the critical situation continue, "it would have a grossly damaging effect by further increasing the already disproportionate import requirements for which there are not unlimited export funds." This may indicate that the regime will be unable to continue subsidizing domestic food production deficiency by increased imports.

On the industrial front, conditions are also unsatisfactory. Siroky complained that in 1953 production costs had increased in many sectors, particularly in fuel and power production, heavy industry and ore mines. The Prime Minister said that in many factories overhead costs absorb savings on wages and raw materials, and that unnecessary expenditures are rising and absorbing accumulated reserves. Many factories make "unwise investments" which tend to increase production costs rather than lower them, while other enterprises violate "financial discipline" by failing to submit their profits or pay their taxes to the State, and by not meeting their financial obligations to other plants. Siroky also condemned the practice of exceeding the wage budget and granting bonuses which do not act as incentives to higher productivity. "This danger must be emphasized all the more since in January the industrial ministries exceeded their wage budgets by 0.8 percent. The figure for engineering was 3.3 percent and for the steel industry two percent."

Another indication that the regime has not had much

success in lowering production costs was Siroky's remark that there was an "absolutely intolerable increase of losses due to production rejects which were caused by failure to take the [necessary measures] or to apply the principle of personal responsibility for rejects."

It is clear from Siroky's speech that by effecting this large-scale price reduction, the regime hopes to give workers the impetus to eliminate agricultural and industrial shortcomings. However, the regime is also aware of the fact that it has set a dangerous precedent in the volume of the sale and will have difficulty in maintaining the current level of supply. On April 7, *Rude Pravo* cautioned: "It is not easy to ensure that our domestic market will be well-supplied now that after the price reductions we have put on sale goods valued at six billion *koruny*. All citizens know that in Czechoslovakia demand is still greater than supply and that we have a shortage of some important raw materials required by our industry." However, the people can experience the full benefits of the price reductions only if the present level of market supply is maintained. That the regime anticipates having to meet continued popular demands was indicated by Siroky when he said that the 1954 plan must be revised in order to guarantee a sufficient amount of available goods this year and next. To do so, the Communists must have the support of the people, which will not be without difficulties, as suggested by Minister Nejedly over Radio Prague on April 4: "So many sceptics and pessimists cannot sleep because of this reduction. They try to think [of all sorts of reasons] but people are not so stupid as to believe . . . that it was only a pre-election maneuver."

Hungary

It seems that when the New Course was officially launched last summer, many Party members were caught unawares. For weeks confusion reigned in Party ranks and, as is now plainly evident, orders were often disregarded, misunderstood or resented (See March issue, page 42). More important, many top leaders who later recanted their sins, opposed the new policy on principle, mainly because it ran counter to their ideological orientation. Many of the functionaries in the various Ministries felt insecure and did not dare take Prime Minister Imre Nagy's words seriously—they seemed to prefer waiting for more definite information on the strength and direction of the latest political winds. This strength has now been revealed in the form of new—and more stringent—Party statutes, published in *Szabad Nép* (Budapest) on March 14, 1954.

Perhaps because of the hesitancy, disorder and general lack of discipline that set in with the advent of the New Course, the main emphasis of the new rules is on iron Party discipline. The tendency is now to protect the Party from "contamination," and to save it from disintegration by strengthening its inner cohesion.

The statutes define the task of the Hungarian Workers (Communist) Party as consisting in "building a socialist social system and raising the material and cultural living standards of the working people." The final aim is clearly

spelled out; it is the "creation of a Communist society." The old statutes, on the other hand, said nothing about the attainment of a Communist society and contained only a reference to the establishment of a People's Democracy.

After discussing the usual topics of "watching over the purity of Party ideology" and of "protecting the Party against all enemies," the statutes refer more specifically to the question of obedience and discipline. The following quotation seems to be an obvious reference to the Party squabble:

"There cannot be two kinds of discipline within the Party; the same rules apply to everyone, irrespective of merit and position. . . . The Hungarian Workers Party can retain its unity and strength only by fighting against those elements that are uncompromising and undisciplined. . . . The Party cannot tolerate the formation of groups and factions within the Party because these would undermine its unity and fighting spirit. Those who organize or join factions within the Party must be excluded as enemies. . . ."

Endeavors to obtain a closing of the ranks is also noticeable in the reorganization of the Central Committee, whose duties, rights and powers are defined as follows:

"During the period between two Congresses, the Central Committee governs Party activities. All members of the Central Committee have equal rights. . . . The Central Committee is responsible to the Party Congress and generally convenes every three months . . . from among its members, it elects the Political Committee (Politburo), which conducts Party affairs in the interval between full meetings of the Central Committee; it also selects the Secretariat, whose members become Secretaries of the Central Committee. . . . The Central Committee elects a Control Committee . . . whose task is to watch over the political attitude, moral purity and Party loyalty of members and candidates; the Control Committee must fight relentlessly against undisciplined attitudes and any activity aimed at creating factions within the Party. . . . The Central Supervisory Committee [elected by the Party Congress] controls . . . the administrative machinery of the Central Committee. . . ."

Formerly, according to the old statutes, the Central Committee elected the Political Committee, the Chairman of the Party, the Secretary General of the Party, the Secretariat, the Organizational Committee, the editor of the Party newspaper, the Control Committee and the Secretary of the Central Committee. Now, the position of Chairman has been abolished and the Party no longer has a Secretary General; the Organizational Committee has also been eliminated. Instead of a single Secretary of the Central Committee, there are now four Secretaries, one of which (at present Matyas Rakosi) is the First Secretary. This provision might seem to be in accord with the trend toward "collective leadership," were it not for the fact that all four Secretaries are also members of the Secretariat (which was not the case for the Secretary of the Central Committee whom they have replaced) and that the most important Party position is now that of the First Secretary. The latter, in other words, seems to be more powerful than was the Secretary General of the Party. Actually, these changes were introduced as long ago as June 28, 1953,



Title: Insured against responsibility.

Caption: "And now come what may, I am covered."

Szpilki (Warsaw), April 4, 1954
as reprinted from *Urzica* (Bucharest).

and the statutes merely "legalize" a situation that has existed for many months.

The statutes disclose for the first time the existence of a new Party organ, the so-called Supervisory Committee. On paper at least, the new body appears to enjoy a status equal to that of the Central Committee, both of them being elected by the Party Congress. The statutes, however, do not give any indication of how the Supervisory Committee functions in relation to the other organs, nor do they reveal whether members of the new group also belong to other committees. It appears, however, that the Supervisory Committee was created to exercise control over the activities of the Central Committee and, as such, its Party power must be considerable.

Gabor Peter

On March 13, 1954, a short notice appeared in the Hungarian press announcing the life sentence imprisonment of 48-year-old Gabor Peter who, as former head of the security police, had been one of the most powerful—and one of the most hated—members of the Party elite. Breaking with past practice, his former comrades failed to dignify his downfall with the usual detailed vilification. His political epitaph was as vague as it was laconic:

"It was established during the investigation that Gabor Peter and his accomplices, many of whom had attained

high posts by keeping their misdeeds secret, committed grave crimes against the State and the people by abusing their positions. On the basis of extensive investigations, ample material evidence, the testimony of witnesses and the defendants' confessions, the Military Supreme Court declared the defendants guilty of the crimes of which they had been accused."

The trial, then, was conducted behind closed doors and the exact nature of the "crimes" was not revealed. But if the indictment did not follow the pattern of theatrical show-trials, it is nevertheless evident that Peter will linger in prison, not as retribution for the monstrosities he perpetrated, but primarily as a result of intra-Party convulsions. Whether his arrest some time in the second half of January 1953 was linked to the USSR purges and rivalries before and after Stalin's death, is not fully known. It is significant, however, that his removal came at a time when the anti-Jewish campaign was at its height throughout the Soviet orbit. Apart from being Jewish, Peter was also one of the few remaining top leaders who had not been trained in Moscow. Ironically, it was Peter who, as head of the Political Police since January 1945 (later known as the Defense Authority or AVH), liquidated such so-called Hungarian Communists as Laszlo Rajk, Gyula Kallai, Janos Kadar and many others.

Peter reached the zenith of his power in the years following the Communist coup, when the AVH was made a separate organization patterned on the Russian MVD. As an independent agency, the AVH was directly subordinated to the Council of Ministers, enjoying a status on a par with that of any other Ministry. After the fall of Peter, and after the department had been taken over by his deputy, Laszlo Piros, the AVH was again placed under the Ministry of the Interior and is now headed by the First Deputy Minister of the Interior. The strength of the AVH has now been reduced, in that the frontier guards have been detached from it and transferred to the Army. Its basic duties, however, remain unchanged, and the organizational shifts must be interpreted as regime tactics designed to blunt the people's hatred for the secret police.

As is usually the case when a Communist potentate is eliminated, Peter's retinue and associates shared his fate. One of these was Gyula Decsi, formerly a police colonel, who was sentenced to nine years imprisonment. This officer was one of the men who conducted hearings in connection with the Mindszenty trial, and he once held the post of Minister of Justice. In turn, his deputy, Police Major Janos Tihanyi, was also arrested. Another man to be purged was Istvan Timar, formerly a police colonel, who was condemned to 11 years in prison. He had once been Gabor Peter's deputy and became section head at the Ministry of Justice. In addition to the aforementioned, "others"—to use the expression of the official communique—were indicted. It seems that about fifty former police officers were imprisoned. The most important of these are: former Police Colonel Jozsef Szaberszki, former Police Lieutenant Colonel Andor Csapo, ex-Police Doctor Istvan Balint, and Marton Karolyi, Miklos Bauer and Lajos Matrai, all three former Police Colonels.

Spole

- **The Communist Party Congress**, originally planned for April 18, has been postponed to May 24. [Szabad Nep (Budapest), March 28]
- **Excerpts from a Rakosi speech**: "Production cost has increased . . . productivity has not increased by the expected degree. . . . There are too many instances involving relaxation of norms and depletion of wage funds . . . wage frauds are often committed with the knowledge of Communist Comrades and, at times, even with the help of Communist functionaries . . . this is an untenable situation." [Radio Budapest, April 21]
- **Election procedure explained**: "Some people even raise the question as to why we hold any elections at all when the [unopposed] candidates are presented to the electorate in advance and when their candidature is assured with nomination." Answer: "If the acceptance of candidates at public meetings were tantamount to their being elected, we could not talk about secret elections." [Rovnost (Brno), March 23]
- **New job, new title**: Czechoslovak workers can now aspire to become not only stakhanovites and shock-workers but also Masters of Etiquette. The new masters will gain their title after passing a special course given by the Ministry of Culture: "The Ministry . . . now selects applicants for this new occupation. . . ." [Mlada Fronta (Prague), April 10]
- **Lucretiu Patrascanu**, former Minister of Justice (1944-47) and once a prominent Communist leader, was executed as a traitor together with another defendant after conviction by a military tribunal on the charge of "subversion." Eleven people were tried on the same occasion. Patrascanu's downfall occurred in 1947, when he was accused of "bourgeois nationalism." [Radio Bucharest, April 18]
- **A major disaster** occurred in the Silesian coal mine Barbara-Wyzwolenie in Chorzow toward the end of March. The official communique was vaguely worded, and merely mentioned that "several scores" of miners lost their lives as a result of an underground fire. The communique also attempted to pin the blame on "foreign-inspired sabotage," thus endeavoring to cover up the present tragic lack of safety regulations in Polish mines. [Radio Warsaw, March 25]
- **The Fourth Session** of the Polish Parliament was set for April 23; the main item on the agenda will be a discussion of the 1954 budget. [Trybuna Ludu, April 10]

- **A solemn commemoration** of the 160th anniversary of the annexation of Lithuania to Russia (in 1795, after the third partition of the Lithuanian-Polish Commonwealth) was proposed for next year by A. Snieckus, First Secretary of the Lithuanian Communist Party. "It is very important," the official said, "to explain to the working people the tremendously progressive influence of that historic event on the political, economic and cultural development of the Lithuanian nation, despite the fact that the Czar and the landlords ruled Russia at that time." [Tiesa (Vilna), February 24]
- **A group of Latvian youths** were sent to the Volga District on April 1st. They will help in the cultivation of new areas. This method of deportation is called "doing one's duty in the service of the great Soviet fatherland." [Radio Riga, April 1]
- **The trial of eight** so-called "diversionists and spies in the service of the American imperialists" opened in Tirana on April 5. As expected, all defendants pleaded guilty. Unexpected in the New Course context was the harshness of the sentences announced over Radio Tirana on April 16: six of the prisoners were shot, one was hung and the eighth sentenced to 10 years imprisonment.
- **Following a Chervenkov** February 25 statement that "relations [of Bulgaria] with Yugoslavia are gradually being normalized," a mixed boundary commission was scheduled to start setting up border pyramids on April 19. [Radio Belgrade, April 7]
- **First reports indicate** that the following major decisions were taken at a plenary session of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party which met on April 19: 1. membership in the Secretariat has been reduced from five to four; 2. the title of Secretary General has been abolished and replaced by that of First Secretary, a function now to be performed by Gheorghe Apostol who thus dislodges Premier Gheorghiu-Dej as Party boss; 3. the long-deferred General Congress of the Romanian Workers' (Communist) Party is now scheduled to take place on October 30, 1954. Apart from Apostol, the Secretariat (now directly responsible to the Politburo) is composed of Nicolae Ceausescu, Mihai Dalea and Janos Fazekas. Based on the collective leadership concept recently adopted at the Bulgarian and Polish Congresses, the Central Committee decreed that members of the Secretariat will henceforth be barred from holding posts in the government. [Radio Bucharest, April 19]

Pensions

As of April 1, 1954, and in accordance with a decree by the Council of Ministers, pensions will be raised by 8 to 50 percent for men over 65 and women over 60. Both men and women under these respective ages will receive a 4 to 25 percent increase in disability pensions, and a special raise of 40 percent will be given to pensioned miners over 65. Pensioned miners under 65 henceforth will be entitled to a 25 percent increase. The decree, described in *Nepszava* (Budapest) of March 24, 1954, is vaguely worded. It mentions for instance, that the aforementioned persons must belong to pension brackets 1-8 to be entitled to the increase, but it fails to say either who belongs to what bracket or how much each category will receive.

It seems, however, that brackets 1-8 do not include the majority of workers, who are to be found in a second group, referred to in the following manner: "workers pensioned from public administration or nationalized private enterprises will receive raises if their pensions do not exceed 200 forints a month or, in the case of widows, 100 forints a month."

The new decree does refer to the fact that the raise will go only to the lowest categories of pensions, as determined by the new law effective on January 1, 1954. The bottom category will be raised by 33 percent for old age pensions and 59 percent for disability.

The last change in the rate of pensions occurred on January 1, 1952. Based on an analysis of this decree, which appeared in *Nepszava* (Budapest) on November 11, 1951, it is estimated that the average pension at that time amounted to 154 forints a month. For two years, then, this sum remained unchanged; it was just sufficient to exist on when introduced and in subsequent months its value was further decreased. The present decree barely re-establishes the purchasing power of two years ago.

Summary Jurisdiction Abolished

A March 10 decree of the Council of Ministers in Hungary abolished summary jurisdiction. "This step," *Magyar Nemzet* commented, was made possible by the increase of order in our People's Republic, the growing unity among our working people and the strengthening of legality." In actual fact, the decree was now less dangerous to pass because the Communists had previously reorganized the courts (on January 22, 1954, as reported the next day in *Nepszava*) by giving the Supreme Court—for the first time in Hungarian legal history—the right to act in the first instance, thus automatically excluding the possibility of appeal. The government has therefore retained one of the basic criteria of summary jurisdiction, only less conspicuously and by transfer to another branch of the legal system.

The crimes hitherto dealt with by summary jurisdiction included: larceny following floods, premeditated murder, arson and plotting of arson, sabotage and negligence in connection with railroads and other transportation, the illegal manufacture, trade in and possession of firearms, ammunition and explosives, robbery, manslaughter and causing floods.

New Measures

By a decision of the Council of Ministers effective March 15, 1954, the prices for meat and fats were cut by an average of 10-15 percent. On March 14, *Magyar Nemzet* (Budapest), published a list of the items affected. The extent of the reduction for the main items is as follows: Cooking fat, 14.3 percent; edible oil, 10.5 percent; margarine 10 percent; pork cutlet, 7.8 percent; pork ribs 14.8 percent; beefsteak, 9.7 percent; stewing beef, 13.5 percent; veal, 7.8 percent; various kinds of sausages, 13 percent; seasoned and smoked sausages, 4.8 percent; salami, 9.1 percent; bacon, 9 percent; cooked ham, 3.6 percent; black pudding, 10.7 to 21.2 percent; cracklings, 15 percent; and canned meat, 4 to 6 percent.

According to Radio Budapest of March 13, "These reductions will amount to a total economy of 500 million *forints* per year for the population as a whole." The regime also claims that, although the price of meals in factory canteens remains unchanged, the workers will benefit from a further "indirect" economy of 60 million *forints* per year as a result of improvement in the quality of the food.

Some benefits will no doubt accrue to the population, but the extent of the improvement in the general standard of living will depend upon the quantity and quality of food available—or made available to the people by the government. Up to now, official pronouncements, as well as reliable refugee reports, all point to the fact that many of the goods mentioned above are in such shortage, that the majority of the people have not been able to obtain them, even when lining up for them for hours. It is possible, of course, that the government has stockpiles of the items, and that it is now prepared—for political reasons—to release part of them for general consumption. Only such a move would make the following regime announcement credible: "Business has increased after the price cut . . . in Lenin Avenue meat shops there were twice as many customers in the morning hours alone as in a whole day during the weeks preceding the price reduction; bacon scraps were bought in large quantities, but many customers also bought the cheaper pork and beef." (Radio Budapest, March 16).

But even if the foodstuff is on the shelves in sufficient quantities, the latest price cuts will not enable the average worker to buy the items regularly. The average worker's monthly wage is now around 800 *forints*, yet according to both official and unofficial reports (and allowing for the latest reductions), he still has to pay 26-27 *forints* for a kilo of pork and 30 *forints* for "pressed, substitute lard." In 1949, when the average monthly wage stood at 600 *forints*, pure lard sold at 19 *forints* a kilo; the price is now around 50 *forints*. So, while some improvement may now be taking place, the worker is still far worse off than he was a few years ago. Furthermore, the prices quoted above all refer to sales in State stores, where, as pointed out, many of the items are either not available or not available in sufficient quantities, and where quality is often so bad that the average citizen prefers to turn to the open market. There, prices remain exorbitantly high.

Romania

One of the significant developments arising from the New Course program has been the reversal of the land-to-town movement so characteristic of the Stalinist era. This funneling of rural personnel into heavy industry has now all but stopped. Instead, to bolster a sagging agricultural sector, the regimes are now transferring urban workers to the countryside. This manpower shift has been repeatedly stressed in the last few weeks by all Romanian propaganda media.

In a leading article entitled "All Efforts toward an increased Agricultural Production in 1954," *Scinteia* (Bucharest) of March 4, 1954, stated that "the main reason for the lagging in agriculture, as compared to industry, is that it has not been sufficiently understood that a decisive impulse must be given at once to agricultural production." Elaborating on this theme in an editorial of March 18, headlined "Industrial Workers and Technicians are helping the Working Peasants in the Fields," the paper disclosed:

"The government and Party have called upon all forces in agriculture and industry to go to battle and raise agricultural production. [To respond to] this appeal . . . is the sacred duty of all our working people. Many have already responded to it, both working peasants as well as industrial workers. . . Many workers and technicians in industrial enterprises are expressing their desire to work on the land. . .

"Success in the agricultural campaign depends on the full use of the agricultural machinery available. MTS and kolkhozes are therefore in need of qualified mechanics who can maintain tractors and machinery in good repair, to be used day and night. The decision of this group of workers has aroused great interest among factory workers throughout the country. More and more workers are expressing the desire to follow the example set by this group. Those who are prepared to work on the land are patriotic men, held in high esteem by all our working people. . . The initiative of a few workers must be transformed into a national movement." (Italics added)

To achieve this end, the regime is giving great display to these "voluntary" applications by workers and technicians employed in industry. Comments on the subject, with names, dates and other details appeared in *Scinteia* (Bucharest) on March 14, 18 and 19; in *Munca* (Bucharest) on March 18, 21, and 23, and on the air—via Radio Bucharest—for four days in a row, starting on March 16. The tenor of these appeals, their frequency and sense of urgency, all point to the fact that the government is indeed "doing battle," and redeploying some of its shock forces as fast as possible to plug a gaping hole in its economic lines. It also appears that many of the petty functionaries in government, industry and general administration, did not take regime intentions seriously. For years these people had been trained to believe that the faster heavy industry grew, the more investment, money and energy that went into its building, the faster would all problems be solved. This was the orthodox line for many years

and only a few months ago the present campaign would have been tantamount to sabotage and treason.

So far, the movement seems restricted to dispatching a number of key men—technicians who have the know-how with which to bring some order to crucial levels of agricultural production such as, for instance, Machine Tractor Stations. Though collectives are also referred to as points of destination for the former urban workers, it does not appear that a wholesale manpower shift is taking place. Rather, workers sent to the kolkhozes seem to have been entrusted with organizing them on a more efficient working basis, and not primarily to take part in production. As *Scinteia* of March 18 put it, "All workers going to the land are undertaking a task of honor, and at the same time a task involving great responsibility. . . . The government and Party invest them with the mission of carrying to MTS and kolkhozes the superior forms of organized labor and production as practiced in socialist industry."

The same article also stresses another angle which, though it appears to be subsidiary at the moment, is nevertheless of prime importance. The paper mentions that the presence of urban workers in villages will "afford a new opportunity of strengthening the alliance between the working classes and the peasantry. Workers who go to the land must take with them the spirit of socialist discipline . . . special attention must be directed to those who possess a high ideological standard." It is of course understandable that dedicated Communists are likely to exert greater efforts in carrying out the present agricultural program than workers who are either opposed to the regime or feel divorced from it. On the other hand, it is evident that worker transfer provides the regime with an excellent opportunity to intensify rural indoctrination. That the Communists are indeed taking advantage of this phase of a movement that is basically an economic necessity, appears to be substantiated by a remark which appeared in the March 14 issue of *Scinteia*. The paper states that "It is in the interest of our continuous struggle for the raising of the material and cultural standards of the working people [that this movement should take place]."

Bulgaria

In its issue of March 9, 1954, *Izvestia* of the Presidium of the Bulgarian People's Assembly published a decree by the Council of Ministers amending the Land Ownership Law. The particular section of the law now changed deals with property rights of "resettled" persons. Though the law does not specifically enumerate causes for such resettlement, it is presumed that some of the persons affected were moved from their old residences mainly for political reasons.

According to the new decree, all persons who have returned, or will return, to their former places of residence are now entitled to be reinstated in their old expropriated property. Thus the decree stipulates that: 1. all expropriated real estate is being returned to persons who were resettled on short notice either by a decision of the Council of Ministers or on the order of the Minister of the Interior; 2. the return of the property will be effected whether or not the

persons involved were compensated for their loss, although it appears that if they were given compensation, it will now automatically revert to the State; 3. old expropriations and former compensations are therefore cancelled. The decree further stipulates that "anyone who has not returned to his old residence by December 31, 1954, will be entitled to compensation only if he was given no replacement for the lost property when resettled."

If the return of the property is impossible, the decree provides for "equivalent replacement" in either property or money. Payments will be made either by the Ministry of Finance or by the Public Institutions which received the property. The exact amount will be estimated by a Commission, "provided for in the regulations on the expropriation of the properties for State and public need."

This measure should be viewed in conjunction with the partial clemency granted political prisoners on the occasion of the ninth anniversary of the Communist coup, which was celebrated on September 9, 1953. No official decree has ever been published on the subject, but Chervenkov and other officials have repeatedly referred to the disbanding of some of the concentration camps and the return of former inmates to regular life. The new decree seems to indicate that, at the moment at least, the regime is willing to allow a number of these former enemies to regain some of their lost rights.

Housing Construction

To encourage cooperative and individual housing construction, the Bulgarian Council of Ministers has instructed the Investment Bank to grant loans up to 40,000 *leva*, with a 25 year mortgage, to workers, employees and members



Caption: How nice it was of the Commission to drop in to see me too.

Szpilki (Warsaw), April 4, 1954

of handicraft cooperatives. Published in *Rabotnichesko Delo* (Sofia) of April 4, 1954, the decree stipulates that the petitioner must have at least 30 percent of the demanded credit invested in private funds in the Bank. The loans should be granted not earlier than six months after the application is made. On all credits granted by the bank for housing construction prior to the effective date of this decision, as well as on those to be granted in the future, the bank will collect two percent interest, beginning January 1, 1954.

In order to fit construction to local needs and take advantage of local resources, the Ministry of Communal Economy and Public Works will have to prepare 20 types of sample drafts for both single and group house-building. To encourage the people to take advantage of the new measure, the decree stipulates that houses and other dwellings started or finished after the enactment of the new regulation are to be exempted from all taxes, duties and other fees levied in connection with the acquisition of blueprints, drafts, permits, etc., for a term of five years after their completion.

Based on this decision of the Ministerial Council, the Presidium of the National Assembly has issued a decree for encouragement and aid of cooperative and individual housing construction. According to this decree, People's Councils can make available land at their disposal for any amount of time against payment or free of charge. This would facilitate construction on State-owned grounds, subject, however, to approval by the Ministry of Communal Economy and Public Construction. Once permission has been granted and the grounds ceded, they become the private property of the house builder or builders.

The present Ministerial decree is actually an extension of a decree of March 1952 on Reconstruction of the Banking System (*Rabotnichesko Delo*, March 4, 1952, dealing with loans for housing construction) and of a decree of November 26, 1951 (*Izvestia* of the Presidium of the National Assembly on December 4, 1951). According to these decrees, loans were granted for a period of 15 years to an amount of 10,000 *leva* (250,000 old *leva*) and interests were calculated according to the usual bank tariffs. The new decree increases the amount fourfold, extends the period of the loans to 25 years and reduces the interest.



Caption: The Director is I.

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The new measure is plainly calculated to improve the desperate urban housing situation that has arisen as a result of the great influx of peasants into industry, the negligible government investment in housing development, and the acute shortage of building materials. To remedy these conditions, a beginning was made when capital investment in housing construction was more than tripled in the Second Five Year Plan as compared to the first plan. Government action, however, was bound to be slow, clumsy and expensive; to do the job well and fast, the regime is now trying to tap private initiative.

The Shape of Things to Come

Polish newspapers omitted this comment made by Hilary Minc, chairman of the Polish State Economic Planning Commission, in reprints of his speech to the Party Congress on March 13. But Radio Warsaw had quoted Minc as saying:

"Yesterday we had tea in the Presidium. Needless to say, the tea was served in cups with saucers. Although I am no expert in geometry, I do know that normally saucers are either oval or round, or anyway have some shape. But even Euclid would not have known what the shape of my saucer was supposed to be. We looked at it and saw that it was marked, in English, 'Made in Poland.' Since neither the home nor the foreign market would accept such rubbish, they had decided to issue it to the government. I would like to say that the government's need for this kind of produce is very limited, and that this method of maintaining production output cannot be continued as a long-term policy. . . ."

Recent and Related

The Century of Total War, by Raymond Aron (*Doubleday: \$5.00*). The polarization of international forces, which has led to the Great Power line-up—USA vs. USSR—of today, is analyzed in this study of events from Sarajevo to Panmunjon by a prominent French political thinker. The question raised by this book: is the cold war a preparation, or is it a substitute, for total war, in this "century of total war"?

The Peoples of the Soviet Far East, by Walter Kolarz (*Praeger: \$4.50*). This detailed study of Soviet policy toward the non-Russian peoples of the Soviet Far East shows how satellite "nations" are made and ruled by the USSR acting as "a European colonial power in the worst old-fashioned sense of the term." The annihilation of each group's mores, religion, and ethnic identity—through cultural Russification, migration to these regions by Russian settlers, and political persecution of all "bourgeois nationalists"—is seen as the aim and consequence of this totalitarian colonialism.

The Threat of Soviet Imperialism, edited by C. Groves Haines (*Johns Hopkins: \$5.00*). Twenty experts present their views on every facet—military, economic, scientific and ideological—of the Soviet machine, and point to the practical steps we can take in these fields to match its strengths and capitalize on the weaknesses.

A Study of Bolshevism, by Nathan Leites (*Free Press: \$6.50*). A study of the concepts of political strategy (the "operational code") contained in Bolshevik doctrine, based on an analysis of the entire recorded verbal production of Stalin and Lenin. The author's purpose is to codify patterns underlying concrete moves made by Soviet leaders in specific situations, in order to enable Western policy-makers to anticipate, and to understand, future moves in top-level Soviet activity.

Economic Survey of Europe in 1953 (*United Nations: \$2.50*). Part II covers the Soviet Union (Chapter 3) and Eastern Europe (Chapter 4), with charts and tables.

Unwilling Journey: A Diary from Russia, by Helmut Gollwitzer (*Muhlenberg: \$3.50*). The account of a German Protestant minister who spent four and a half years in a forced labor battalion as a prisoner of war in the Soviet Union. While confirming the record of hunger, exploitation and brutality, Pastor Gollwitzer takes a generous view of the Russian people, expressing gratitude to those who went out of their way to help the suffering prisoners, and attributing the ruthlessness of others to the extreme poverty and pressure under which they live. Convinced of Hitler's criminality long before the defeat, the author tells frankly of his spiritual struggle to see whether Christianity and Marxism could be reconciled, which he finally abandoned on the basis of what he saw around him in the Marxist Motherland.

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